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ABSTRACT
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Policy Regimes and Population Health: Assessing
Causal Loops
Stephanie J. Frisbee, M.Sc, M.A.
Tobacco products remain among the most controversial consumer products of all time:
cigarettes are the only legal product that, when used as intended, are lethal. The global and
individual burden attributable to the primary use of tobacco, or secondary or tertiary exposure to
cigarette smoke, whether measured by morbidity, mortality, or economic costs, is substantial.
With the combined efforts of scientific research, public health and policy advocates, the image
and use of tobacco products has undergone profound change. However, while much has been
achieved regarding the attitudinal, behavioral, and policy changes needed to diminish the
individual, social, and economic costs of tobacco use, much remains to be yet accomplished if
these adverse tobacco use impacts are to be further curtailed. There is considerable evidence
that tobacco use is becoming highly concentrated in lower socio-economic groups and that the
rate of decline in smoking is slowing.

Further, as the tobacco epidemic emerges in the

developing world, there is considerable interest ine applying the lessons learned in
industrialized countries to developing countries, thereby truncating the tobacco epidemic and
forgoing some of the enormous costs in countries least able to absorb such costs.
The unifying theme of the present work is an integration of the public health and political
science perspectives on tobacco control so as to establish a more comprehensive framework of
the underlying factors and elements interrelating tobacco use and tobacco control policy. A
substantial challenge in developing such a framework is the complexity of the relationship
between the two primary outcomes of interest. The relationships, including interdependencies
and feedback mechanisms, are much more accurately characterized by a causal loop. This
work presents an overview of the tobacco epidemic, a review of two very different literatures
with different perspectives on the tobacco epidemic (public health literature and political and
policy science), an empirical policy history analysis integrating the political and policy science
viewpoint with the public health perspective on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic, and two
quantitative analyses alternately supporting the interdependence and complex temporal
relationship between tobacco control policy adoption and population health outcomes as well as
the importance of societally-derived factors. An integrated conceptual model based on the
causal loops of tobacco control policy and tobacco-related population health is then presented

that incorporates the realms of population, governmental, judicial, public health, tobacco
industry and other subsystems, and scientific communities. However, while this framework
does assimilate the key elements and forces elucidated during the course of this work and
integrates the political and policy science with the public health perspective, in truth this
framework likely elicits more questions than it answers. The research questions and agendas
and metrics proposed highlight both the strengths and deficiencies of the two perspectives.
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1

INTRODUCTION
Tobacco products remain among the most controversial consumer products of all time.

As many others have previously highlighted, cigarettes are the only legal product that, when
used as intended, are lethal. Alternately stated, there is no safe level of exposure to tobacco,
tobacco smoke, or tobacco smoke particles. [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of the Surgeon General, 2006] Further, the global and individual burden attributable to
the primary use of tobacco, or secondary or tertiary exposure to cigarette smoke, whether
measured by morbidity, mortality, or economic costs, is substantial. Smoking has been causally
linked to multiple cancers, coronary heart disease, stroke, obstructive lung diseases, infertility,
and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]
Exposure to secondhand smoke, also called “passive smoking” or environmental tobacco
smoke, is causally linked to heart disease and cancer, and, in children, ear infections,
exacerbation of asthma and other respiratory symptoms and infections, and increased risk for
SIDS. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010] Additionally, recent reports have
documented that residual tobacco smoke on surfaces, including clothing, furniture, vehicle
surfaces, and skin, reacts with ambient nitrous acid to form carcinogenic substances, resulting
in yet another exposure route, a “third-hand” route, to the deleterious effects of tobacco
products. [Sleiman, Gundel, Pankow, Jacob, Singer, & Destaillats, 2010] In the United States, it
is estimated that each pack of cigarettes sold represents a $10.47 loss in direct (medical care)
and indirect (productivity) costs and that there are 5.1 million years of potential life lost annually
due to cigarette smoking. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] From 2000-2004,
the total economic losses in the United States attributable to cigarette smoking were $193 billion
($96 billion direct medical expenses, and $97 billion in indirect lost productivity). [Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]

Further, annual mortality in the United States

attributable to smoking is estimated at 443,000, including almost 50,000 deaths annually from
secondhand smoke. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] Globally, the World
Health Organization estimates that tobacco causes 5 million deaths annually and, by 2030, the
annual tobacco-attributable mortality will climb to 8 million annually, resulting in one billion
cumulative deaths in the 21st century. [World Health Organization, 2008] More notably, of the
1.1 billion people worldwide who currently smoke, 80% live in low- and middle-income countries
and these same low- and middle-income countries are projected to experience more than 70%
of the predicted one billion 21st century cigarette-related deaths. [Jha, 2009] Thus, tobacco is
amongst the leaders in global all-cause mortality, is most assuredly the leading cause of
[1]

preventable death [World Health Organization, 2008], and is increasingly a barrier to
overcoming health disparities both within and between countries.
The nature and magnitude of the adverse health, economic, and societal effects of
tobacco have emerged through the efforts of almost a century of scientific research. Combined
with the efforts of public health and policy advocates, the image and use of tobacco products
has undergone profound change. Starting with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the U.S.
government (Department of Agriculture) provided price supports for tobacco farmers in
exchange for agreed-upon acreage and production quotas. Further, in a practice that started in
World War I and continued until the 1975, the U.S. military distributed cigarettes as part of
rations for military personnel (formal military tobacco control efforts did not begin until 1986).
[Smith & Malone, 2009] Thus, in the 1950s tobacco in general and cigarettes specifically were
widely used and accepted products, promoted and endorsed by physicians and the government
alike. However, there has been a monumental paradigm shift in the perception, regulation, and
use of these products in the last half century such that these products have become
marginalized, if not de-normalized. While comparative data prior to 1960 are difficult to obtain,
Figure 1-1 demonstrates the substantial decline in smoking prevalence in OECD countries since
the middle of the 20th century. Whereas in many countries half or almost half of their population
were daily smokers in 1960, by the start of the 21st century the vast majority of OECD countries

% of Total Population (Age 15+Years) Smoking Daily

Figure 1-1. Population Smoking Prevalence in OECD Countries, 1960-2009
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had halved that – i.e., ≤25% of the total population were daily smokers – and the prevalence of
daily smokers continues to decline. Further, though also with the caveat that comparative or
standardized data are not readily available, surveys from the Gallup., Inc.® have reported that in
1999, 92% of Americans believed that smoking caused lung cancer [Morales, L; Gallup, Inc.,
2008], that 56% of adults in 2008 thought that secondhand smoke was harmful compared to
36% in 1995 [Morales, L; Gallup, Inc., 2008], and that 54% of adults in 2005 supported smoking
bans in restaurants compared to 17% in 1987. [Moore, D W; Gallup, Inc., 2005]. Further still,
the United States has developed and implemented what is regarded as one of the most
restrictive tobacco control policy regimes in the world today. [Studlar, 2010]
This paradigm shift in attitudes, behavior, and policy has been achieved through multidisciplinary efforts sustained over multiple generations. Basic and population (epidemiology)
sciences have identified the causal biologic mechanisms for tobacco-related morbidity and
mortality as well as the social burden of tobacco use. Public health scientists, including health
economists, have developed and quantified the effectiveness of various tobacco prevention and
abatement strategies.

Psychologists and medical professionals have contributed to the

understanding of effective strategies to change individual attitudes and behaviors, including the
treatment of nicotine addiction. Sociologists have documented changes in the social dynamics
and perceptions of smoking, the tobacco industry, and the responsibility of government to
delineate and protect the rights of individuals from the harmful effects of tobacco. And finally,
political scientists have studied and reported on how various political structures, forces, and
dynamics shape and affect the adoption of tobacco control policies. That is, this sustained,
multidisciplinary effort has been, though perhaps unintentionally, Heclo’s “CODA” – the
combination of both case study and programmatic analysis contributing to analytic realism.
[Heclo, 1972]
However, while much has been achieved in the United States and other industrialized
countries regarding the attitudinal, behavioral, and policy changes needed to diminish the
individual, social, and economic costs of tobacco use, much remains to be yet accomplished if
these adverse tobacco use impacts are to be further curtailed. The fact remains that, despite
decades of effort and advocacy, tobacco use still places an enormous burden on societies. The
most recent estimates from the CDC attest to this: 46.6 million Americans are current smokers
and an additional 88 million, including 54% of children 3-11 years of age, are exposed to
secondhand smoke; and there continue to be approximately 443,000 tobacco-attributable
deaths and 8.6 million tobacco-related illnesses annually. [Centers for Disease Control and
[3]

Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on
Smoking and Health, 2010] Additionally, estimates have suggested that smoking-attributable
expenses averaged 11% of state Medicaid expenditures, or a total of $22 billion nationwide, in
2004 [Armour, Finkelstein, & Fielbelkorn, 2009], and that between 1995–2015 tobacco-related
Medicare expenses will be $800 billion. [Department of Health and Human Serivces, Centers for
Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2010] Further, there is considerable evidence that tobacco
use is becoming highly concentrated in lower socio-economic groups (smoking prevalence is
approximately 25% in those with a high school education or less, or 50% of all current smokers,
compared to 6% in those with a graduate degree), and that the rate of decline in smoking is
slowing (the smoking prevalence in the U.S. was estimated at 20.9% in 2005 and 20.6% in
2009; in high school students, between 1999-2003 smoking prevalence declined from 36% to
22%, but between 2003-2009 declined from 22% to 20%), both of which are disquieting trends.
[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention
and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, 2010] Stated more starkly, it is likely that
the next 10% of smoking prevalence will be more difficult and intransigent to eliminate than the
previous 10% of population smoking prevalence as tobacco use becomes socially and politically
entrenched in socioeconomic and geo-demographic clusters that are traditionally more difficult
to reach and less responsive to conventional health promotion and health education messages
and public health policy arguments. Counter-acting the decline in the gains from public health
advocacy and policy change efforts will require an increase in the efficiency of these efforts –
not necessarily of the endorsed programmatic or policy solutions themselves, but of the efforts
to enact these evidence-based programs and policies. Thus, increasing the efficiency of these
programmatic and policy enactment efforts will implicitly require a much clearer and more
precise understanding of the factors that will facilitate (or impede) a given jurisdiction in the
adoption of strategies to reduce smoking prevalence and consumption, including the
implementation of comprehensive tobacco control policies.
Neither the changing nature of the challenge [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on
Smoking and Health, 2010], [Tynan, et al., 2010], [Mendez, 2010] nor the need to adjust the
approach to policy change have gone unnoticed by the public health community. In particular,
two approaches are being advanced within the public health community: the need to take a
more systems-based approach to tobacco control; and the need to develop a more

[4]

sophisticated understanding of (and approach to) the political side of tobacco control policy
enactment.
“Systems” approaches are not new. In political science, for example, David Easton,
whose scholarship began in the 1950s, is generally regarded as a pioneer in the development of
a comprehensive (“systems”) approach to the study of political systems. (E.g., [Easton, 1957])
The application of such systematic approaches is, however, relatively recent in the biomedical
sciences, including public health, disciplines which, by their nature and tradition, tend towards
focus on hypothesis-driven, reductionist research questions designed to identify specific
mechanisms (or risks). In public health, with its close relationship to and shared origin with
epidemiology, such an approach has often (though not always) translated into research and
policy solutions targeted at changing individual behavior. However, in a post-epidemiologic
transition era where societal burdens of disease increasingly come from chronic, not acute,
illnesses, individually-based

methods,

particularly

when

absent consideration

of

the

environments in which such individual behaviors are occurring, have much less impact on
improving the public’s health. [McKinlay & Marceau, 2000] As a recent editorial in the American
Journal of Public Health observed,
“Systems modeling has been gaining increasing acceptance among the
public health community, which is recognizing its value in addressing the
complex nature of problems that affect the health of the population.”
From: [Mendez, 2010]
In tobacco control, a concerted – and federally (NIH) initiated -- effort to develop a
focused research effort on systems approaches to tobacco control was prompted by the
“Initiative on the Study and Implementation of Systems”, and particularly the National Cancer
Institute publication Greater than the Sum: Systems Thinking in Tobacco Control in 2007. [Best,
et al., 2006], [National Cancer Institute, 2007] The stated purpose of these efforts have been to
identify feedback loops between components within the system [Mabry, Marcus, Clark,
Leischow, & Mendez, 2010], and
“Is it possible to understand the interplay of factors that both sustain and
potentially disrupt tobacco use?” and “What structures and functions are
essential for both understanding that complexity and improving our efforts
in tobacco control?”
From: [Marcus, Leischow, Mabry, & Clark, 2010]
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In further support of the effort to encourage a systems-based approach to tobacco
control policy research, the full issue of the July 2010 American Journal of Public Health was
dedicated to studies using a systems framework to investigate various aspects of tobacco
control including adolescent smoking, cessation, diffusion of policies and adoption of the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and social networks among others. Episodes such
as these federally-sponsored initiatives and editorial foci highlight the growing recognition of the
importance of and need for systematic approaches to understanding the elements and factors,
and how they relate and interact, that affect both tobacco use and tobacco control policy.
The second of the approaches being advanced as necessary to improve the efficiency of
tobacco control efforts is the development of a more sophisticated command of the political side
of tobacco control policy enactment.

The public health community has been criticized by

members of its own as well as the policy science establishment for what is interpreted as a
deficient understanding, acknowledgment, or willingness to work within (or a combination of all
three) the political system that ultimately enacts policy.

From within the public health

community, the failure of the McCain Bill in 1998 has been forwarded as an exemplary
illustration of these deficiencies in the public health community. [McKinlay & Marceau, 2000],
[McKinlay & Marceau, 2000] It is not unreasonable to postulate that some of this perceived
inability to master the political aspects of tobacco control stems from elementary principles of
the discipline of public health, particularly the emphasis of and reliance on science and scientific
evidence for the development of evidence-based policies. In contrast, the political system and
the policy process has been described as,
“…the culture of politics where policy development is not linear but highly
contingent, often unpredictable, and dependent upon convincing people to
recognize the existence of a problem and the best way to resolve it.
Outcomes result from building majorities, not from scientific expertise.”
From: [Rudder & Fritschler, 2009]
As alternately stated by others, public health is ultimately a political issue:
“Science can identify solutions to pressing health problems, but only
politics can turn most of those solutions into reality.”
From: [Oliver, 2006]
That the “best” (“evidence-based”) policy solutions become compromised during the policy –
and political – process is often viewed with disbelief in the public health community, and
antithetical to the rationally-based scientific process at the core of much of public health. As has
[6]

been previously described, the response from the public health community to the long delays in
enacting evidence-based policy, or outright policy failures (e.g., the McCain Bill defeat by Motion
of Cloture in 1998) has not been to engage in the compromising, bargaining, or power-sharing
aspect of the political process, but rather to re-frame the issue into starkly “good” vs. “evil” terms
and as a “war” against the tobacco industry with smokers (and those exposed to secondhand
smoke) its victims. [Larsen, 2008] An archetypal example of this stance is articulated in the
recent Government of Ontario’s 2011-2016 tobacco control strategy which, in addition to having
as its vision “a tobacco-free Ontario by 2030”, states,
“Treating the tobacco as a “normal” legitimate industry undermines the
efforts by the government and health organizations to safeguard the health
of Ontarians from tobacco products….The tobacco industry should not be
considered either normal or legitimate. The government of Ontario’s new
strategy needs to incorporate a plan of action for de-normalization and delegitimizing the industry.”
From: [Ontario Tobacco Strategy Advisory Group, 2010]
And,
“The tobacco industry tries to frame the problem of tobacco use as “a
consumer choice.” This could not be further from the truth. The addiction
to tobacco takes away any choice the consumer has to not use tobacco
products.”
From: [Ontario Tobacco Strategy Advisory Group, 2010]
This strategy has been characterized by some as being anti-political – beyond the scope of
normal politics because one of the participants is corrupt, illegitimate, or beyond moral reach –
implying that the public health community, by its choice of framing of tobacco use and the
tobacco industry, is necessarily disqualifying the democratic process itself and the possibility
that,
“…they can ignore how citizens might want to set the limits of public health
intervention.”
From: [Larsen, 2008]
That is, despite calls from within the public health community itself to develop competencies and
strategies so as to engage the democratic, political process [McKinlay & Marceau, 2000], [Milio,
1985], [Oliver, 2006], the public health community continues with a strategy that likely so
precludes such engagement.
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Thus, in synthesizing these two lines of reasoning, a framework that combines the social
process of tobacco use as well as the political and policy processes of tobacco control and
policy implementation is sought. A comprehensive – “systematic” – framework must necessarily
combine the public health perspective, with its focus on in science-based arguments and
development of evidence-base policies and emphasis on the outcome of reductions in smoking
prevalence, and the political science perspective, with its focus on understanding the elements
of the policy process and using policy process theories to explain the policy adoption and
emphasis on the outcome of policy adoption. Interestingly, despite the longstanding tobacco
control efforts, it has been observed that,
“…it is remarkable how underdeveloped the interaction between the two
regimes really is.”
From: [Larsen, 2008]
That is, this is an area ripe for both conceptual and quantitative development which the present
work, in parts, attempts to address.
1.1

Purpose and Outline of the Present Work
The unifying theme of the present work is an integration of the public health and political

science perspectives on tobacco control so as to establish a more comprehensive framework of
the underlying factors and elements interrelating tobacco use (outcome of prevalence) and
tobacco control policy (outcome of policy adoption). A substantial challenge in developing such
a comprehensive framework, however, it is the complexity of the relationship between the two
primary outcomes of interest – tobacco use (prevalence) and policy adoption. There is both
conceptual [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004] and quantitative [Chaloupka & Saffer, 1992] evidence
that the causal relationship between these two outcomes is neither unidirectional nor linear.
“Factors other than government policy – especially shifts in social norms –
have influenced that decline, but those norms have themselves been
directly and indirectly influenced by government policies. In short, tobacco
consumption has become, in part, a political outcome….These respective
tobacco-control regimes emerge as largely consistent with broader public
attitudes about the importance of health and “well-being,” but we have less
confidence about whether such attitudes influence the development of
control legislation, or if the direction of causation is reversed.”
From: [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004]
That is, the relationships, including interdependencies and feedback mechanisms, are much
more accurately characterized by a causal loop.
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Figure 1-2. Initial Conceptualization of a Comprehensive Framework Illustrating a Causal-Loop Relationship
Between the Social and Political Factors of Tobacco Control

Policy Process

Population
(Social System)

Government
(Policy System)

Social Process

As a starting point, then, a comprehensive framework can initially be conceptualized as
shown in Figure 1-2. What remains is identifying the elements within this causal loop and
establishing a better understanding of the nature of these causal loop associations between the
social and political forces influencing tobacco control. Thus, the conceptualization represented
in Figure 1-2 will be re-visited at the end of the present work after an examination of the tobacco
epidemic from both the public health and political science perspectives, and primary
investigations into the nature of the associations between elements of this causal loop diagram.
Broadly, then, the research questions posed by the present work are:
R1: What are the fundamental elements that are part of this causal loop diagram?
R2: What is the nature of the relationship between tobacco control policies and tobacco
control policy regimes and tobacco-related population health?
R3: What are the research questions that arise from this causal loop model?
While central-level tobacco use and tobacco control policy in the United States is the primary
focus of the current work, it would be detrimental to exclude valuable information from statelevel and / or international (mostly industrialized countries) activities and studies, and thus these
will be included as appropriate to increase both the rigor and generalizability of the current work.
To address these research questions, the present study will follow the course of study outlined
below.
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•

The tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world will be described in overview.
Specifically, two models that describe the tobacco epidemic model will be detailed.
The current state of the tobacco epidemic and tobacco control policies in the United
States will also be described, including both the current smoking prevalence as well
as the current, relevant tobacco control policies.

•

The tobacco control literature will be reviewed from the public health perspective.
This review will include: defining tobacco control policies and tobacco control policy
regimes; the current understanding of “best practices”, or “evidence-based, in
tobacco control policies; a description of ongoing coordinated, international efforts to
combat the global tobacco epidemic and enact these “best practices” tobacco control
policies; and the universal and emerging challenges facing tobacco control activities
will be identified and briefly discussed.

•

The tobacco control literature will be reviewed from the policy science perspective.
This review will include: how theories of the policy process, especially the agendasetting theories (Multiple Streams Framework, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, and
the Advocacy Coalition Framework), have been applied to explain tobacco control
policy adoption and evolution; tobacco control policy adoption as explained by
theories of policy learning, diffusion, transfer, conversion, and networks; the impact
of social change, including elements of issue framing, on tobacco control policy
adoption; the importance of policy type (typology) on tobacco control policy; the
influence of institutions and institutionalism on tobacco control policy adoption; the
role of scientific communities and experts in the development and adoption of
tobacco control policy; and, finally, how the courts and legal proceedings have
influenced on tobacco control policy.

•

An investigative policy history analysis will be conducted on the evolution of tobacco
control policy in the United States.

This policy analysis will use Heclo’s ideas-

interests-institutions framework. [Heclo H. , 1994]
•

Two quantitative investigations will be presented, one based on the U.S. states and
the second in the European Union, interrogating factors influencing tobacco control
policy adoption.

•

Finally, the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1-2 will be re-visited. The
findings from the previous chapters, both the reviews of literature and the empirical
chapters, will be integrated and the elements of the framework expanded and the
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framework itself refined. Subsequent research questions arising from this framework
will be discussed.
Acquiring a better understanding the elements of and relationship between the elements in
this causal loop is important, from the political and policy science perspective, because of how
this knowledge will broaden a generalizable understanding of the policy process in other policy
areas. From the public health perspective, acquiring a better understanding the elements of
and relationship between the elements in this causal loop is important if efforts to combat the
tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world are to become more efficient.

Of additional

importance though not the direct purpose of the present work, if the lessons learned about
combating the tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world are to be efficiently and effectively
transferred to the developing world thereby averting much of the tobacco epidemic, which is the
implicit focus of public health efforts such as the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
among others, a more precisely calibrated understanding of the factors causally affecting
tobacco control policy adoption is needed.
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2

AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC

2.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to simply provide an overview of the tobacco epidemic in the

industrialized world. Two models that describe the tobacco epidemic model will be detailed.
Additionally, the current state of the tobacco epidemic and tobacco control policies in the United
States will be described, including both the current smoking prevalence as well as the current,
relevant tobacco control policies.
2.2

Models for Characterizing the Tobacco Epidemic in the Industrialized World
The tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world has evolved over the last 60+ years,

during which time tobacco evolved from a widely used and little regulated product to one that is
now used by less than a quarter of the American population and is highly regulated. It is not
surprising, then, that models developed to characterize the tobacco epidemic have developed
stages based on chronologic demarcations in public health parameters and policy approaches.
Two models based on the historic evolution of the tobacco epidemic in the United States and
other industrialized countries, the Phases of Tobacco Control model and the Tobacco Epidemic
Model, are described below.
2.2.1

The Phases of Tobacco Control Model
The Phases of Tobacco Control is a six-stage model that demarcates the tobacco

epidemic based on the type of tobacco control policy regime. [Studlar, 2002], [Studlar, 2008]
The six phases are outlined in Table 1-2.
In Phase I, cigarettes in particular evolved rapidly from a niche product to a much more
widely used consumer product due to the development of the automatic cigarette making
machine and its subsequent widespread use by James B. Duke, the portable safety match,
reliable packaging, and extensive advertising. The U.S. federal government did not pursue any
restrictive policies, rather deferring action, if any, to the states. Tobacco products were the
Table 2-1. Phases of Tobacco Control Model
Phase

Tim efram e

Title/Description

Phase I

1884-1914

Consolodation of the Cigarette Industry and Early Controversies

Phase II

1914-1950

Era of Good Feeling; Cigarettes Promoted by Governments

Phase III

1950-1964

The Gathering Storm of Health Concerns

Phase IV

1964-1984

Regulatory Hesitancy

Phase V

1984-2008

Tobacco as Social Menace

Phase VI

The Future

Neoprohibitionism versus harm reduction?

Source: [Studlar, 2008]
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target of some temperance movements and some states enacted product bans, though most
states did not implement any restrictive policies.
The second phase, encompassing both World Wars, marked a substantial expansion in
the use of cigarettes. Cigarettes were regarded as the lesser of three moral sins available to
troops (the other two being alcohol and prostitution) and so their use was promoted by the
government.

Thus, cigarettes acquired a de facto image of being patriotic and socially

acceptable.
In the third phase, credible scientific evidence began to emerge that raised concern
about deleterious health effects, particularly lung cancer. Some popular media outlets began to
cover these stories and additional research was supported by private organizations such as the
American Cancer Society.

Despite the mounting evidence however, government policy

remained lax, with few restrictions and some, but not substantial, taxation.
In the fourth phase, a series of government-sponsored reports were published from
multiple countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada, and culminated in the 1964 U.S.
Surgeon General’s Report. [U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964] These
reports served to review the scientific evidence linking tobacco to adverse health outcomes and
then to affirm and endorse that tobacco caused various diseases and even mortality. Thus,
while the tobacco industry could discredit and so deflect the conclusions of individual studies,
this task became much more difficult when it was the position of multiple governments that the
cumulative evidence supported that tobacco caused cancer, among other diseases (though this
did not deter them from so trying). Despite these now-endorsed scientifically-based positions,
government policy to reduce tobacco consumption and smoking prevalence remained largely
impotent.

While some package labeling requirements were enacted, lax federal taxation

policies (which were not increased between 1951 and 1982) resulted in cigarettes becoming
more affordable over time. It was not until the early 1980s and the publication of several
exposé-type books and articles in the popular media that the course in both public opinion and
policy finally began to change.
In the fifth phase, scientific evidence regarding the health hazards of secondhand smoke
as well as the addictiveness of nicotine changed the tone of the public and policy discourse.
More, increasingly restrictive tobacco control policies were enacted and social attitudes toward
both smoking and the tobacco industry became increasingly negative. This phase also saw
multiple, additional Surgeon General’s reports, increased legal activity directed against tobacco
[13]

companies, including that by the state Attorneys General, and the Master Settlement
Agreement.
The sixth and final phase, with yet to be determined activities and results, foreshadows
the looming challenge for tobacco control activists pursuant to alternate and so called “reduced
risk” tobacco products, products that tobacco companies are increasingly developing as
smoking prevalence (and industry revenues) in industrialized countries continue to decline.
2.2.2

The Tobacco Epidemic Model
The Tobacco Epidemic Model was proposed based on the study of the historic patterns

in five key metrics of the tobacco epidemic (smoking prevalence, cigarette consumption, lung
cancer rates, smoking attributable death, and tobacco control activities) in industrialized
countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. [Lopez, Collishaw, &
Piha, 1994] The characteristics of each stage of the Tobacco Epidemic model, based on these
five metrics, are described in Table 2-2.
In Stage I, male and female smoking prevalence starts at very low levels but begins to rise
rapidly though few, if any, tobacco related deaths are evident.

In Stage II, male smoking

Table 2-2. The Tobacco Epidemic Model
Stage I
General
Characterization
Prevalence (Male)
Prevalence (Fem ale)

Consum ption

Lung Cancer Rate
(Male)
Lung Cancer Rate
(Fem ale)
Sm oking Mortality
(Male)
Sm oking Mortality
(Fem ale)

Policy

Duration

Stage II

The beginning

Expansion to w idespread use

Low (<15%) in early stage but rising
rapidly in atter stage
Very low due to traditional sociocultural factors (<5%-10%)

May reach 50%-80%

Low (<500 cigs/person/year)

1000-3000 cigs/person/year

Rare

Rapid rise from 5/100,000 to
50/100,000
≈8-10/100,000

Rare

Lags male prevalence, but rises
rapidly

Stage III
Beginning of both abatement and the
"real" health consequences
Peaks in early stage (often at ≈60%)
then declines in latter stage to ≈40%
Peaks in mid-stage (often at ≈35%45%) and then decreases to a period
of long plateau; distribution of female
smoking typically highly skew ed,w ith
much higher prevalence in younger
w omen (often ≈40%-50%) but much
low er in older w omen (often <10%)
3000-4000 cigs/person/year in males
and 1000-2000 cigs/person/year in
females
Peak in latter stage at ≈110120/100,000
25-30/100,000

Stage IV
Decline and denormalization
Continues to decline, though slow ly
Continues to decline, though slow ly

Not specified

Rates decline, possibly as much as
20% from their peak
Not specified

Not yet evident in early stage, but a
By latter stage, ≈10% of all-cause
few cases emerging tow ard the latter mortality is attributable to smoking
stage
Not yet evident
Still very low

Rapid rise to latter stage w hen 25%30% of all-cause mortality is
attributable to smoking
Low but rising to latter stage w hen
≈5% of all-cause mortality is
attributable to smoking

Peaks early in stage often at ≈30%35% of all-cause mortality, then
progressively declines
Rises rapidly during this stage, though
its eventual peak depends upon the
peak in female smoking prevalence; 23 decades into stage the eventual
peak could reach ≈20%-25% of allcause mortality then begin to decline

No control policies; agricultural
support policies likely

Control activities sporadic and not w ell
developed; lack of public and political
support in part due to yet poorly
understood risks

Conditions for control policies become
more favorable; smoke free public
places and transportation are among
the first enacted but smoke-free
w orkplaces not yet common; media
important in enacting policies; smoking
is becoming socially not as acceptable

≈20 years

≈20-30 years

≈20-30 years

Increased "demand" for legislation that
provides for smoke-free personal
environments; policies needed to
support nicotine-addicted smokers
w ho w ant to quit; social differences in
smoking prevalence persist; continued
changes in social climate need to be
supported
20+ years

Source: [Lopez, Collishaw, & Piha, 1994]
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prevalence rises rapidly and reaches levels far higher than that for females, reaching as high as
50%-80% of the male population. By the end of this stage, tobacco-attributable illness and
deaths rise rapidly, accounting for 10% of all male deaths. Tobacco control activities in this
stage are poorly developed, if present at all, and cessation and cessation support activities are
uncommon. In Stage III, the prevalence of male smoking peaks and then begins to decline.
The prevalence of female smoking plateaus later in this stage and then also begins to decline,
though smoking prevalence among younger women can reach levels close to that of males.
Knowledge of smoking health hazards becomes more widespread, yet because of the latency
between exposure and tobacco-related illness and death, during this stage the incidence and
prevalence of tobacco-attributable disease continues to rise rapidly and peaks at 25%-30% of
male mortality, with tobacco-proportionate mortality even higher in the middle-age groups.
However, as knowledge of smoking hazards spreads, the receptivity for tobacco control
increases and such activities become more organized and successful, and tobacco control
policies become more comprehensive. In Stage IV, the final stage of this epidemic model,
smoking prevalence for both genders continues to decline at slow but similar rates, but
smoking-attributable death rates remain high – 30%-35% of all female deaths and 40%-45% of
male deaths in middle age. While smoking-attributable male death rates begin to decline at the
latter phases of this stage, smoking-attributable female death rates continue to rise, reflective of
female smoking prevalence peaking after that for males. An important focus of tobacco control
activities becomes ensuring smoke-free environments, including smoke-free workplaces.
Likewise, smoking cessation efforts expand, though socio-economic differences in smoking
prevalence and smoking-attributable death continue.
Both the Phases of Tobacco Control and the Tobacco Epidemic Model are natural history
models based on the unfolding of the tobacco epidemic in the United States and Canada (the
former model, which, since its original introduction, has been updated to include most
industrialized democracies – see [Studlar, 2005], [Studlar, 2009]) and, more broadly,
industrialized countries that included the United States (the latter model). While the models
have a slightly different emphasis as the basis for differentiating between the different phases of
the epidemic, both models span the 100+ years over which the tobacco epidemic has unfolded
in industrialized countries.

Additionally, both models have in common that tobacco control

activities do not begin in earnest for at least 75 years after the beginning of the epidemic, a time
after which male smoking prevalence in particular has already peaked, often at more than half
of the male population, and thus when the consequences of decades of expanding and
unchecked smoking and subsequent lung cancer and other morbidities and smoking-attributable
[15]

mortality are first being felt. That is, in both models, tobacco control policies are enacted too
late to avoid the substantial individual and societal costs attributable to tobacco use. Avoiding
these costs, then, is contingent upon earlier enactment of tobacco control policies to shorten the
duration of model stages or avoid them altogether. Thus, the success of policy diffusion efforts
from the industrialized countries to developing countries, many of which are still early in the first
stages of the tobacco epidemic will be paramount if the enormous societal costs of tobacco use
in the developing countries, arguably those countries least able to absorb such avoidable costs,
are to be evaded.
2.3
2.3.1

The Tobacco Epidemic in the United States
A Brief History of the Evolution of the Tobacco Epidemic in the United States
The history of smoking prevalence in the United States is succinctly described in Figure

2-1. While smoking prevalence was not routinely and systematically prior to 1960 as it is now
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, it is estimated that smoking prevalence in
the United States was at or near 50% during the middle of the 20th century. As shown in Figure
2-1, smoking prevalence has steadily declined though it is noted that neither the proportion of
adult smokers or high school students reached the desired goals established as part of the
C.D.C.’s Healthy People 2010 initiative.

Figure 2-1. Trend in Prevalence of Current Smokers, Adults and High School Students, 1965-2007
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Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]
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2000

2010

With regard to the development of tobacco control policies, the competing interests and
balances in these policies have been those of the tobacco industry, including tobacco farmers
and others in hospitality industries, who have wanted as few restrictions as possible on the sale
and distribution of cigarettes and the indefinite continuation of agricultural supports for tobacco
farmers and international trade promotion for their products, and public health advocates, who
have wanted if not the outright ban of tobacco products, then substantial restrictions and
regulations on the sale, advertisement, and distribution of tobacco products with the objective
being the abatement of current and prevention of future societal harm and costs due to the
consumption of tobacco. In the U.S. federalist system, tobacco control policies have been part
of the decision agenda and implemented at multiple venues, including at the federal-, state-,
and local- levels. Central-level policy making can be grouped into four categories: legislation
Table 2-3. Federal Tobacco-Related Legislation, Enacted
Year

Title / Authority

Summary

1987

Public Law 100-202

• Provided provisions to prevent unfair and deceptive practices in commerce
• Act used multiple times to curtail misleading advertising and claims, especially on cigarette
packages
• Amended 1938
• Required a package warning label (“Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health”; other text/warning prohibited) but not a warning label on advertisement
• Required that the FTC and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to report to Congress
annually on cigarette advertising and promotion practices and the health consequences of
smoking, respectively
• Required new package warning (“Caution: The Surgeon General Has Determined that
Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health”; other text/warning prohibited)
• Prohibited cigarette advertising on television and radio
• Preempted states and localities from regulating or prohibiting cigarette advertising or promotion
for health reasons
• Banned little cigar advertising on television and radio
• Required rotating health warning labels on cigarette packages and advertisements (“Surgeon
General’s Warning: Smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may
complicate pregnancy”; “Surgeon General’s Warning: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces
serious risks to your health”; “Surgeon General’s Warning: Smoking by pregnant women may
result in fetal injury, premature birth, and low birth weight:; “Surgeon General’s Warning:
Cigarette smoke contains carbon monoxide”)
• Other text/warning labels were preempted
• Required DHHS to submit biennial reports on smoking and health
• Created the Federal Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health
• Required cigarette manufacturers to provide a brand-specific, confidential list of ingredients
• Designed to determine the feasibility of developing cigarettes less likely to ignite upholstery and
mattresses
• Required three rotating health warning labels and advertisements (“This product may cause
gum disease and tooth loss”; “This product may cause mouth cancer”; “This product is not a
safe alternative to cigarettes”
• Preempted other text/warning labels
• Prohibited advertising on television and radio
• Required DHHS and FTC to submit reports to Congress
• Required companies to submit a brand-specific, confidential list of ingredients, including
nicotine content
• Required DHHS to conduct a public information campaign on the health hazards of smokeless
tobacco
• Banned smoking on domestic air flights of 2 hours or less

1989

Public Law 101-164

• Banned smoking on domestic air flights of 6 hours or less

1992

Synar Amendment to the
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and
Mental Health Administration
(ADAMHA) Reorganization Act
of 1992
Pro-Children Act of 1994

• Required all states to adopt and enforce restrictions on sales of tobacco to minors

1914

Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act of 1914

1965

Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965

1969

Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969

1973
1984

Little Cigar Act of 1973
Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act of 1984

1984

Cigarette Safety Act of 1984

1986

Comprehensive Smokeless
Tobacco Health Education Act
of 1986

1994
2009

Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act of

• Required all federally-funded children’s services to become smoke-free
• Granted FDA authority to regulate tobacco products

Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]
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affecting the sale, distribution, or marketing of tobacco products; regulation affecting the sale,
distribution, or marketing of tobacco products; excise taxes on tobacco products; and policies
and programs affecting tobacco farmers.

In Tables 2-3 & 2-4, seminal federal legislation

affecting tobacco control is summarized. In Table 2-3, it can be seen that while there was some
limited-scope activity immediately following the 1964 Surgeon General’s report, it was not until
1984 that the first comprehensive, federal legislation was enacted. Further, it was not until 1992
with the Synar Amendment that there was a central-level policy to restrict tobacco sales to
children.
The information in Table 2-4 summarizes central-level legislation that either could have
been or was intentionally not extended to cigarettes or tobacco products resulting in “missed
opportunities” for tobacco control.

This information thus represents governmental “non-

Table 2-5. Federally-Enacted Legislation that was a “Missed Opportunity” for or Impeded Tobacco Control
Year
1960
1970
1972
1976
1976

Title / Authority
Federal Hazardous
Substances Labeling Act
(FHSA) of 1960
Controlled Substances Act of
1970
Consumer Product Safety Act
of 1972
Amendment to the Federal
Hazardous Substances
Labeling Act of 1960
Toxic Substances Act of 1976

Summary
• Authorized FDA to regulate hazardous substances
• In 1963, the FDA set forth its interpretation that tobacco did not meet criteria for “hazardous”
under the Act, pending the 1964 Surgeon General’s report
• Designed to prevent abuse of drugs, narcotics, and other addictive substances
• Specifically excluded tobacco from the definition of a “controlled substance”
• Transferred authority granted FDA under FHSA to the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC)
• Did not include tobacco or tobacco products in the definition of “consumer products”
• In response to a petition from the American Public Health Association to the CPSC requesting a
maximum level of tar in cigarettes (21 mg), Congress amended the FHSA to specifically
exclude tobacco and tobacco products being considered a “hazardous substance”
• Act to “regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury
to health or the environment”
• Tobacco or tobacco products not included in definition of “chemical substances”

Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]

Table 2-4. Federal Regulations Affecting Tobacco Products and Use
Year

Title / Authority

Summary

1967

FCC

1971

FCC

• Fairness Doctrine – attempted to ensure that coverage of controversial issues (in this case
cigarettes) by a broadcast station was balances and fair; required that stations broadcasting
cigarette commercials donate air time to anti-smoking messages
• Under the Fairness Doctrine, anti-smoking messages ended when cigarette advertising ended

1973

Civil Aeronautics Board

• Required no-smoking sections on all commercial air flights

1975

Department of Defense

• Discontinued cigarettes in K- and C-rations for soldiers and sailors

1987

DHHS

• Established smoke-free environment at all facilities

1992

FTC

1993

WIC (Congress)

• First enforcement action against Pinkerton Tobacco (under Comprehensive Smokeless
Tobacco Health Education Act) claiming that the Pinkerton logo appeared illegally during a
television broadcast
• Smoke-free environment at all facilities

1993

EPA

• Classified environmental tobacco smoke as a Class A carcinogen (known human carcinogen)

1994

OSHA

• Announced proposed legislation to prohibit smoking in workplaces, except in designated,
separately ventilated rooms
• Established smoke-free environment at all facilities

1994

Department of Defense

1995

President Clinton / FDA

1997

President Clinton/Executive
Order

• Announced planned regulations (by FDA) to restrict the sale, distribution, and marketing of
tobacco products, especially to minors
• Established smoke-free environments at all federal facilities

Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]
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decisions” in tobacco control policy.
Central-level regulations governing specific aspects of tobacco products or use are
summarized in Table 2-5. Of particular note is the Fairness Doctrine by the F.C.C., used to both
broadcast and then stop broadcasting anti-smoking messages on network television. Also, it
was not until 1997 that federal workplaces were declared to be smoke-free environments.
Federal excise taxes on cigarettes are summarized in Table 2-6. Since 1950, federal
excise taxes have undergone long periods of inactivity (no increases) resulting in extended time
during which the real price of cigarettes fell. There was a 30-year lag between the 1951 levy
and the subsequent increase in 1982 and, since then, federal excise taxes on cigarette have
been increased approximately every 10 years. The most recent increase, signed by President
Obama in 2009, raised the federal tax on a pack of cigarettes to $1.01. Combined with the most
recent information on state excise taxes [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010],
which in 2009 averaged $1.37 per pack, the “average” combined federal and state excise tax for
cigarettes in the United States is $2.38. As a comparison, in 2009 the Canadian federal excise
tax for cigarettes was CDN$1.70 per pack and an average provincial excise tax of CDN$3.43,
resulting an “average” combined federal and provincial excise tax of CDN$5.13 per pack. [Tran,
2009]
Finally, federal agricultural support programs for tobacco farmers are summarized in
Table 2-7. A comprehensive set of support programs including price supports, crop insurance,
and crop research and marketing began in 1933 under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.
[Womach, 2005] With the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004, these agricultural
support programs were discontinued and the Tobacco Transition Payment Program, created by
the 2004 Act, was implemented to support tobacco farmers in transition to a free market system
and will continue until 2014. [Farm Service Agency, 2005]

Table 2-6. Federal Excise Taxes on Cigarettes
Year

Title / Authority

Summary

1951

Revenue Act of 1951

• 8¢ per pack (from 7¢ per pack with the justification to help fund the Korean War)

1982

Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982
(P.L. 97-248)
Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1990 (P.L. 101-508)
Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-33)
Insurance Reauthorization Act
of 2009

• Increased to 16¢ per pack

1990
1997
2009

• Two-stage increase: on Jan. 1/1991 to 20¢ per pack and an additional 4¢ per pack increase (to
a total of 24¢ per pack) on Jan 1/1993
• Two stage increase: on Jan 1/2000 by 10¢ per pack to 34¢ per pack and an additional 5¢ per
pack to 39¢ per pack on Jan 1/2002
• Increase to $1.01 (from 39¢) per pack
• Revenue to be used to fund SCHIP health insurance program
• Increase originally proposed (to 84¢ per pack) to fund the 2007 reauthorization of the SCHIP
program, but the initial bill (HR 976) was vetoed by President Bush. The final bill (P.L. 110-173)
did re-authorize SCHIP but without an increase in tobacco taxes.

Source: [Talley, 2002]
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Table 2-7. Federal Agricultural Policies and Programs for Tobacco Farmers
Year

Title / Authority

1933

Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933

2004

Fair and Equitable Tobacco
Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108357)

Summary
• Administered through the US Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency
• In exchange for adhering to production quotas, tobacco farmers received price supports,
nonrecourse loans through the Commodity Credit Corporation
• Additional elements of support included federal crop insurance, tobacco inspection and grading,
tobacco research, and extension education among others
• Ended the tobacco support program (from the 1933 act)
• Quota owners and farm operators compensated for capital losses and loss of future support
(funded by a $9.6 billion over 10 years funded via an assessment on tobacco manufacturers
and importers

Source: [Womach, 2005], [Farm Service Agency, 2005]

2.3.2

Current Estimates of Smoking Related Population Health
Estimates from the C.D.C.’s National Health Interview Survey project that 20.6% of

adults were current smokers in 2008. [Dube, Asman, Malarcher, & Carabollo, 2009] As shown
in Figure 2-2, more men than women smoke and a socioeconomic gradient is apparent, with
substantially higher rates of smoking in those with fewer years of education compared to those
with graduate education, and those below the poverty line compared to those above the poverty
line. In youth, results from the C.D.C.’s 2007 Youth Risk Behavior Survey estimated that 8.1%
of high school students were current frequent smokers (smoked cigarettes on at least twenty of
the last thirty days), 20.0% were current smokers (smoked cigarettes on at least one of the last
thirty days), and 50.3% had ever tried cigarettes. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Office on Smoking and Health, Division of Adolescent and School Health, National Center for
Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion , 2008] As previously shown in Figure 2-1
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Figure 2-2. Adult Smoking Prevalence, United States, 2008

Source: [Dube, Asman, Malarcher, & Carabollo, 2009]
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and discussed in the Introduction, while adult smoking prevalence decreased from 42.4% in
1964 to 19.8% in 2007 and smoking in high school students decreased to 20% in 2007, the rate
of decline in smoking prevalence has slowed and neither rates are projected to reach the
Healthy People 2010 goals of 12% and 16% respectively. [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009]
Current adult and youth smoking prevalence and adult smoking-attributable mortality
rates for individual states are presented in Table 2-8. [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2010]

Utah (9.3%) followed by California (14.0%), New Jersey (14.8%), and

Maryland (14.9%) had the lowest proportion of adult current smokers in 2008 while Missouri
(25.0%), Kentucky (25.2%), Indiana (26.0%), and West Virginia (26.5%) has the highest
proportion of adult current smokers with West Virginia having almost 3-times (2.85) the
proportion of adult smokers compared to Utah. Utah also had the lowest proportion of youth
current smokers (6.5%) followed by Hawaii (6.8%), California (6.9%), and the District of
Columbia (7.2%).

Oklahoma (13.3%), Arkansas (14.5%), Wyoming (14.9%), and Kentucky

(15.9%) had the highest proportion of youth current smokers with Kentucky having almost 2.5times (2.45) the proportion of youth smokers compared to Utah. Similarly, Utah also had the
lowest smoking-attributable adult mortality rate (138.3 per 100,000) followed by Hawaii (167.6),
Minnesota (215.1), and North Dakota (225.0) while the highest levels of smoking-attributable
adult mortality rates were observed in Mississippi (333.6 per 100,000), Nevada (343.7), West
Virginia (344.3), and Kentucky (370.6) with Kentucky again having almost 3-times (2.68) the
smoking-attributable mortality rate of Utah.
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To provide comparison and international perspective, the smoking prevalence in
O.E.C.D. countries, averaged over 2004-2006 where data were available, is shown in Figure 23. During this time period, only Sweden had a lower proportion of its population aged 15+ years
who smoked daily – 15.5% in Sweden compared to 16.9% in the United States. Six of twentyseven countries reported that less than 20% of their population were daily smokers, and sixteen
of twenty-seven reported that less than 25% of their population were daily smokers.
Table 2-8. State-Specific Smoking Prevalence and Smoking-Attributable
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Adult Smoking
Prevalence, 2008
22.1
21.5
15.9
22.3
14.0
17.6
15.9
17.8
16.2
17.5
19.5
15.4
16.9
21.3
26.0
18.8
17.9
25.2
20.5
18.2
14.9
16.1
20.5
17.6
22.7
25.0
18.5
18.4
22.2
17.1
14.8
19.4
16.8
20.9
18.1
20.1
24.7
16.3
21.3
17.4
20.0
17.5
23.1
18.5
9.3
16.8
16.4
15.7
26.5
19.9
19.4

Youth Smoking
Prevalence, 2006-2007
12.0
9.7
10.6
14.5
6.9
10.3
9.8
9.3
7.2
9.5
10.0
6.8
8.9
10.2
11.8
11.7
11.9
15.9
11.0
11.4
8.8
9.5
10.7
11.7
9.4
11.8
12.2
11.0
10.2
9.8
9.1
11.8
8.2
10.8
12.4
12.9
13.3
9.7
11.8
11.3
11.8
12.5
13.0
9.5
6.5
11.3
11.0
9.7
12.6
12.2
14.9

Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]
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Adult Smoking-Attributable
Mortality Rate (per 100,000)
317.5
270.4
247.4
323.7
235.0
237.6
238.3
280.9
249.9
258.8
299.4
167.6
237.4
263.1
308.9
248.0
262.7
370.6
299.8
289.8
261.9
249.4
281.9
215.1
333.6
307.8
276.0
235.8
343.7
272.4
239.5
234.0
246.1
298.4
225.6
299.1
332.1
263.3
259.0
266.8
293.4
239.2
325.0
273.1
138.3
247.5
267.0
261.0
344.3
244.2
283.1

Figure 2-3. Smoking Prevalence in OECD Countries, 2004-2006
United States
United Kingdom
Turkey
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Slovak Republic
Portugal
Poland
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Mexico
Luxembourg
Korea
Japan
Italy
Israel
Ireland
Iceland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Estonia
Denmark
Czech Republic
Chile
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia

16.9
23.7
33.4
15.5
26.4
25.0
19.6
26.3
25.0
21.7
31.0
23.7
25.9
28.3
22.7
24.4
19.7
39.3
23.2
24.7
22.1
25.7
37.9
17.3
22.0
23.2
17.4
0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

% of Population 15+ Years Old Who Are Daily Smokers

Data Source: OECD Heatlh Statistics, 2010

2.3.3

Current Domestic Policy
There are three components to the current U.S. tobacco control policy at the central-

level: taxation, enacted legislation, and bureaucratic infrastructure.
2.3.3.1 Central-Level Taxation
As part of Children’s Health Insurance Program (C.H.I.P.) Reauthorization Act of 2009
(Public Law No. 111-3), the central-level tobacco excise tax was raised to $1.01, a $0.62
increase from the previous excise tax of $0.39. The excise-tax increase was included as a
revenue provision of the bill, meaning that the excise tax was “paying for” the CHIP
reauthorization and program expansion. Per the provisions in the Bill, the excise tax covers
cigars, cigarettes, cigarette papers and tubes, smokeless tobacco, pipe tobacco, roll-your-own
tobacco, and also taxes floor stocks of tobacco products. The Bill, and tax increase, was
effective April 1, 2009.
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2.3.3.2

Legislation
The current central-level tobacco control legislation is the Family Smoking Prevention

and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (Public Law No. 111-31).

The Act represents the most

comprehensive single piece of tobacco control legislation enacted at the central-level in the
United States and creates a new regulatory scheme for tobacco products within the F.D.A.;
thus, this Act represents the culmination of regulatory and legislative attempts begun in 1995
(and the subsequent 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule). Very similar versions of this Act were introduced
in the 108th Congress, passed by the Senate in 2004, and passed by the House in 2008.
[Redhead & Burrows, 2009] The current Act, sponsored by Rep. Waxman (D-CA), was passed
by the House on April 2, 2009 (H.R. 1256; H.Rept. 111-58, part 1 and 2), by the Senate on May
20, 2009 (S. 982), and signed by President Obama on June 22, 2009. [Redhead & Burrows,
2009], [Congressional Research Service, 2009]
A central function of this Act was to amend the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to
provide the Secretary of Health and Human Services, through the F.D.A., the jurisdiction and
responsibility to regulate tobacco products, which the F.D.A. originally asserted in 1996 but was
overturned by the Supreme Court in F.D.A. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. The key
provisions of the Act are summarized in Table 2-9. While the F.D.A. is prohibited from banning
nicotine in tobacco products or the products themselves, they were authorized with a broad
scope of authority to develop regulations for the manufacture, distribution, sale, and marketing
of tobacco products subject to the consideration of both individual and population health.
Components of the Act were implemented in September 2009 and, as required in the Act, the
F.D.A. issued “Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents” which became effective on June 22, 2010. [U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, 2010]

However, this 2010 Final Rule did not include the

restrictions on outdoor advertising included in the 1996 Final Rule in order to permit additional
study and public comment in light of the Supreme Court Ruling in Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v.
Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al, No. 00-0596. [U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, 2010]

As was anticipated, this Act has already been challenged in court

(Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration
et al. Civil Case No. 09-771 (RJL).
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Finally, in June 2010 the F.D.A. issued a review reporting on the first year of activities
pursuant to the implementation of the Act in June 2009. Key among these activities was the
creation of the National Center for Tobacco Products which identifies its mission as the
Table 2-9. Key Provisions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009
Topic
Allowable Scope of Activity

Disallowed Scope of Activity

Infrastructure

Preemption

Product and Manufacturing
Standards

New Products
Amendment of Previous Acts

Re-issue of 1996 FDA Final
Rule

Modified Risk Tobacco Products

Specific Requirements -Additives
Required Action – Further Study
Mandated
Required Action – Public
Disclosure
Miscellaneous Stipulations

Description
Secretary/FDA may:
•
Restrict sale or distribution of products to protect public health
•
Restrict advertising and promotion consistent with the First Amendment
•
Alter label requirements to promote better understanding of risk of use of tobacco products
•
Adopt product standards that reduce the yield of nicotine and reduce or eliminate other product components
•
Conduct product testing
•
Can recall or ban a product that poses unreasonable risk of substantial harm
Secretary/FDA may not:
•
Ban cigarettes/tobacco products
•
Require reduction of nicotine content to zero
•
Require written or oral prescription to obtain products
•
Prohibit face-to-face sales in retail outlets
•
Establish a minimum purchase age older than 18 years
•
Publicly disclose trade secrets or other confidential information
Secretary/FDA must create:
•
Center for Tobacco Products to implement Act
•
Technical support office for small manufacturers
•
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee
•
Expert Panel
•
Federal agencies, states, political subdivisions, Indian tribes etc., may enact additional or stricter measures,
including excise taxes, except for those relating to product manufacturing standards, adulteration and labeling,
and modified risk tobacco products
•
States and localities can impose specific bans on the time, place, or manner of advertising or promotion but not
the content of such advertisements
Requires that tobacco manufacturers:
•
Submit a list of ingredients (and quantity) for each product
•
Submit the form and content of nicotine in each product
•
Submit a list of “harmful constituents” (as defined by the Secretary/FDA) in each product
•
Submit all documents that relate to health, toxicologic, physiologic, or behavioral effects of tobacco products,
additives, or components
•
Register annually with the Secretary/FDA
•
Comply with manufacturing standards, including uniform standard for ingredients, to be established by the
Secretary/FDA
•
Foreign/tobacco importers must register with the Secretary/FDA and reasonably comply with requirements to
establish that product content and manufacture conform with standards to be set by the Secretary/FDA
•
Pre-market approval for all new products
•
The Secretary/FDA must develop a pre-market approval process that includes health information
•
Amends the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act such that labeling requirements are those developed
by the Secretary/FDA
•
Amends the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Act of 1986 such that labeling requirements for
smokeless tobacco products are the same as those developed by the Secretary/FDA for cigarettes
The Secretary/FDA is required to re-issue the Final Rule as issued by the FDA in 1996 with some minor revisions. The
rule requires:
•
Ban on sales of tobacco products to those <18 years of age
•
Ban on packs with <20 cigarettes
•
Significant limitations on sales from vending machines or self-service displays
•
Bans free samples of cigarettes; limits distribution of smokeless tobacco
•
Bans brand-name sponsorship for sporting, musical, or cultural events or sponsorship of any team or group
participating therein
•
Bans gifts of cigarettes/tobacco products or gifts for buying cigarettes/tobacco products
•
Bans use of music in audio ads (i.e., words only)
•
Bans sale or distribution of branded non-tobacco products (e.g., hats, t-shirts)
•
Restricts advertising, bans outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of schools
•
A modified risk product may be commercially marketed if: 1) it significantly reduces tobacco-related harm for
tobacco users; and 2) have population benefits for both smokers and non-smokers when evaluated as actually
used by consumers
•
A product not labeled or marketed as a modified risk product may be sold for five years if: 1) it would promote
public health; and 2) the product is expected to benefit the health of the population
•
Post-market surveillance is to be conducted on all reduced risk products with reports annually
•
All flavorings, natural or artificial, such as vanilla, clove, orange etc., are banned with the exception of menthol
•
•
•

Expert Panel shall study health implications of raising minimum age to purchase tobacco products
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee shall study and report on: 1) the effects of altering nicotine
content including whether there is a point at which dependence / addiction is not induced; 2) the health impact on
the use of menthol; 3) the nature and health impact of dissolvable tobacco products
The Secretary/FDA must publish annually a list of harmful or potentially harmful products in each tobacco product

•
•

Tobacco manufacturers may not in any way use FDA regulation to construe that tobacco products are safe
Secretary/FDA required to issue regulations mandating use of color graphic health warning labels

Source: [Congressional Research Service, 2009]

[25]

protection of “public health by issuing and enforcing tobacco product regulations and educating
the public about the dangers of tobacco use”. [U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010]
Additional key activities in the first year of F.D.A. jurisdiction in tobacco control are listed in
Table 2-10 and include the issuance of multiple rules and final guidance as well as the
development of the infrastructure and networks the F.D.A. will need to fully implement all
provisions of the 2009 Act.
2.3.3.3 The Tobacco Control Bureaucracy – Structural Support for Tobacco Control
With the implementation of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control of
2009, the United States now has three central-level formal, bureaucratic agencies responsible
for tobacco control and prevention policies.

The F.D.A., through the National Center for

Tobacco Products, is responsible for developing, forwarding, and enforcing, through provisions
Table 2-10. Key Activities in the Inaugural Year of F.D.A. Tobacco Regulation
Area
Protecting Kids

Establishing a Science
Base

•
•

•
•
•

Regulating Tobacco
Products

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
Communication
Stakeholders

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Activities
Announced and enforced ban on flavored cigarettes (9/2009)
Re-issued 1996 Final Rule (3/2010). Provisions included:
•
National minimum age of 18 to purchase tobacco products
•
Banned sales of packs <20 cigarettes
•
Banned distribution of free samples of tobacco products
•
Banned event sponsorship
•
Banned vending machine sales in all but adult-only facilities
Issued guidance for industry on registration and product listing for owners and operators of
domestic tobacco establishments (11/2009)
Issued guidance for industry on listing of ingredients for tobacco products (11/2009)
Established Tobacco Products Scientific Advistory Committee (TPSAC) (11/2009) with first
meeting in 3/2010. Members of the TPSAC are: JM Samet (Chair) and CL Stark (Acting
Designated Federal Official), NL Benowitz, MS Clanton, DK Hatsukami, JD Heck, PN
Henderson, GN Connolly, KL DeLeeuw, LA Hamm Jr., JE Henningfield, JH Lauterbach, M
Wakefield
Appointed Cpt. D Ashley as Director, Office of Science (6/2010)
Announced ban on flavored and candy-like tobacco products (9/2009). Warning letters issued to
multiple companies in violation of ban.
Issued final guidance regarding requirements for submission of product ingredients and
additives
Issued final guidance regarding registration requirements for tobacco product manufacturers
and tobacco products
Issued final guidance regarding requirement that manufacturers and importers submit
documents relating to health, toxicological, behavioral, or physiologic effects of current or future
tobacco products, and their contents (ingredients, components, additives of products and
smoke)
Issued letters to industry requesting information about perception and use of dissolvable
tobacco products
Issued draft guidance regarding enforcement for regulations restricting sale and distribution of
tobacco products to youth. Regulation became enforceable on 6/22/.2009.
Began review of industry plans to comply with rotating package warning labels for smokeless
tobacco products. Regulation that package and advertising warning labels rotate quarterly
became enforceable on 6/22//2009.
Issued guidance on use of the terms “light”, “mild”, “low” etc
Issued guidance to solicit public comment and feedback on how FDA will develop and publish
information on harmful or potentially harmful constituents in tobacco products
Held seven listening sessions in fall 2009
Created Center website
Established small business office
Launched call center for consumers and stakeholders
Communication with tobacco journalists and publication to begin educating about Tobacco
Control Act and FDA’s public health role
Opened multiple public dockets to allow public to provide information, research, ideas, feedback
etc.
Presented at multiple public health, tobacco control, scientific, retailer, and tobacco industry
conferences
Began retailer education campaign about advertising and sales to youth

Source: [U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010]
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in the Family Smoking Act, the manufacture, distribution, sale, and marketing of tobacco
products. The C.D.C., through the Office for Smoking and Health, is responsible for tobacco
prevention and control.

The smaller Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health

coordinates tobacco education and control activities within and between central-, state-, and
local-level government and private agencies
The Office for Smoking and Health, originally established in 1965, has two principle
programmatic efforts: the National Tobacco Control Program and global tobacco control
programs whose main collaborative effort, the Global Tobacco Surveillance System (G.T.S.S.),
was established to facilitate the development of standardized and internationally comparative
surveillance data on variety of tobacco issues (e.g., tobacco use, exposure to secondhand
smoke, etc.). These programmatic foci are supported by four units and three branches within
the Office: Global Tobacco Control Unit; Resource Management Unit; Policy, Planning, and
Coordination Unit which also includes a Planning Team and a Senior Policy Advisor; Health
Communications Branch which also includes an Information Resources, Development and
Implementation, and a Media team; Epidemiology Branch which includes an Evaluation,
Surveillance, Research, and Data Analysis and Survey Support team; and a Program Services
Branch which includes two program support teams. [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009]
The National Tobacco Control Program (N.T.C.P.), created in 1999, coordinates,
supports, and funds national and state-level prevention and control efforts.
identifies the following as its goals, components, and activity areas:
Goals:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Eliminate exposure to secondhand smoke
Promote quitting among adults and youth
Prevent initiation among youth
Identify and eliminate disparities among population groups

Components:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Population-based community interventions
Counter-marketing
Program policy/regulation
Surveillance and evaluation

Activity areas:
1. Clean indoor air policy
2. Tobacco use treatment
[27]

The N.T.C.P.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Access by minors
Advertising and promotion
Economic approaches (excise taxes)
Mass media and counter-advertising
Synergistic effects (changing of social norms)

From: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010], [Wisotzky,
Albuquerque, Pechacek, & Park, 2004]
Funding for state-level tobacco control programs is provided from the National Center for
Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion at the C.D.C. to the reciprocal offices
mirrored in state departments or bureaus for public health. The N.T.C.P. thus functions to
coordinate and support the activities of fifty state-level tobacco prevention and control programs,
as well as programs in the District of Columbia, eight other U.S. territories and jurisdictions, and
seven tribal support centers. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010] Additionally,
the N.T.C.P. funds six national-level networks intended to target specific minority or at-risk
communities. Currently, the funded national networks focus on African-Americans, American
Indians/Alaska

Natives,

Asian

Americans/Pacific

Islanders,

Hispanics/Latinos,

lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender communities, and low socioeconomic groups and include:
APPEAL PROMISE Network (Asian Pacific Partners for Empowerment, Advocacy, and
Leadership); National African American Tobacco Prevention Network; National Latino Tobacco
Control Network; The National LGBT Tobacco Control Network; Break Free Alliance; and the
National Native Commercial Tobacco Abuse Prevention Network. [National Networks for
Tobacco Control and Prevention]
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Figure 2-4. Schematic Representation of the National Tobacco Control Program
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• Types of interventions
• Health communication interventions (education,
change social norms, counter industry marketing)
• Cessation interventions (goal to have all smokers
quit by age 30)
• Advocacy

Sources: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009], [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010],
[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007], [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007]

The N.T.C.P. utilizes a community-based model with the goal of producing lasting
changes in social norms for tobacco by implementing economic, regulatory, and comprehensive
evidence-based programs projected to have the largest population impact. [Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2007]

The foundation for the implementation of the N.T.C.P.’s

community-based model is the development and support of networks of coalitions comprised, in
turn, of myriad community-based organizations. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2007]

The benefits of a coalition structure are multifold.

Importantly, non-governmental,

community-based organizations can engage in activities, particularly policy advocacy and
lobbying, not allowable by government agencies. Additional benefits of a coalition infrastructure
include: representation of community diversity; synergy of resources and efforts; expansion of
public support to sustain tobacco control programs; diversity in membership to propagate and
amplify community mobilization; policy advocacy; changing social norms by advocating for and
promoting pro-health values; membership diversity implies broad community representation and
thus imparts credibility leading to community buy-in; broad and diverse coalition membership
reduces duplication of effort within a community and promotes collaboration and leveraging of
[29]

Table 2-11. Membership of the Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health
•

•

•
•

•

Members appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services from institutes and
agencies deemed appropriate by the Secretary and may include:
• National Cancer Institute
• National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
• National Institute for Child Health and Human Development
• National Institute on Drug Abuse
• Health Resources and Services Administration
• Department of Veterans Affairs
• Veterans Health Administration
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
At least one member from:
• Federal Trade Commission
• Department of Education
• Department of Labor
Any other Federal agency selected by the Secretary
Five members from physicians and scientists from private entities engaged in tobacco-related health effects
educational efforts
Members serve for four-year overlapping terms with a Chair appointed by the Secretary

Source: (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007)

talents and capital, both economic and human; and more effectual efforts to counter-act tobacco
industry practices. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007] Thus, the N.T.C.P. is
hierarchical in nature with the Office for Smoking and Health and the N.T.C.P. providing
strategic, organizational, technical, and scientific support as well as funding to state agencies.
The state agencies subsequently function similarly for the coalitions of community-based
organizations. This structure, including the functions of each organization level, is depicted in
Figure 2-4. The community-based model of coalitions thus results in overlapping networks
community-based organizations that collaborate and coordinate resources to implement the
N.T.C.P. recommended interventions, programs, and policies.
Finally, the last and smallest component of the central-level tobacco control and
prevention structure is the Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health. Created as part of
the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, the Committee consists of representatives
from multiple agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services as well as other
central-level government departments (full membership of the Committee is specified in Table
2-11). [Centers for Diseaes Control and Prevention, 2009] The Interagency Committee serves
to advise the Secretary for Health and Human Services on the coordination of tobacco research
and educational programs, and other tobacco-related activities with other central-, state-, and
local-level government and private agencies. [Centers for Diseaes Control and Prevention,
2009]

Specifically, the Committee is accountable to the Secretary for Health and Human

Services through the Director of the C.D.C. and is required report biennially to Congress on
educational efforts by both central-level government and private agencies to improve public
knowledge about the tobacco-related health effects and the effects of such efforts (i.e., the
public’s level of knowledge thereof). [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007]
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2.3.3.4 State-Level Taxation and Legislation
In addition to central-level policies, states also establish tobacco control policies which
are summarized in Table 2-12. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]

As of

December 31, 2009, 58.8% of states had smoke-free workplace laws, 54.9% had smoke-free
restaurant statutes, and 43.1% required smoke-free bars. In 2007, 49.0% of state Medicaid
programs covered pharmaceutical nicotine replacement therapy for all enrollees and another
25.5% of states covered such therapies for some enrollees; 17.6% of states did not cover any
pharmaceutical nicotine replacement therapy. In 2009, approximately 25% of states had some
form of preemption for advertising and promotion, meaning that local jurisdictions were not
allowed to enact stricter regulations than those enacted at the state-level. Also, by December
31, 2009, almost half – 49.0% -- of states had minimum price laws. At the same point in time,
the average state excise tax was $1.33±$0.12 (SE), ranging from $0.07 in South Carolina to
$3.46 in Rhode Island; 25% of states had excise taxes equal to or in excess of $2.00. Finally,
using the recommended expenditures established for each state by the C.D.C., total actual
expenditures on tobacco control programs were estimated as percent of recommended
expenditures. In 2007, the average percent of recommended expenditures was 25.5%±3.21%
(SE), ranging from 1.1% of recommended expenditures in Tennessee to 85.5% of
recommended expenditures in Maine. Fourteen states spent less than 10% of recommended
levels with the lowest spending states being Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, Michigan, Texas.
Only seven states spent in excess of 50% of recommended levels with the highest spending
states being Hawaii, Alaska, Wyoming, Delaware, and Maine.
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Table 2-12. Summary of State-Level Tobacco Excise Tax and Enacted Tobacco-Control Legislation

State

Alabama

Medicaid FFS
100% Smoke-Free 100% Smoke-Free
Coverage for
Indoor Air Laws,
Indoor Air Laws,
Tobacco
12/21/2009
12/21/2009
Dependence
(Worksites)
(Restaurants)
Treatments, 2007
(Medications)
No
No
No

Medicaid FFS
Tobacoo CounterCoverage for
Prevalence of
Marketing Media
Tobacco
Households with NoIntensity, per
Dependence
Smoking Rules,
Quarter, 2008
Treatments, 2007
2006-2007 (%)
(TRPs - Youth)
(Counseling)
No
73.8
0

Tobacoo CounterLocal Advertising
Percentage of Minimum Price
Marketing Media
Local Advertising
State Cigarette
Recommended
Law for
Intensity, per
and Promotion Laws and Promotion Laws
Excise Tax per
Allowed, 12/31/2009 Allowed, 12/31/2009
Tobacco Control
Cigarettes,
Quarter, 2008
Pack, 12.31/2009
(Display)
(Promotion)
Investment, 2007
12/31/2009
(GRPs - Adult
Households)
0
Yes
Yes
0.425
3.7
No

Alaska

No

No

Some

All

79.5

Yes

Yes

2

70.7

Arizona

Yes

Yes

No

Pregnant Only

82.6

23

111

Yes

Yes

2

38.2

Yes
No

Arkansas

Yes

No

Some

All

65.1

49

52

Yes

Yes

1.15

44.3

Yes
No

California

No

No

All

No

87.6

138

670

Yes

Yes

0.87

19.2

Colorado

Yes

Yes

All

Pregnant Only

82.6

118

344

Yes

Yes

0.84

48.7

No

Connecticut

No

No

No

No

79.5

50

59

Yes

Yes

3

7

Yes

Yes

Yes

1.6

79.4

Yes

Yes

Yes

2.5

10

Yes

Delaware

Yes

Yes

All

No

77.5

District of Columbia

Yes

Yes

All

No

73.7

20

118

Florida

Yes

Yes

Some

No

84

321

1183

Yes

Yes

1.339

3.1

No

Georgia

No

No

No

No

79.2

0

0

Yes

Yes

0.37

2.7

No

Hawaii

Yes

Yes

All

No

83.7

134

1003

Yes

Yes

2.6

66.6

No

Idaho

No

Yes

All

No

87.3

14

99

Yes

Yes

0.57

12.8

No

Illinois

Yes

Yes

All

No

73.8

14

146

Yes

Yes

0.98

6.3

No

Indiana

No

No

All

All

66.2

266

722

No

No

0.995

15.3

Yes
Yes

Iowa

Yes

Yes

Some

Pregnant Only

72.4

249

969

Yes

Yes

1.36

21

Kansas

No

No

Some

No

75.5

29

138

Yes

Yes

0.79

7.5

No

Kentucky

No

No

No

Pregnant Only

60.9

0.5

1

No

No

0.6

6

Yes

Louisiana

Yes

Yes

Some

No

74.7

62

157

Yes

No

0.36

17.2

Yes

Maine

Yes

Yes

Some

All

75.8

1

11

Yes

Yes

2

85.5

No

Maryland

Yes

Yes

Some

All

81.5

22

171

Yes

Yes

2

32.2

Yes

Massachusetts

Yes

Yes

All

All

80.3

76

433

Yes

Yes

2.51

11.4

Yes

Michigan

No

No

Some

All

70.9

37

151

No

Yes

2

2.1

No

Minnesota

Yes

Yes

All

All

79.3

15

67

Yes

Yes

1.23

39.2

Yes

Mississippi

No

No

All

Pregnant Only

72.7

0

0

No

No

0.68

1.4

Yes

Missouri

No

No

No

No

69.5

2

8

Yes

Yes

0.17

1.7

No

Montana

Yes

Yes

All

No

79.4

Yes

Yes

1.7

57.3

Yes

Nebraska

Yes

Yes

No

No

76.7

106

631

Yes

Yes

0.64

20.3

Yes

Nevada

Yes

Yes

All

No

81.7

4

18

No

No

0.8

14.6

No

New Hampshire

No

Yes

All

Pregnant Only

80.7

Yes

Yes

1.78

5.9

No
Yes

New Jersey

Yes

Yes

All

No

82

Yes

Yes

2.7

10.4

New Mexico

Yes

Yes

All

All

76.7

80

253

Yes

Yes

0.91

38.9

No

New York

Yes

Yes

Some

No

75.3

395

2389

Yes

Yes

2.75

34.8

Yes
No

North Carolina

No

No

All

No

73.1

308

549

No

No

0.45

16

North Dakota

Yes

No

Some

All

74.8

0

0

Yes

Yes

0.44

47.1

No

Ohio

Yes

Yes

All

No

66.7

11

26

Yes

Yes

1.25

32.1

Yes
Yes

Oklahoma

No

No

All

All

71

2

37

No

No

1.03

25.8

Oregon

Yes

Yes

All

All

84.8

60

363

Yes

Yes

1.18

11.1

No

Pennsylvania

Yes

No

All

All

71.5

93

556

Yes

Yes

1.6

20.5

Yes
Yes

Rhode Island

Yes

Yes

No

All

77.9

Yes

Yes

3.46

14.6

South Carolina

No

No

All

No

75

6

105

No

No

0.07

5.4

No

South Dakota

Yes

Yes

Some

No

76.7

23

218

Yes

No

1.53

15.7

Yes

Tennessee

Yes

No

No

No

68.9

0

1

No

No

0.62

1.1

Yes

Texas

No

No

Some

No

81.3

0

0.5

Yes

Yes

1.41

2.3

No

Utah

Yes

Yes

All

Pregnant Only

90.6

1070

4766

No

No

0.695

35.6

No

Vermont

Yes

Yes

All

No

75.4

Yes

Yes

2.24

61.8

No

Virginia

No

No

All

Pregnant Only

79.1

65

135

Yes

Yes

0.3

14.1

No
Yes

Washington

Yes

Yes

Pregnant Only

Pregnant Only

87

255

575

Yes

No

2.025

42.6

West Virginia

No

No

Pregnant Only

All

62.6

68

289

No

Yes

0.55

24.1

No

Wisconsin

No

No

Pregnant Only

All

72.5

30

119

No

No

2

17.8

Yes

Wyoming

No

No

Pregnant Only

All

70.2

Yes

Yes

0.6

78.2

No

Data Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]
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3

LITERATURE REVIEW: THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC FROM THE PUBLIC
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE

3.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the existing, scientific tobacco

control literature from the public health perspective. This review will include: defining tobacco
control policies and tobacco control policy regimes; the current understanding of “best
practices”, or “evidence-based, in tobacco control policies; a description of ongoing coordinated,
international efforts to combat the global tobacco epidemic and enact these “best practices”
tobacco control policies; and the universal and emerging challenges facing tobacco control
activities will be identified and briefly discussed.
3.2

Tobacco Control Policy Best Practices
In both the natural history models discussed in Chapter 2, the Phases of Tobacco Control

Model and the Tobacco Epidemic Model, tobacco control policies do not emerge until four–five
decades after the beginning of the epidemic when the health and economic effects of tobacco
use become patent after the prolonged latency period between [cumulative] tobacco exposure
and disease. Further, because of this latency between exposure and the onset of tobaccorelated disease, the delay of policy implementation until after the entrenchment of addiction to
tobacco use results, as described in the Tobacco Epidemic Model, in sustained and substantial
adverse societal costs despite gradual, decreasing smoking prevalence. This section describes
the contemporary understanding of evidence-based tobacco control policy, the evidence base
for which has been predominantly established in industrialized countries, thus defining the terms
“comprehensive tobacco control policy” and “tobacco control policy regime”.
3.2.1

Individual Policy Instruments
The evidence base for tobacco control policies has accumulated over the past 3-plus

decades from ecologic studies, natural experiments, as well as controlled or quasi-experimental
intervention trials at the individual, community, and population level. Substantiation for this
substantial body of evidence is two-fold: the Cochrane Library and population-based simulation
models.
The Cochrane Library is a collection of six different databases that functions as a
repository for peer-reviewed systematic reviews based on the international evidence for myriad
health topics. A keyword search on “tobacco” in the Cochrane library yields more than 2,200
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entries (53 entries in the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 35 reviews of other types,
2,037 entries in the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, 36 entries in the Cochrane
Methodology Register, 13 entries in the Health Technology Assessment Database, and 94
entries in the National Health Service (U.K.) Economic Evaluation Database), which
cumulatively summarize and integrate the evidence from many thousand individual studies
conducted in countries and for time periods according to criteria for that review. (Search
conducted on 6/6/2010 at [The Cochrane Collaboration])
Additionally, a sufficient body of scientific knowledge on the relative effectiveness of
tobacco control policies is available to permit the development of at least two formal simulation
models. SimSmoke, developed by the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation with David
T. Levy, Ph.D. as the Senior Scientist, was originally developed with evidence from trials and
studies conducted in the United States but more recently has been adapted for international
application. [Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation], [Levy, Cho, Kim, Park, Suh, & Kam,
2010] SimSmoke uses smoking rates and smoking-attributable deaths as its primary endpoints
and permits the projection of policy effectiveness (i.e., reduction in smoking rates) based upon
characteristics of the population to whom the policy will be applied (e.g., baseline smoking rates,
and relative proportions of gender, age, and ethnicity) as well as characteristics of the policy
itself (e.g., duration of advertising campaign, magnitude of tax increase, etc.). An alternate
simulation model, the Tobacco Policy Model with Tammy O. Tengs, Sc.D. as the principal
developer, uses quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as the primary endpoint. The Tobacco
Policy Model uses U.S. census-based data (and demographic projections), stratified by both
age and gender, to model the effects of reductions in smoking initiation, increases in cessation,
and reductions in relapse in different age groups and genders on QALYs gained over a
specified time period. [Tengs, Osgood, & Lin, 2001] Because of the use of QALYs as the
specified endpoint, projections from this model are necessarily pre-disposed to emphasize the
importance of prevention of initiation in younger age-groups.
Tobacco control policies have been variously categorized, but are generally considered
to have three principal objectives:
•

Preventing

smoking

initiation

entrenchment in young adults.

in

youth

and

adolescents

and

smoking

Because the vast majority of smokers begin

smoking as teenagers and the entrenchment of the habit and addiction to
nicotine occurs between the ages of 18-24 years, policies that inhibit and
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otherwise prevent experimentation with smoking during high school are
paramount, though success of these policies will not noticeably impact population
smoking prevalence for as long as 15 years (smaller proportion of the larger
population).
•

Promoting smoking cessation in current smokers.

Most studies suggest that

approximately 75% of current smokers want to quit and, for most smokers,
multiple quit attempts are needed before successful cessation is achieved
(smokers report an average of 4.1 quit attempts and former smokers report an
average of 6.1 quit attempts). [Jones, J M; Gallup, Inc., 2006] Thus, providing
access to behavioral and pharmacologic-based efficacious cessation support
treatments is key to averting the associated health and economic consequences
of smoking, and immediately affecting population smoking prevalence. [Levy,
Mabry, Graham, Orleans, & Abrams, 2010]
•

Protecting non-smokers from exposure to tobacco smoke or tobacco smoke
particles.

As the scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports, exposure to

secondhand smoke also causes multiple, negative health effects. [U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1986]
Thus, the protection of non-smokers from involuntary exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke with smoke-free air policies has become a fundamental element
of tobacco control programs.
To achieve these policy objectives and counter tobacco industry activities, jurisdictions
implement tobacco control policies broadly grouped as:
•

Taxation. Excise taxes levied at the central (national) or state level based on
either ad valorum (added to the price based as a percentage of the value) or flatrate formulas.

•

Protection. Typically termed “clean air” policies, these groups of policies are
designed

to

protect

non-smokers

from

exposure

to

“involuntary”

or

“environmental” tobacco smoke.
•

Education. Policies and programs designed to inform the public of the
addictiveness and health consequences of smoking and, more recently, the
actions of the tobacco industry.

•

Regulation. Policies that affect the manufacture, sale, and distribution of tobacco
products, including package labeling, requiring health warning labels, prohibition
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of product sales to minors, and restriction of advertising and promotional
practices including event sponsorship and advertisements in magazines and on
billboards.
•

Cessation support.

Individually-based interventions to help current smokers

break their nicotine addiction and quit smoking is increasingly recognized as both
a moral imperative as well as a practical necessity to immediately affect
population smoking prevalence rates. [Levy, Mabry, Graham, Orleans, &
Abrams, 2010]
As discussed above, there is a substantial body of scientific evidence quantifying the
effectiveness of various policies in different jurisdictions across time periods and demographic
strata, though a complete summary of these studies is beyond the scope and purpose of the
present study.

For the purposes of the discussion here, the comparative, quantitative

effectiveness of different policies will be summarized based on the foundation evidence for
SimSmoke. [Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, 2004] As shown in Table 3-1, taxes and clean indoor
air laws have the largest, consistent, and quantifiable effects on smoking prevalence when
policies are considered as individual instruments.
Selection of policy instruments is influenced by the desired evaluation time frame. For
example, a recent study using SimSmoke demonstrated that a policy goal of substantial, shortterm (3-5 years) reduction in smoking prevalence requires a mix of policies designed to increase
the quit rates in adult smokers (as opposed to policies designed to reduce initiation rates in
adolescents and young adults), including tax increases, media campaigns, and smoke free air
policies and must also necessarily require substantial support for cessation programs. [Levy,
Mabry, Graham, Orleans, & Abrams, 2010] In contrast, consideration of benefit over a longer
(generation) timeframe results in selection of policies with more emphasis on prevention of
smoking initiation in adolescents (when most begin smoking) and smoking entrenchment in
young adults, in whom cumulative life-long benefit will result in greater population QALYs.
[Tengs, Osgood, & Lin, 2001], [Tengs, Osgood, & Chen, 2001]
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Table 3-1. Quantitative Estimates of the Effectiveness of Individual Tobacco Control Policy Instruments
Policy Type
Taxes

Clean Indoor Air Laws

•

•

Quantitative Effectiveness
Starting at an assumed baseline of $4.00, a $1.00
price increase (25%) reduces smoking prevalence by
7% in 3 years, and by up to 14% over a longer time
period (as effects of marginally higher decreases in
prevalence in younger, more price-sensitive smokers
have a larger impact on estimates of population-wide
smoking prevalence )
Comprehensive bans, with strong enforcement and
media publicity, reduce smoking prevalence by 11%,
with 7%-8% attributable to worksite bans and 2%-3%
attributable to restaurant bans; partial bans are
estimated to be 50% as effective

•
•
•
•
•
•

Advertising Restrictions

•

Product Labeling

•

Mass Media Policies

•
•

School Education
Programs

•

Comprehensive advertising bans reduce prevalence
by 4% and initiation by 6%; partial bans reduce the
effectiveness to a 2% reduction in both initiation and
prevalence
Large, graphic warning labels may reduce smoking
prevalence by 2% and increase cessation rates by
2%
Well-funded and long-term campaigns can reduce
prevalence by up to 7% when combined with other
policies
Youth-oriented campaigns can reduce youth
prevalence by 6.5% but have a smaller impact on
population-wide prevalence rates
SimSmoke does not attribute any quantifiable effect
of school education programs on population smoking
prevalence

•

•
•
•
•
•

•
Youth Access Enforcement

•

Access to Cessation
Treatments

•

Telephone Quit Lines

•

Policies with strong enforcement, strict penalties, and
community support can reduce youth prevalence up
to 25%, but these effects can take up to 15 years to
be detected in adult prevalence rates

•

With broad treatment coverage, cessation programs
increase quit rates by 25% leading to a 2% reduction
in prevalence in 5 years and a 3.5% reduction in
prevalence in 10 years
Telephone quit lines can be very effective for those
who call, but detectable population-wide effects are
minimal (participation is often <5% of all smokers)

•

•

•
•

Summary of Evidence
Price elasticity estimates range from -0.3 to -0.5
Price effects include lower initiation rates, higher
cessation rates, and lower consumption for those
continuing to smoke
Price elasticities are generally higher in adolescents
and young adults, and in lower income groups
Bans protect non-smokers from harmful exposure,
reduce opportunities to smoke, and support smokefree social norms
States with comprehensive bans have 5%-20% lower
per capita consumption and ≈10% lower prevalence
In companies, quit rates are 10%-15% higher in firms
with compared to those without bans
Advertising bans and restrictions reduce the
opportunities for tobacco companies to create
attractive and favorable images of smoking
Recall of the presence of content of text-based
warning labels is low; recall increases with more
prominent and graphic warning labels
Media campaigns are more effective when combined
with other policies
Effectiveness depends upon scale and duration
A social marketing approach, with multiple, targeted
and tested messages aimed at different
sociodemographic groups
Earlier school-based programs focused on educating
students about the harmful effects of smoking; more
recent programs use a life-skills approach educating
students on resisting smoking initiation as well as the
sociopolitical culture of tobacco use
The CDC recommends school-based programs,
including “booster” programs, though evidence
regarding effectiveness is mixed
Many youth get tobacco from non-retail sources such
as the “black market”, theft, older peers and siblings,
and parents
Effectiveness of strict access policies thus depend
upon the extent to which market sources are
substituted by non-market sources
Access to insurance-covered cessation programs
increase their use, and use of cessation programs
double-to-quadruple success rates
Quit lines are convenient and, when used, evidence
supports effectiveness in all age groups and gender
Quit lines are most effective when advertised as part
of mass media campaign

Source: [Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, 2004]

3.2.2

Comprehensive Tobacco Control and Tobacco Control Policy Regimes
A comprehensive tobacco control program is one that consists of a combination of

individual

policy

instruments.

Specifically,

comprehensive

tobacco

control

policies

simultaneously address multiple or all of the principal objectives (prevention of initiation,
promotion of cessation, protection from secondhand smoke) with policy instruments from
multiple or all of the broad policy groups (taxation, clean air policies, education, regulation,
cessation support). For example, a jurisdiction’s comprehensive tobacco control program might
include: effective levels of taxation (balancing initiation prevention and cessation against
smuggling incentives); public

anti-tobacco education campaigns;

implementation

and

enforcement of laws preventing youth access; restrictions on tobacco advertising; widespread
adoption of smoke-free air laws; support for cessation programs, including training of healthcare
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professionals and access support for individuals; and school-based prevention programs.
[Wakefield & Chaloupka, 2000]
The evolution from a “comprehensive tobacco control program” to a “tobacco control
policy regime” is subtle and rarely discussed in the public health literature, the regime construct
being more familiar to the political science field. One such study, from the political science
tradition, defines policy regimes as the cumulative policies and programs used by governments
to control tobacco and identifies “hands-off”, “low-control”, “moderate-control”, “high-control”,
and “prohibitionist” regimes. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004] However, in the operationalization of
their definition and categorization of countries included in their study, the authors conflated
several important policy distinctions made in the public health literature and used what the
authors termed a “rough-and-ready three-point scale”. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004] Still, it is
entirely possible to develop a definition for a tobacco control policy regime by fusing the political
science concept of the aggregate set of government policies and programs and the public
health programmatic frameworks forwarded by the World Health Organization and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
In 2008, the World Health Organization forwarded the MPOWER Package, a set of six,
evidence-based policies (groups of policies) regarded as the requisite foundation to effectively
counter the tobacco epidemic. [World Health Organization, 2008] MPOWER is the acronym for
these groups of policies, which are described in Table 3-2.

This report emphasizes the

implementation and enforcement of these collective policies in order to prevent smoking
initiation and entrenchment in adolescents and young adults, assist current smokers in
cessation, and prevent exposure in non-smokers.

The difference between “comprehensive

policy” and the “policy regime” advanced in the MPOWER Package is the inclusion of
surveillance and monitoring and the expectation for the simultaneous implementation of all
policies in the MPOWER framework.

The 2008 report also highlighted, though briefly, the

underfunding of tobacco control programs both in personnel and the financing of program
activities. The report estimated that for countries reporting data (n=89), 95% of global tobacco
control spending was done in high-income countries and that global tobacco tax revenues
exceeded by 500-times spending on tobacco control activities.

Further, while 74% of the

countries submitting data (n=174) reported a national tobacco control agency, of the 86
countries submitting staffing data, 55% of the 604 total, global staff were in six high-income
countries resulting in an average of 3.4 full-time equivalent staff in 93% of the countries. This
underfunding, including the large disparity between high- and low-income countries, was again
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Table 3-2. Summary of Policies in the MPOWER Package
Component
M

Definition
“Monitor tobacco use and prevention
policies”

•
•
•

P

“Protect people from tobacco smoke”

•
•
•

O

“Offer help to quit tobacco use”

•
•

W

“Warn about the dangers of tobacco”

•

•
E

“Enforce bans on tobacco advertising,
promotion, and sponsorship”

•
•

R

“Raise taxes on tobacco”

•
•

Description
Track several indicators prevalence, impact of policy interventions, and
tobacco industry activity (marketing, promotion, lobbying)
Data on prevalence and program effectiveness should be available based
on age, gender, race and geographic jurisdictions
Effective dissemination of findings from surveillance and monitoring
programs
Complete ban on all indoor smoking (no “designated” indoor smoking
areas)
Strong enforcement of bans, including strong penalties for violations
Bans are most effectively implemented in conjunction with mass media
campaigns
Substantial and meaningful access to evidence-based, culturally
appropriate cessation programs for the estimated ¾ current smokers
wishing to quit
Three-pronged approach to cessation support includes incorporation into
primary care (thus must include training and support for primary healthcare
workers), well-staffed and well advertised quit lines, and availability of low
cost pharmacologic therapy to treat nicotine addiction (nicotine
replacement therapy)
Anti-tobacco media and educational campaigns conducted by the
government or NGOs to warn of the health hazards and addictiveness of
tobacco use and support a socially unacceptable and negative image for
tobacco use (campaigns conducted by the tobacco industry have been
shown to be ineffective or to increase tobacco use)
Use of large, graphic warning labels on packages and advertising, which
are more effective than text-only warnings
Comprehensive ban on advertising in all media formats and promotion for
any event and at point-of-sale
Strict and strong enforcement, particularly of activities aimed at
adolescents and young adults
Product-specific excise tax (i.e., in addition to any value-added tax that
applies to broad categories of goods) that is both strictly enforced and
regularly adjusted for inflation
To avoid “substitution effects”, all tobacco products should be taxed
similarly

Source: [World Health Organization, 2008]

discussed in the 2009 report along with stronger recommendations for the structure of centrallevel tobacco control programs, though the report did not make minimum funding or staffing
recommendations. [World Health Organization, 2009]
The MPOWER Package from the World Health Organization had a global perspective
and focused its analysis and recommendations at central-level governments. In contrast, the
C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program, originally developed in 1999 but revised multiple
times since, forwards a multi-level approach that includes activities at the central-, state-, and
local-level jurisdictions. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010], [Wisotzky,
Albuquerque, Pechacek, & Park, 2004] The C.D.C. has also published a series of three “best
practices” reports to disseminate the rationale and implementation for this national program:
Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, Best Practices User Guide:
Coalitions – State and Community Intervention, and Best Practices User Guide: Youth
Engagement – State and Community Intervention.

[Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention, 2007], [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007], [Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2010]
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Considered integratively and collectively, the C.D.C.’s framework is premised on a
central-level agency that develops and supports a state- and community-level infrastructure
developed around coalition networks; it is these coalition networks that are the programmatic
functional units of the tobacco control policy regime. Compared to the MPOWER framework,
the C.D.C.’s recommendations are far more prescriptive regarding the structure, content, and
programmatic activities of these networks. Further, the C.D.C. makes explicit recommendations
for structural and programmatic funding levels for the overall and each component of the policy
regime, estimated using formulas developed and made publicly available by the C.D.C., that
account for: overall population demographics and demographic strata; smoking prevalence;
population socioeconomic factors such as proportion living near the poverty level, education
level, and the proportion receiving publicly subsidized health insurance; geographic size; the
number of local health units; infrastructure costs such as cost of living and labor costs; and the
cost and complexity of conducting programs (e.g., mass media campaigns) to reach target
populations (e.g., youth, racial minorities). As forwarded by the C.D.C., the four goals for a
tobacco control policy regime are the prevention of tobacco use initiation in adolescents and
young adults, the promotion and support for cessation among current smokers, the protection
and eventual elimination from exposure to secondhand smoke, and the identification and
elimination of tobacco-related disparities in the population, all of which are achieved through
state and community interventions, health communication interventions, cessation interventions,
surveillance and evaluation, and administration and management. [Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2007] The C.D.C. has recently published a standard for central – and statelevel surveillance and evaluation programs based on the MPOWER framework, complete with
suggested metrics (summarized in Table 3-3) for each activity area. [Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2010]

Table 3-3. CDC-Recommended Surveillance and Evaluation Metrics Based on MPOWER Framework
Component
“Monitor tobacco use and prevention
policies”
“Protect people from tobacco smoke”
“Offer help to quit tobacco use”
“Warn about the dangers of tobacco”
“Enforce bans on tobacco advertising,
promotion, and sponsorship”
“Raise taxes on tobacco”

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Recommended Metrics
Current smoking among adults
Past month cigarette use among youth
Smoking-attributable adult mortality
State smoke-free policy
Adults who reported anyone smoking in work area within past two weeks
Percent of smokers calling Quitline
Medicaid coverage for counseling and medications
Households with no-smoking rules
Tobacco counter-marketing media intensity
State allows local advertising and promotion laws (no preemption)
Retail environment tobacco licensure
Amount of cigarette excise tax
Minimum price law
State funding for tobacco control

Source: (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010)
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So, while the specifics of the C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program and its
subsequent implementation recommendations have clearly been developed for and tailored to
the United States, the substance of these programs and recommendations are not without
substantial generalizability to jurisdictions beyond the United States.

Further, these

Table 3-4. Tobacco Control Policy Regime Components
Component
Structural
Central-level
Components

•
•
•

Sub-central level

•
•
•

Market Regulation
Functional
Components

Surveillance and
Monitoring

•
•
•
•
•

Policy
Components

Budget & Financial
Support

•
•
•
•
•

Secondhand smoke

•
•
•
•
•

Cessation

•
•
•

Public education
campaigns and
health warnings

Barriers to smoking
initiation, particularly
by youth and
adolescents

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Taxation

Enforcement
Component

Ability of jurisdictions
to enact policies
Enforcement and
penalty

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Elements / Description
Nationally-designated lead agency (within national health bureaucracy or other appropriate agency)
with both dedicated funding and personnel
National agency provides leadership for national priorities, policy and program development, and
capacity building at sub-central levels
A standing, nationally representative tobacco control advisory committee that consists of both
governmental and non-governmental agencies to facilitate the development of and implementation of a
national tobacco control program
Agency or bureaucracy at sub-national level of government with designated authority and responsibility
for coordinating and implementing the national tobacco control program within that jurisdiction
Direct liaison with the national lead agency
Facilitates development of, capacity building within, and coordination between community-based
organizations
Regulation and monitoring of products within the market as regards content, manufacture, and product
claims
Evaluation and approval of new products before introduction into the marketplace
Surveillance of tobacco use (prevalence), initiation (incidence), and consumption (number of sticks per
day) with a methodological valid and reliable monitoring system; the monitoring system allows for the
stratification of these metrics by age, gender, and key ethnic and geographic groups
Surveillance of population knowledge, attitudes, and intentions towards smoking and tobacco use,
exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke, and the tobacco industry
Surveillance of tobacco industry activities including lobbying, advertising and promotional activities, and
sales
Surveillance of tobacco control policy activities (at all stages in the policy cycle)
Monitoring of both agency and program effectiveness, including fiduciary responsibilities
Regular public reporting of results from surveillance and monitoring activities
Dedicated and stable funding for personnel and program activities at the central and sub-central levels
Spending goals for tobacco control activities are established for both central and sub-central
jurisdictions based on transparent and publicly available criteria that considers baseline smoking (and
other tobacco use) prevalence, national tobacco control objectives, and estimated costs for
implementing program activities
Both estimated (goal) and actual spending on tobacco control activities are reported publicly
Ratio between taxation revenues and total tobacco control program spending
“Clean air” legislation / restriction or prohibition of smoking and other tobacco use in indoor public, civic,
and workplace venues
“Clean air” legislation / restriction or prohibition of smoking and other tobacco use in outdoor public,
civic, and workplace venues
“Clean air” legislation / restriction or prohibition of smoking and other tobacco use in private venues
(homes, vehicles)
Evidence-based pharmacologic, behavioral, or combination cessation programs for all smokers
Individually-focused financial incentives to and supports for smokers/tobacco users to access these
programs
Training of and support for primary care providers (nursing, medical, dental) to incorporate cessation
counseling into routine care giving
“Quit-lines”
Health communication strategies, interventions, and programs about the health effects of and risks
associated with smoking and other tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke
Warning communications (labels) to smokers/tobacco users at point of sale, point of consumption
(packages), and point of reach (advertising)
Programs and strategies targeted at youth, including school-based programs
Restrictions on youth access to tobacco including minimum age requirements, proof-of-age
requirements, and sales in an unverifiable/unregulated environment (internet, vending machine, mail)
Regulation of where products may be purchased (including possible licensure requirements) and how
products may be displayed in retail outlets
Regulations regarding advertising practices and promotional activities, including but not limited to those
that appeal to youth, adolescents, and young adults (e.g., use of cartoons in advertising, product
placement in movies, event sponsorship, promotional activities such as giveaways, etc.)
Intentional use of taxation to decrease prevalence, incidence, and consumption of tobacco
Frequency of alternations in level of taxation to account for inflation
Preemption practices – the ability of sub-central jurisdictions to establish policies more restrictive than
those at the central level
Provision for enforcement of and penalty for violation of implemented policy, including budget and
personnel
Labeling and packaging provisions to deter smuggling
Capability for injunctive relief while disputes over compliance are resolved Public reporting of
enforcement activities
Violation “tip-lines”
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recommendations both complement and build upon the MPOWER framework. What emerges,
then, as a definition for a “tobacco control policy regime” is the orientation of a jurisdiction’s
cumulative policy activity regarding the reduction and elimination of tobacco-attributable disease
and death in the population within that jurisdiction. The components to be considered when
determining the type of tobacco control policy regime in a given jurisdiction at a given point in
time are summarized in Table 3-4. These components are advanced based on a synthesis of
the World Health Organization’s MPOWER Package and supporting materials, as well as the
C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program and supporting materials. Thus, these components
are an amalgamation of the structural and policy best practices from these organizations. As is
seen in this table, the important distinction between “comprehensive tobacco policy” and a
“tobacco control policy regime” is the consideration of the structural elements including central
leadership, sub-central networks, and the support for policies and programs such as budgeting
and surveillance and evaluation. The intent of identifying these criteria is not to define, in a
dichotomous manner, whether a jurisdiction does or does not have a tobacco control policy
regime, but rather to identify the dimensions to consider when characterizing the nature of the
tobacco control policy regime in a given jurisdiction at a given point in time. Ideally, the nature
of a jurisdiction’s tobacco control policy regime can be differentiated along a meaningful
continuum, implying the need for scaling and measurement.

The quantification of tobacco

control policy regimes is discussed in the next section.
3.2.2.1 Quantifying Tobacco Control Policy Regimes
As the policy solutions to combating the tobacco epidemic have evolved from single
policy instruments to a set of policy instruments (comprehensive tobacco control policy) to
multiple policy instruments supported by an infrastructure that includes personnel, financial, and
surveillance and evaluation (tobacco control policy regime), a parallel problem of the
measurement and characterization of these policy regime configurations has also emerged.
From an administrative and research perspective, the ability to meaningfully discriminate
between such different policy regime configurations across different jurisdictions and time
periods requires a quantification methodology. The approach in reports and studies to date that
have characterized or needed to quantify policy regime configurations has typically been one of
three possible solutions.

In the first approach, a list of policy elements is generated and

jurisdictions are then evaluated with a series of dichotomous (yes/no or checkmarks) or nominal
(e.g., no/minimal/moderate/complete) scores for each of the policy criteria. These analyses
thus approximate a compendium of a jurisdiction’s status (or that for multiple jurisdictions) on a
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catalog of policy elements and, while some policy elements such as taxation lend themselves to
quantification, the evaluation of most policy elements is categorical. [Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2010], [World Health Organization, 2008], [World Health Organization,
2009] Consequently, the consideration of individual policy elements in this approach means
that a single, cumulative score for an “overall” comparison remains elusive. Additionally, the set
of and definitions for the individual policy elements considered are rarely consistent across
reports or over time, making comparisons difficult. In the second approach, a grouping or
grading system is created that accounts for the cumulative set of policy instruments which
categorizes jurisdictions into similar groups or assigns a report-card-like grade. [Marmor &
Lieberman, 2004], [American Lung Association, 2009] However, while this approach considers
the cumulative set of policy instruments and thus attempts to differentiate between policy
regimes, the methodology is typically study/report-specific and so the rigor and generalizability
of the grouping methodology is unclear. Further, because the grouping or grading system
remains categorical in nature, statistical analyses are limited to those accommodating such
categorical variables and thus comparisons across time and jurisdictions are again difficult. In
the third approach, an attempt to establish interval quantification of policy regime configurations
is made by developing a policy score. [Joossens & Raw, 2006], [Studlar, Christensen, &
Frisbee, 2009], [Studlar, Christensen, & Sitasari, 2011] While some analytic utility is gained for
that study, the scoring methodology is typically not rigorous, and the inclusion of policy elements
as well as the definition, point assignment, and weighting for policy elements varies between
studies. Thus, the challenge for all three of these commonly employed approaches is that
comparison across and between studies and reports is very limited due to non-standardized
approaches to the inclusion of policy elements, data sources, and scoring and weighting of
policy elements.
Within the existing literature, four attempts have been made to develop a standardized
policy scoring system: the Assessment of the Comprehensiveness of Tobacco Control Laws
Scale (A.C.T.-L.) [Klonoff, et al., 1998], the Measuring Activities of Tobacco Control (M.A.To.C.)
score [Thyrian & John, 2006], the Tobacco Control Scale (T.C.S.) [Joossens & Raw, 2006], and
a rating systems for youth access to tobacco laws in U.S. states [Alciati, et al., 1998], though
these scores have not been widely applied or cited. The A.C.T.-L. is a 55-item questionnaire
designed to score city- and county-level anti-smoking ordinances, and the score has
environmental tobacco, advertising, and youth access subscales.

The methodologic

development of the A.C.T.-L. was reported in the original study, including the validity and
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reliability, though the score was not applied to specific jurisdictions. [Klonoff, et al., 1998] Also,
the original report has only been cited by three other studies in PubMed, one of which was a
non-tobacco study and a second was the study developing the M.A.To.C. score, and the score
itself has not been applied in a study indexed in PubMed. The M.A.To.C. score consists of the
self-reported (by country experts) responses to a series of thirty questions, also identified and
developed by a group of experts, and the original study reported the results of the application of
the score to fourteen European countries. [Thyrian & John, 2006] The M.A.To.C. score has
been cited by two other studies in PubMed, one of which applied the reported M.A.To.C. scores
in subsequent analysis. [Thyrian & John, 2006] Finally, the T.C.S. score is a country-based
expert survey, developed based on expert opinion as to policy element content and weighting,
with an overall score (a total of 100 points) and sub-scale scores for price, public place bans,
spending on public information campaigns, advertising bans, package health warnings, and
cessation treatment. [Joossens & Raw, 2006] The original report, in addition to reporting the
methodology for the score development, also reported the T.C.S. scores for thirty European
countries based on surveys administered in 2005 and there has been a subsequent report that
updated these 2005 country-based scores. [Joosens & Raw, 2008] The T.C.S. has been cited
by nine other studies indexed in PubMed, one of which applied the reported TCS scores in
subsequent analysis and was the same study which also cited the M.A.To.C. score. [Thyrian,
Panagiotakos, Polychronopoulos, West, Zatonski, & John, 2008] Finally, a rating system was
developed to score states on youth access laws using statutes compiled in the National Cancer
Institute’s State Cancer Legislative Database (S.C.L.D.) which was comprised of a score based
on a five-point rating of nine different youth access-oriented policy elements. [Alciati, et al.,
1998] However, it is unclear that this ranking system has been applied outside this National
Cancer Institute database. For both the M.A.To.C. and T.C.S. scores, the use of non-public
datasets (i.e., the use of self-report surveys of selected country experts administered by the
authors of the study) has substantially limited the applicability of the score by other researchers
to other jurisdictions or time periods, and the reliance on country-based expert self-reporting
raises concerns about score reliability when there is a personnel change in those country-based
experts.
Thus, there remains a large gap and need in the literature.

The absence of a

theoretically rigorous and statistically valid and reliable mechanism to quantify the nature of a
jurisdiction’s tobacco control policy regime at a given time point has undoubtedly impeded the
conduct of both temporal and comparative studies. So, while such a quantification method – a
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score – does not yet exist, it is possible to identify at least some of the ideal criteria for such a
score. Accordingly, it is forwarded that an ideal score would have the following characteristics:
•

Be applicable to both research and administrative (e.g., public health agencies,
health advocacy groups) settings;

•

Have both a transparent and publicly available scoring system, and be based on
publicly available data so that researchers and agencies alike could apply the score
across jurisdictions and time periods;

•

Be applicable to different types of jurisdictions with equal validity and reliability (e.g.,
a country, a state or province, or a county or city), implying that the selection of and
definitions for content (policy elements) would need to be meaningful both across
jurisdictions and time;

•

While being theoretically, methodologically, and statistically sound, also be feasible
and reasonable to implement and track in a wide variety of settings and jurisdictions;

•

Have both a total score, and sub-scale scores for key areas of interest such as
advertising and youth smoking, among others

•

Selection of content (policy elements) be theoretically based, as well as the scoring
and weighting system.

For any scoring system, the simultaneous achievement of these criteria will not be
without substantial challenge, in particular the last criteria of a theoretic foundation for both
content and weighting.

Whereas much of the evidence for policy effectiveness has been

gathered from studies of individual policies, much less is understood about interaction effects
between individual policy elements, [Levy, Bauer, & Hye-ryeon, 2006] and the directionality of
the causal relationship between policy and population health outcome (prevalence), particularly
as regards temporality, is also ambiguous. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004]

Regardless and

despite these challenges, development of a method to validly and reliably quantitatively
characterize the nature of a tobacco control policy regime remains both a significant need in the
field and an area suitable for research and development.
3.2.3 Evidence of the Effectiveness of State-Level Tobacco Control Policy Regimes
In industrialized countries, where the investment has been made in policy development and
adoption as well as well as the personnel and surveillance and evaluation to support population
tobacco control programs, it is consistent with the above discussion to consider these states to
have a tobacco control policy regime. Thus, comparative evaluations can be conducted to
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assess the relative effectiveness of these policy regimes. Within the United States, because
each state administers its own tobacco control program (as discussed previously, with funding
and coordination through the N.T.C.P. at the C.D.C. and additional funding from state M.S.A.
settlement agreements as well as taxation) and the role of the U.S. central government has
been comparatively sluggish, each state can be considered to have its own tobacco control
policy regime thus permitting between-state comparative studies comparing features of either
the state tobacco control programs and / or adopted policies and measures of state population
health (e.g., smoking prevalence).
In the United States, California (1989) followed by Massachusetts (1993), Arizona (1994),
Oregon (1996), and Florida (1997) were the first states to implement state-level tobacco control
programs. [Siegel, 2002], [Wakefield & Chaloupka, 2000] Several reports, using case-study
methodology, have reported on the results from individual state-level programs, particularly
results for the “early adopters” – California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida. In a
review of published reports (scientific, peer-reviewed studies as well as state-issued reports),
one study concluded that despite differences in program strategies and approaches, the statelevel programs were associated with a decline in adult smoking prevalence as well as a change
in the “factors” influencing teen smoking. [Wakefield & Chaloupka, 2000] In a review of the
California and Massachusetts programs, another study reported a reduction in cigarette
consumption but no measureable impact on smoking initiation by adolescents. [Siegel & Biener,
1997] In a follow-up study evaluating the California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and
Florida programs, the same research group concluded that these state-level programs could be
very effective in improving population health but that results were highly contingent upon
sustained, adequate funding and the intensity and aggressiveness of program activities. [Siegel,
2002] Finally, in a more recent review of case study reports of the California, Massachusetts,
Florida, and Sydney/Melbourne (Australia) tobacco control programs, the author concluded that
there was strong evidence to support the effectiveness of these state-level programs, though
the author noted the challenges of accounting for wide variation in program funding over time.
[Pierce, 2007]
Population-based analyses have also been undertaken. In a study applying the S.C.L.D.
score (described above, [Alciati, et al., 1998]), scores calculated quantifying state-level youth
access-focused policies in 1996 were found to correlate to the state tobacco excise tax
(positive), the proportion of the state living in rural areas (negative), leadership in the state
legislature (negative for Republican-controlled houses), and the prevalence of teen smoking in
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1997 as estimated by C.D.C.’s Youth Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (Y.R.B.S.). [Luke,
Stamatakis, & Brownson, 2000] In another study using youth smoking prevalence estimates
from the Monitoring the Futures Project collected as part of the Institute for Social Research at
the University of Michigan, state-level per capita tobacco control expenditures were found to be
negatively associated with smoking prevalence and consumption. [Tauras, et al., 2005] In a
study using a quasi-experimental design, similar results were reported in adults: per capita
expenditures on state-level tobacco control programs were negatively associated with adult
smoking prevalence. [Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 2008] Finally, in another study
utilizing data from the Monitoring the Futures Project, cigarette price was found to be positively
associated with cessation in teens as were youth access laws. [Tworek, et al., 2010]
The body of literature quantitatively documenting the effectiveness of these state-level
tobacco control programs (policy regimes) is not as robust and the results have been, as other
studies have acknowledged [Tworek, et al., 2010], more equivocal than perhaps anticipated.
This likely has myriad explanations, including the underdevelopment of both the technical
aspects as well as the theoretical underpinnings of these studies. As discussed previously,
inclusion of the policy elements within the tobacco control programs is based on the
effectiveness of these policies typically established in single-intervention trials and little is
understood about either the interactions between individual policy elements or the temporal
relationships between policy and a population health outcome. Moreover, and also discussed in
the Introduction, in these studies the directionally in the causal association is typically assumed
to be from policy to health outcome when, in fact, that may not be accurate – or at least an
oversimplification. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004] Further, because a validated quantification
method for characterizing tobacco control policy regimes is not available (discussed above),
these studies typically treat all state tobacco control programs similarly (“yes/no” or “yes/no” to a
series of specific policy elements), or per capita spending is substituted as a measure of policy
comprehensiveness or vigor. That is, assessment of these state-level programs has generally
not distinguished between policy adoption and aspects of implementation, spending and
programmatic activities, or other aspects of programmatic activities such as intensity,
aggressiveness, or structural characteristics or functional capacity. While statistical techniques
such as network analysis are now being applied to the evaluation of the organizational
characteristics of state-level tobacco control programs and networks of the associated
community-based coalitions [Krauss, Meuller, & Luke, 2004], [Harris, Luke, Burke, & Meuller,
2008] these analyses and the results from them are still nascent. Thus, substantial scholarship
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remains to develop more rigorous assessment methodologies for these state-level tobacco
control programs so as to elucidate the most effective program structures and processes to elicit
the best population health outcomes.
3.2.4

International Cooperative Efforts to Enact Tobacco Control Policies
While the gradual decline in smoking prevalence in industrialized countries has resulted

in shrinking markets for tobacco companies (though not profitability), global trade liberalization,
the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and dissolution of the Soviet bloc, economic unification in Europe
(European Union), and global trade agreements have resulted in the opening of new markets for
tobacco companies, and transnational tobacco companies have capitalized on these new
market opportunities. [Collin, Lee, & Bissell, 2002]

As discussed in the Introduction, while

tobacco consumption has decreased by approximately 50% in the last 20-30 years in countries
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, both prevalence and consumption
have increased substantially in developing countries such that these countries now account for
80% of global smokers. [Jha, 2009] Further, whereas nearly 70% of the 100 million tobaccorelated deaths in the 20th century occurred in high-income countries, it has been forecast that
70% of the projected 1 billion tobacco-related deaths in the 21st century will occur in low- and
middle-income countries. [Jha, 2009]

Tobacco companies have aggressively pursued the

emerging markets in these developing countries. For example, research using tobacco industry
documents on the activities of transnational tobacco companies in central and eastern
European countries shortly after the collapse of the communist regimes has reported evidence
for tactics such as an explosion of advertising, often targeted at women and children, in
societies previously unaccustomed to the promotion of consumer goods and often without
existing tobacco control policies or the capacity to quickly implement such policies. [Zatonski,
2003], [Lipand, 2007], [Szilagyi, 2006] Such evidence has resulted in a clear recognition that
coordinated global tobacco control efforts are needed to counter a sophisticated, global tobacco
industry.
Such international tobacco control efforts began as early as the 1960s. Specifically, the
1967 1st World Conference on Tobacco or Health (W.C.T.O.H.) held in New York City, NY is
often considered the inaugural event in a formal, global tobacco control effort. These World
Conferences have been held triennially since 1967, hosted by different countries worldwide.
The purpose of these international forums has been and remains the facilitation of policy
learning and diffusion, particularly by creating the structure (networks) through which such
learning and diffusion can occur, and the promotion and dissemination of globally-focused
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research and evidence on epidemiology, tobacco industry activities, and policy effectiveness.
While other international forums have developed since the first W.C.T.O.H., such as the AsiaPacific Conferences on Tobacco or Health (A.Pa.C.T.), the European Conferences on Tobacco
or Health (E.C.To.H.), the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco (S.R.N.T.), and the
World Cancer Congress (U.I.C.C.), the W.C.T.O.H. remains the preeminent international
meeting for tobacco control. Further, while facilitation of policy implementation to combat the
tobacco control epidemic in industrialized countries was the focus of early conferences,
expansion to include efforts to facilitate such policy implementation in low- and middle-income
countries has occurred over time. As forwarded previously (Introduction), truncating or averting
stages of the tobacco epidemic in developing countries has evolved to become the implicit,
primary objective of international tobacco control policy efforts.

Despite the challenges in

organizing and hosting these conferences, not limited to funding, logistics, and industry attempts
to undermine the conferences [Muggll & Hurt, 2003], several global initiatives have developed
as a result of these conferences, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control chief among
them.
The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (F.C.T.C.)
was initially conceptualized in the 1990s by a small group of American academic researchers
and public health advocates, with very early support from Health Canada, and was proposed as
a resolution at the 9th World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Paris in October 1994 and
again at the World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly in 1996. [Roemer, Taylor, &
Lariviere, 2005] The process from the initial proposal of using the constitutional authority of the
World Health Organization to develop a legally binding treaty to the formal adoption of the
F.C.T.C. spanned almost a decade and consisted of multiple working groups, intergovernmental
negotiating bodies, draft resolutions, and negotiations and revisions to these draft resolutions.
[World Heath Organization, 2010], [Warner, 2008] The F.C.T.C. was adopted by the World
Health Assembly in May 2003 and came into effect in February 2005. The Convention had 168
signatories (signed before June 29, 2004) representing 91.8% of the world’s population, and
currently has 169 parties (countries legally bound to enact the provisions of the F.C.T.C.;
signatory countries through domestic ratification, and non-signatory countries through accession
or succession) representing 86.6% of the world’s population, and 183 participants (signatories
and / or parties) representing 94.89% of the world’s population. [Framework Convention
Alliance, 2010] Of the original 168 signatory countries, fourteen have not yet ratified the treaty
(notably, the United States being one of these countries) and of the parties to the Framework,

[49]

fifteen were not original signatories (i.e., became party to the Framework through accession
(n=14) or succession (n=1)). [Framework Convention Alliance, 2010]
As stated in Article 3 of the F.C.T.C., the objective of the Convention is:
“The objective of this Convention and its protocols is to protect present and
future generations from the devastating health, social, environmental and
economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco
smoke by providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be
implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and international levels
in order to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco
use and exposure to tobacco smoke.”
From: [World Health Organization, 2003]
A complete list of the Articles of the Convention is outlined is Table 3-5. As evidenced
from this list, the major content areas to be addressed by F.C.T.C. include: measures to reduce
the demand for tobacco, including taxation, education and public awareness, and advertising
and package labeling; measures to reduce youth access to tobacco; global strategies to
counteract smuggling; and elimination of exposure to secondhand smoke.
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Table 3-5. Articles of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
I: Introduction
Article 1
Article 2

Use of Terms
Relationship between this Convention and other agreements and legal
instruments
II: Objective, guiding principles and general obligations
Article 3
Objective
Article 4
Guiding Principles
Article 5
General Obligations
III: Measures relating to the reduction of demand for tobacco
Article 6
Price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco
Article 7
Non-price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco
Article 8
Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke
Article 9
Regulation of the contents of tobacco products
Article 10
Regulation of tobacco products disclosure
Article 11
Packaging and labeling of tobacco products
Article 12
Education, communication, training and public awareness
Article 13
Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship
Article 14
Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation
IV: Measures relating to the reduction of the supply of tobacco
Article 15
Illicit trade in tobacco products
Article 16
Sales to and by minors
Article 17*
Provision of support for economically viable alternative activities
V: Protection of the environment
Article 18
Protection of the environment and health of persons
VI: Questions related to liability
Article 19
Liability
VII: Scientific and technical cooperation and communication of information
Article 20
Research, surveillance and exchange of information
Article 21
Reporting and exchange of information
Article 22
Cooperation in the scientific, technical and legal fields and provision of related
expertise
VIII: Institutional arrangements and financial resources
Article 23
Conference of the Parties
Articles 24
Secretariat
Articles 25
Relations between the Conference of the Parties and intergovernmental
organizations
Article 26
Financial resources
IX: Settlement of disputes
Article 27
Settlement of disputes
X: Development of the Convention
Article 28
Amendments to this Convention
Article 29
Adoption and amendment of annexes to this Convention
XI: Final Provisions
Article 30
Reservations
Article 31
Withdrawal
Article 32
Right to vote
Article 33
Protocols
Article 34
Signature
Article 35
Ratification, acceptance, approval, formal confirmation or accession
Article 36
Entry into force
Article 37
Depositary
Article 38
Authentic texts
Source: [World Health Organization, 2003]

The first global initiative to address a non-communicable disease, the F.C.T.C. is often
referenced as the first global health treaty, though it is actually not a treaty (an instrument
explicit in its terms and required actions at the time of approval) but a framework convention (an
instrument that identifies the overall objectives and specific content areas to be addressed and
the process for developing the specific protocols for implementation after approval). [Warner,
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2008] That is, by becoming party to the Convention, countries agreed to participate in the
negotiation process and to implement the protocols developed and agreed to as part of that
negotiation process. The negotiation and protocol approval process is conducted under the
auspices of the Conference of the Parties (C.O.P.), a body created by the F.C.T.C. itself and of
which all parties to the F.C.T.C. are members with voting privileges, which has the authority to
conduct and oversee the proscribed negotiations as well as adopt protocols and annexes to the
Convention. [Warner, 2008] The F.C.T.C. in general, and the negotiation and protocol adoption
process specifically, is also supported by groups such as the Framework Convention Alliance, a
group of non-governmental organizations and health advocacy groups that has provided
technical and other support to the F.C.T.C. from a very early stage in the process. [Warner,
2008] To date, the C.O.P. has approved guidelines for Articles 5.3, 8, 11, and 13 and has
active work groups creating guidelines for implementation for Articles 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, and 18.
[World Health Organization, 2010] The intent for the Article guidelines is that they form a
“minimum standard” for tobacco control legislation which party countries must enact
domestically.
Because of the format as a framework convention rather than a treaty, the adoption of
the F.C.T.C. by the World Health Organization in 2003 signified the end of one series of
complex negotiations and the beginning of another series of international negotiations to
establish the specific terms and protocols for global tobacco control. As one would anticipate in
a process with 168-183 countries each with specific circumstances and interests, the
negotiation of the F.C.T.C. and the subsequent protocols and guidelines, domestic ratification,
and implementation of domestic policy has been a complex and challenging process with many
obstacles. In the consensus-based negotiations of the F.C.T.C., multiple studies have reported
on the ability of individual countries to weaken or otherwise influence the requirements of the
Articles. Of particular note have been studies of Japan’s actions to weaken F.C.T.C. language
[Assunta & Chapman, 2005], and allusions to obstreperous tactics on the part of the United
States and attempts to unduly influence final Convention language. [Warner, 2008], [Collin, Lee,
& Bissell, 2002] The World Health Organization has also not been without criticism, particularly
stemming from perceived insufficient conflict of interest standards that have been manipulated
and used advantageously by the tobacco industry. [Godlee, 2000]
Predictably, the tobacco industry has been incontestably opposed to the F.C.T.C. and
numerous studies have documented industry tactics to undermine, weaken, and otherwise
impede F.C.T.C. negotiations, development of Convention guidelines, and implementation of
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domestic policies in party countries. The reported tactics to impede the development of the
F.C.T.C. have included: lobbying and pressuring countries to either not participate in
negotiations or advocating to weaken Convention Articles; advocating for an agreement based
on voluntary codes of conduct rather than regulation; threatening to withdraw support for
domestic government programs if countries participated (this tactic was particularly employed in
developing countries, including those emerging from post-Soviet regimes, where transnational
tobacco companies often contributed financially to, e.g., health and education budgets as a
means of exerting influence); refusing to comply with implemented regulations; implicitly
supporting smuggling; and exploitation of the negotiation process so as to impede progress.
[Collin, Lee, & Bissell, 2002] Studies have also reported on “Project Cerberus”, an effort by
British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, and Japan Tobacco International between 1999-2001,
to develop, propose, and advocate for a global voluntary regulatory code so as to make the
F.C.T.C. unnecessary. [Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008] Tobacco industry tactics have
also included a particular focus on creating and / or exploiting economic fears in countries with a
domestic tobacco agricultural sector or those which rely on tobacco industry contributions to
domestic (non-tobacco) programs. To accomplish this, analysis of tobacco industry documents
have reported on attempts to undermine economic impact estimates by the World Bank by
commissioning industry-sponsored reports and studies [Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008]
and creating economic fears by producing and distributing projections for the job and economic
losses attributable to implementing the F.C.T.C. or other domestic tobacco control measures.
[Otanez, Mamudu, & Glantz, 2009] In the European Union and the United Kingdom, studies
have also reported that the tobacco industry is attempting to create tension between F.C.T.C.
guidelines, particularly Article 5.3, which proscribes tobacco industry consultation or
involvement in negotiations except when strictly necessary, and perceptions about existing E.U.
standards for “good governance” and “better regulation” so requiring industry participation in
policy negotiation, with the eventual goal to substantially weaken the effectiveness of the
F.C.T.C. [Smith, Gilmore, Fooks, Collin, & Weishaar, 2009]
Ratification of the F.C.T.C. and implementation of subsequent domestic policy has been
and will continue to be challenging, particularly in developing countries which often have neither
the legal framework nor the legislative sophistication to implement the Article guidelines in a
timely or effective fashion. [Owusu-Dabo, McNeill, Lewis, Gilmore, & Britton, 2010] The tobacco
industry has been adept at exploiting these vulnerabilities by influencing both legislators and the
legislative process in developing countries to weaken the impact of the F.C.T.C., Article
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guidelines, and domestic policy. [Samet, Wipfli, Perez-Padilla, & Yach, 2006], [Meija, Schoj,
Barnoya, Flores, & Perez-Stable, 2008], [Albuja & Daynard, 2009] Thus, while the process to
establish the specific F.C.T.C. Article guidelines continues with substantial work remaining, the
ultimate ability of the F.C.T.C. to combat the global tobacco epidemic will likely substantially
depend upon the successful and sustained technical and strategic support for the drafting and
implementation of meaningful domestic tobacco control policies in developing countries.
Two other international tobacco control efforts require mention both because of their
scope and association to the F.C.T.C.: the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation
Project (I.T.C. Project) and the Global Tobacco Surveillance System (G.T.S.S.). The I.T.C.
Project was initiated in 2002 in four countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States), though it has since expanded to more than a dozen countries. [Fong, G T;
Cummings, K M; Shopland, D R; for the ITC Collaboration, 2006] A survey, the I.T.C. Project is
designed to assess the psychosocial and behavioral effects of F.C.T.C. policies and is based on
psychosocial and health communications theoretical and conceptual models. [Fong, et al., 2006]
Further, it is designed as a parallel prospective longitudinal cohort study of adult smokers and
non-smokers (in some countries) with a sampling plan based on a quasi-experimental design.
[Thompson, et al., 2006] With standardized questionnaires and implementation methodology,
the ITC Project allows opportunities for intra-country longitudinal comparisons and inter-country
comparisons not previously available. To date, the I.T.C. Project has resulted in more than fifty
studies indexed in PubMed on topics ranging from population attitudes towards specific tobacco
control policies to intentions to and predictors of cessation.
Finally, the G.T.S.S. began in 1998 as a collaboration between the C.D.C., the Canadian
Public Health Association, and the World Health Organization which had recently launched its
Tobacco Free Initiative. The G.T.S.S. was explicitly designed to establish standardized and
internationally comparative surveillance data on issues such as tobacco use, exposure to
secondhand smoke, exposure to tobacco advertising or promotion, and cessation. [The GTSS
Collaborative Group, 2006] In order to develop such a comparative data repository, a key task
of the G.T.S.S. has been to develop a series of standardized questionnaires, sampling
methodologies, and field procedures implementable in the now 190+ countries that contribute
data to the G.T.S.S. [Warren, et al., 2009], [Global Tobacco Surveillance System Collaboration
Group, 2005].

The G.T.S.S. has developed into four modules: the Global Youth Tobacco

Survey (G.Y.T.S., the first module implemented), the Global School Personnel Survey
(G.S.P.S.), the Global Health Professions Student Survey (G.H.P.S.S.), and the Global Adult
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Tobacco Survey (G.A.T.S.). [Warren, et al., 2009] The G.T.S.S. has resulted in multiple peerreviewed research publications as well as atlas-type compendiums and data reports with webbased access to results. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]
The F.C.T.C. in particular, but also companion efforts such as the I.T.C. Project and the
G.T.S.S., are part of the emerging field of global health governance. The origins of global
health governance are derived from the normative expansion of human rights to include
“health”. [Gable, 2007] Fundamentally, it has been recognized that without health individuals
cannot advocate for or benefit from their other human rights. [Gable, 2007] The right to health
was first explicitly delineated in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1948] and then expanded
upon in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. [United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1966] Hence, efforts to advance
global health through global health governance can be interpreted as advancing human rights
and addressing issues of social justice by ameliorating global health disparities. Two additional,
important functions for global health governance, including the requisite structures and
processes, have been identified: a mechanism to mount effective and timely responses to global
infectious disease outbreaks such as SARS, H1N1, HIV/AIDS [Taylor, 2004], [Gostin & Hodge,
Global health law, ethics, and policy, 2007], [Dressler & Marks, 2006]; and as a means to
present a countervailing force against globalized economic regimes and the unequal and unjust
distribution of economic benefits that often results from the international trade agreements that
support such regimes. [Dressler & Marks, 2006], [Thomas & Weber, 2004] Thus, while the
language of the F.C.T.C. does not itself directly invoke human rights, the connection to human
rights, global public health, reduction of global health disparities, and counteracting the effects
of the globalization of “big tobacco” has been clearly recognized. [Dressler & Marks, 2006]
3.3

Universal Challenges to Enacting Tobacco Control Policies
Currently, tobacco products and their use are legal in all countries throughout the world.

Recently, the only country to attempt to fully ban the possession and use of tobacco, Bhutan,
reversed their 2004 ban in 2009 due to widespread difficulties in enforcement and the
development of a black market despite what might be considered conditions advantageous to a
successful ban (small, isolated, and mountainous country and low smoking prevalence).
[Joosens, 2009], [Government of Bhutan, 2009] Further, in the United States polls suggest that
only 17% of the population supports an outright ban on tobacco products. [Jones, J M; Gallup,
Inc., 2009] By definition, tobacco control policies aim to decrease demand for cigarettes and
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other tobacco products by directly influencing the behavior of current or future smokers. As
such, tobacco control policies also necessarily have an economic impact on those growing,
manufacturing, distributing, or selling an otherwise legal product.

That is, the fundamental

paradox of tobacco control policies is the ambition to ban the use of a legal product but not the
product itself. This paradox has resulted in debate, and often conflict, about the appropriate role
of government, the legal and moral basis for tobacco control policy, an acceptable balance
between individual and property rights, and even about the balance between different individual
rights. The issues raised in these debates will be discussed in this section.
3.3.1

A “Right” to Tobacco Control or a “Right” to Smoke?
In the United States, the 1938 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Carolene

Products Company [United States v. Carolene Products Company, 1938] is often cited as the
legal, jurisprudential basis for the regulation of tobacco products. [Byrd, Shapiro, &
Schiedermayer, 1989] In this ruling, the Court established different standards for the judicial
review of legislation: regulation of economic (property) rights could be assumed to be
constitutional provided that a sound rationale was provided by the legislature, but legislative
regulation of civil or personal rights (e.g., life, liberty) would be subjected to a much stricter
standard of judicial review. [Powell, 1982], [Funston, 1975] That is, the Court effectively created
a hierarchy of rights wherein personal or civil rights have primacy over property rights and are
so afforded more protection. Thus, an appeal to the protection of personal and human rights
has evolved as a legal rationale to advance tobacco control policies.
As discussed above, the United Nations explicitly identified a right to health as a
fundamental human right in 1948:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25
“25.1

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”
From: [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 1948]

In this Article, the instrumental value of health is clearly recognized as fundamental to achieving
equality in the realization of human rights. In 1966, the United Nations continued conceptual
extension human rights to include a right to health:
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12
“12.1

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health.

12.2

The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include
those necessary for:
a. The provision for the reduction of the still-birth rate and of
infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;
b. The improvement of all aspects of environmental and
industrial hygiene;
c. The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic,
endemic, occupational and other diseases;
d. The creation of conditions which would assure to all
medical service and medical attention in the event of
sickness.”
From: [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 1966]

In Article 12.1, the right to both physical and mental health is explicitly affirmed. Further, Article
12.2 identifies the obligations of the State to protect and advance not only individual health but
also public health.

In subsequent comments pursuant to the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations further advanced these rights and
obligations with increasingly prescriptive language regarding what States ought to do to protect
these rights including, for example, necessary characteristics of health care systems (though
ultimately this International Covenant is yet functionally unenforceable). [Kinney, 2001]
So, while the right to health is not an enforceable right in the realm of international law,
within the United States (and other countries as well) the protection of health, now understood
as a fundamental human or personal right with precedence over property rights, has been
advanced as sound rationale, the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United
States v. Carolene Products Company, for tobacco control policies.

The emergence and

accumulation of scientific evidence establishing causal links between tobacco use and exposure
and morbidity and mortality has given substantial credibility to the use of the human rights
framework as the basis for this [U.S.] Court-standard of sound rationale. Insofar as a person
has a right to health (a human or personal and civil right) which is accorded greater
consideration and protection than the right of another to smoke (a property right or legally
protected interest), a hierarchy also established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Carolene Products Company, protection of non-smokers from exposure to secondhand or
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environmental tobacco smoke, established by scientifically valid evidence as having negative
health effects and increasing mortality risk, policies restricting or banning smoking particularly
indoors have thus been framed as protection of human rights. [Oriola, 2009], [Katz, 2006],
[Dressler & Marks, 2006] The human rights framework, in conjunction with the specific rights
and obligations advanced in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
[United Nations General Assembly, 1989], has also been applied as the foundation of rational
basis for policies protecting children from exposure to secondhand smoke, enticement to use
tobacco products, and employment in or exploitation (child labor) in tobacco agriculture or
manufacturing industries. [Dressler & Marks, 2006], [World Health Organization, 2001]
Despite legitimate appeal to protection of the human right to health, tobacco products
remain legal as does their use, and thus tobacco control policies necessarily limit personal
liberty to obtain and use these legal products. [Pope, 2000] The legal principles which serve as
justification to limit personal freedom with a tobacco control policy, which is substantively
distinguished from the public explanations forwarded for a given policy, are those of the limiting
harm to others, the harm principle, or limiting the harm to oneself, the principle of either soft or
hard paternalism. [Pope, 2000], [Oriola, 2009] The harm principle, widely regarded as the most
legitimate basis for governments to limit individual autonomy and with a longstanding legal and
philosophical tradition, presupposes that an individual’s right to liberty and autonomy is
justifiably abridged so as to prevent harm to others. [Pope, 2000] Thus, some tobacco control
policies that limit an individual’s liberty to use tobacco, whose use results in known negative
(harmful) health consequences for those exposed to secondhand smoke, can clearly be justified
with the harm principle, for example indoor smoking bans. [Oriola, 2009] However, there must
necessarily be limits to the harm principle, particularly in the understanding of what constitutes a
reasonable or sufficient harm to warrant limitations on liberty, or there is a risk for a limitless,
normative expansion in the conception of harm to include justification for virtually any
government liberty-limiting action. [Pope, 2000] It is possible to argue that there are some
instances, such as transient exposure to secondhand smoke outdoors, where the harm to
others is not of sufficient magnitude or risk to warrant limitations on liberty with the harm
principle, and thus other justifications are sought. [Pope, 2000]
In using the principle of paternalism, the state justifies limitations on individual liberty
through coercive policies to protect one’s life, health, and / or safety because an individual is
deemed to not have sufficient knowledge, maturity, or voluntary autonomy to make an informed
and sound decision (soft paternalism), or solely to protect the individual from the harmful
[58]

consequences of an otherwise informed and autonomous choice (hard paternalism). [Oriola,
2009], [Pope, 2000] The transition in legal justification from the harm principle to the principle of
paternalism unavoidably entails increased scrutiny and increased criticism from those
philosophically more aligned with civil libertarianism, who regard any government liberty-limiting
intervention defended as being in the government-deemed individual’s best interest with
profound skepticism. While policies justified with the principle of soft paternalism to protect
vulnerable populations, such as tobacco control policies protecting children from secondhand
smoke or those designed to prevent smoking initiation in children and adolescents (legal
“minors”), and policies justified by the harm principle are generally accepted by civil libertarians
[Hospers, 1980], paternalistic policies limiting the liberties of adults are much more
controversial. [Hospers, 1980], [Oriola, 2009], [Pope, 2000] The debate about the acceptability
of paternalistic tobacco control policies, and the demarcation between tolerable and
insupportable, is made more complex by two issues: the uniqueness of tobacco products as the
only consumer product whose use as intended irrefutably results in harm to both the user and
exposed non-users; and whether the decision to smoke is truly informed (and whether package
warning labels fulfill this standard) and autonomous and, subsequently, whether continued use
given the addictive qualities of nicotine is autonomous. [Pope, 2000]
These debates are by no means settled, in part because the concept and understanding
of “harm” continues to evolve in legal, political, and public spheres and tobacco control
advocates have long understood the importance of acquiring additional, scientific evidence to
further quantify “harm”. [Byrd, Shapiro, & Schiedermayer, 1989]

However, tobacco control

advocates are not of uniform opinion or certainty on the utility of rights-based arguments to build
public and political support for tobacco control policies. [Fox & Katz, 2005], [Jacobson &
Banerjee, 2005], [Katz, 2006]

The trepidation is partially due to the tobacco industry’s

successful framing of tobacco control advocates as “Health Nazis” who infringe upon “smokers’
rights” such that it is tobacco control advocates who may be perceived as being on the antirights side of the debate [Katz, 2006], though it is noted that the use of “rights” in this context
confounds, likely intentionally, common language understanding with technical definition of
rights to obscure the difference between a fundamental human right and a legally protected
interest. [Dressler & Marks, 2006] The tactical challenges of using rights-based arguments vis à
vis the tobacco industry aside, the invocation of rights as a reason to enact tobacco control
policies necessarily raises fundamental, philosophical questions including:
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“Who has the right to rank health in the hierarchy of social norms or goods?
What authority, if any, is there for the state to permit or prohibit behaviors
that will likely bear on health? What sanctions can attach to healthharming behavior? What health-affecting entitlements are there, and how
are they ensured?”
From: [Coggon, 2009]
How a particular country or society answers these questions is deeply rooted in
philosophical, cultural, and political traditions, as well as constitutional and case law
jurisprudence. How such traditions vary between countries or change over time, and how such
differences and changes affect the adoption of tobacco control policies is not well understood
and remains an area needing additional research inquiry.

It seems evident, though, and

certainly within the United States, that rationalization of tobacco control policies based solely on
rights-based arguments is difficult and likely inadequate due to practical challenges (i.e.,
effective counter-arguments forwarded by the tobacco industry), and that rights-based
arguments appealing to the harm principle alone likely do not meet judicial standard for sound
rationale while rights-based arguments appealing to paternalism plausibly meet with stronger
judicial (and political) scrutiny. There is also an uncomfortable logical inconsistency and policy
conundrum in rights-based justifications for tobacco control policies: if tobacco products so
violate fundamental human rights to health, cause sufficient harm, and so interfere with
informed and autonomous decision making, then why are these products not banned? Hence,
there must also be additional rationale for tobacco control policies.
3.3.2

Debates about the Economic Rationale for Tobacco Control Policies
Included in the normative expansion of the understanding of the harm caused by

cigarettes have been the economic costs to society caused by the use of or exposure to
tobacco products. As stated previously, the C.D.C. has estimated an economic cost of $10.46
associated with each pack of cigarettes sold, an estimate which includes direct medical
expenses and indirect economic losses such as lost productivity. [Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2009] Tobacco taxes thus function dually to reduce demand and to recover
some of the tobacco-related costs, particularly those attributable to tobacco-related medical
care. However, neither the body of literature estimating these costs to society nor the literature
on tobacco taxes are without controversy.
The majority of studies estimating the economic costs to society have been conducted in
the United States and largely estimate costs associated with primary use of cigarettes (i.e.,
costs associated with exposure to secondhand smoke or due to use of non-cigarette tobacco
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products much less common).

Further, the estimation of such costs is methodologically

complex, and so estimates vary depending upon: the dataset; whether a prevalence or
incidence approach is used; whether costs for only specific tobacco-related diseases are
considered or all medical costs are included; the methods underlying the determination of the
disease and mortality risk ratios and attributable fractions; the scope of costs considered (i.e.,
medical costs alone, or additional costs such as insurance, pension costs, or years of life lost);
whether payment inputs as well as expenditures are considered (i.e., the considerate of socalled “net” vs. “gross” costs); as well as statistical methodologies, which have evolved over
time. [Max, 2001] Most studies concur on the direction, though not on the magnitude, of the
annual, direct smoking-attributable medical costs: smokers have higher annual medical costs
than do never-smokers (and, in some studies, than former-smokers as well), and are estimated
to account for anywhere from 6%-9% to 12%-14% of medical expenditures. [Max, 2001],
[Warner, 2003], [Warner, Hodgson, & Carroll, 1999], [Hodgson, 1992], [Hayashida, et al., 2010],
[Fellows, Trosclair, Adams, & Rivera, 2002]
However, when the lifetime costs of smokers vs. non-smokers are considered, reported
study results are far more equivocal. A Swiss study first queried whether the shorter lifespan of
smokers compensated for the higher medical costs incurred during their lifetime. [Leu &
Schaub, 1983]

Two oft-cited American studies concluded that while smokers’ medical

expenditures impose costs on society, these expenditures are recuperated in foregone pension
and nursing home payments due to early mortality, resulting in a so-called “death benefit”.
[Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss, & Wasserman, 1989], [Viscusi, 1995] But a critique of the
estimation methods used in these studies has focused on the costs that were and were not
considered: while non-smokers have higher pension and nursing home costs than smokers
(because smokers die at a younger age) that make up for or exceed their lower medical
expenditures, these studies did not account for the larger inputs made into these systems by
non-smokers (through taxation over a longer lifespan) which negates, according to this critique,
any “death benefit”. [Warner, Hodgson, & Carroll, 1999]

Further, additional studies have

indicated that the observed balance in “net” vs. “gross” lifetime expenditures (the “net”
expenditures accounting for lower pension outlays due to shorter lifespan) is influenced by
several methodologic considerations. First, the importance of whether the study differentiates
between never- vs. former- vs. current- vs. always-smokers and how the outlays and inputs for
each are apportioned is highlighted by the observed “quitting ill” phenomenon in which the
medical crisis that motivated cessation results in substantially elevated medical costs in these
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individuals, who are now, though only recently, non-smokers, in the short- to mediumtimeframe. [Warner, 2003] Second, whether the amount of smoking (i.e., packs per day) is
considered as evidence suggests that medical expenditures increase with the amount smoked.
[Hodgson, 1992] Third, whether costs other than medical expenditures, such as health status or
quality of life, are considered. [Hayashida, et al., 2010] Finally, which disease-related costs are
considered as attributed to smoking and whether gender and the age at time of cessation is
considered. [Rasmussen, Prescott, Sorensen, & Sogaard, 2004], [Rasmussen, Prescott,
Sorensen, & Sogaard, 2005] The wide variability in methodologic approaches and findings
suggests that this topic is not yet resolved but rather remains controversial, and conclusions
from individual studies are highly dependent upon the aforementioned methodologic details.
[Max, 2001], [Warner, 2003] Finally, regardless of the questionable ethical legitimacy for doing
so, the tobacco industry has cited results from the industry-favorable studies, while ignoring
contrary studies and methodologic complexities, to argue against enacting tobacco control
policies on the basis that smoking is cost-effective because of the “death benefit”. [Pellegrini,
2001] At a minimum, the tobacco industry has effectively created controversy around this issue.
Taxation is a prominent and ubiquitous tobacco control policy and is justified as a means
to recover some of the smoking-attributable medical expenditures and to affect a price-induced
reduction in demand. Beyond ideologically-based “no tax is a good tax” criticisms, high levels of
tobacco taxation are contentious because of the intersection of poverty, price elasticities and
concerns about tax regressivity. Both within the United States and globally, there is substantial
evidence that tobacco use is increasingly becoming a characteristic of lower socioeconomic
classes. [World Health Organization, 2004] In the United States, there is evidence that the
social disparity in smoking prevalence has increased since the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement [Franks, et al., 2007], and studies have reported associations such as increased
food insecurity in poor households with a smoker compared to poor households without a
smoker. [Armour, Pitts, & Lee, 2008] Given this socioeconomic gradient, any tax on tobacco
products, a consumption good, will necessarily be regressive (a larger proportion of total income
in lower socioeconomic strata is spent on consumption and thus any consumption tax tends to
regressivity), which is compounded by the higher smoking prevalence in these lower
socioeconomic strata. [Remler, 2004]

So, increasing levels of tobacco taxation could be

understood as nevertheless beneficial if such tax increases differentially induced poorer
smokers to quit. However, evidence for higher price elasticity (in absolute value terms) amongst
lower socioeconomic groups is unclear. [Regidor, Pascual, & Gutierrez-Fisac, 2007] Evidence
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supports that adolescent and young adult smokers are the most price elastic. [Grossman &
Chaloupka, 1997], [Franz, 2008], [Tauras, 2004]

In adults however, observations from

epidemiologic studies that social disparities in smoking prevalence have increased despite
repeated price increases [Franks, et al., 2007], [Regidor, Pascual, & Gutierrez-Fisac, 2007] as
well as from studies making direct estimates of elasticities [Gospodinov & Irvine, 2009] have
suggested that demand may actually be more inelastic in lower socioeconomic groups.
Reporting oppositional results, other studies have suggested higher price elasticity amongst
lower socioeconomic strata. [Siahpush, Wakefield, Spittal, Durkin, & Scollo, 2009], [Farrelly &
Engelen, 2008], [Thomas, et al., 2008] It is noted that the concern is not the effectiveness of
tobacco taxation to affect a decrease in both prevalence and consumption at the populationlevel, but whether these effects are distributed evenly throughout all sociodemographic groups
in a population; on the latter point the answer is yet uncertain.
The varied results may, in part, be due to the time perspective taken as studies have
demonstrated short-term price inelasticity with cross-price effects (i.e., reduced consumption or
substitution with cheaper or “gray-market” goods) but much higher price elasticity in the long
run. [Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994], [Hyland, et al., 2005] A possible explanation for
these varied observations is that the probability of cessation (calculated or interpreted as a price
elasticity) after a tax increase is dependent upon the ability to access cessation support to assist
in overcoming nicotine addiction. Individuals in upper socioeconomic strata are more likely to
be able to access such cessation supports of their own accord while individuals in lower
socioeconomic strata are more likely to require social and/or monetary support to obtain these
supports. Thus, important ethical questions arise about tobacco taxation related to social equity
and social justice, notably: 1) How must taxation policies be constructed so as to ensure
reduction not entrenchment or exacerbation of social disparities; and 2) If provision of cessation
support is key to minimizing social gradients in taxation effects, is it ethical for jurisdictions to
raise taxes without providing commensurate cessation support (in extension, then, should
Medicaid be required to provide cessation support)? [Feldman, 2001], [Feldman, 2009] The
importance of support for cessation in promoting social equity in tobacco use reduction, both
within countries and globally, has been noted as a moral imperative and the absence of it as a
mandate in the F.C.T.C. has been a source of particular criticism of the Framework. [Meier &
Shelley, 2006], [Meier B. M., 2005]
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Thus, as with rights-based arguments the economic rationale for and policy instruments
used in tobacco control are not incontrovertible, and each jurisdiction must address these issues
and debates when enacting tobacco control policies.
3.3.3

Final Comments on “Rights” in Light of Health Disparities and Social Justice
Appeals to and arguments about human rights and the human right to health, the harm

principle and legal paternalism, concerns about the regressivity of taxes, and unease regarding
the use of social stigmatization and de-normalization to promulgate tobacco control policies
conflux when tobacco use and tobacco control policies are considered in the context of social
disparities in health.

As has already been discussed, the use of tobacco is increasingly

concentrating along social gradients such that, either within a country or between countries,
tobacco users are from lower socioeconomic strata or poorer countries. Thus, in addition to the
arguments already presented, tobacco use and tobacco control policy debates become yet
more complicated when social justice and related issues are considered. Many have argued
that comprehensive and aggressive tobacco control policies, including the F.C.T.C., are
imperative (with some allusions to moral imperatives) to advance human rights (right to health),
reduce social disparities, and so promote social justice. [Wilson & Thomson, 2005], [Healton &
Nelson, 2004], [Crow, 2005], [Crow, 2004] But if tobacco use is concentrating along social
gradients, it is not unreasonable to query if tobacco control policies need to be adjusted to
account for the different needs and concerns of these socioeconomic strata. Strategies such as
de-normalization and social stigmatization is considered by some to aggravate rather than
diminish health disparities and social injustice [Bell, Salmon, Bowers, Bell, & McCullough, 2010]
and the social justice concerns about excise tax regressivity have already been discussed.
Additional concerns include the intentional targeting of these disadvantaged social strata by
tobacco companies [Barbeau, Leavy-Sperounis, & Balbach, 2004] as well as the structure of
non-tax tobacco control policies. Specifically, individuals in lower socioeconomic strata typically
have fewer individual (human), social, and economic capital resources which affects one’s
ability to access or effectively use cessation treatment, for example, and lower health literacy
which affects one’s ability to read and understand package and advertising warning labels, for
example. [Weiss & Smith-Simone, 2010], [DiClemente, Delahanty, & Fiedler, 2010]
Accordingly, if tobacco control policy is to be used as a way to reduce health disparities, the
perspectives and needs of individuals in of lower socioeconomic strata must be considered and
accommodated if social justice is to be truly advanced.
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In summary, what has been presented in these subsections is the philosophical basis for
opposition to tobacco control policies both domestically and internationally. While the concerns
presented here have been framed within the context of U.S. legal standards and evidence, the
fundamental issues of limitations on liberties, protections of human rights, and values are
ubiquitous and so are universal challenges to implementing tobacco control policies. These are
also arguments and concerns that have been effectively forwarded by the tobacco industry
worldwide as barriers to implementing tobacco control policies. How these arguments or a
society’s legal framework affect public or political opinion or policy adoption across jurisdictions
or time periods is not well understood and remains an area to be explored.
3.3.4

The Universal and Ubiquitous Anti- Anti-Tobacco Arguments
The now decades-long debates in the political and public arenas over tobacco control

policies have facilitated the development of a series of common arguments for and against
these policies. As these arguments have persisted, they have become somewhat familiar and
entrenched within the population and resistant to change. Many of these arguments have been
recycled again and again in different jurisdictions at different time periods in response to the
policy debate of that time and place. Their perseverance is likely due to their populist appeal
and face validity, even if their premises or conclusions are not supported by fact. Anthologies of
these arguments have, at various times, been compiled and presented in either academic or
popular literature.

Summaries of the arguments presented in three such publications are

presented in Tables 3-6—3-8. In the first publication summarized in Table 3-6, from a decidedly
pro-tobacco control perspective, twelve anti-tobacco control “myths” are summarized and
rebuttal arguments are given for each of these “myths”. [Frieden & Blakeman, 2005] In the
second publication summarized in Table 3-7, from a more neutral perspective, the “myths”
about the economic implications of tobacco and tobacco control as argued by both the tobacco
industry and tobacco control communities are presented along with the “reality” – i.e., the “truth”
as supported by scientific studies – underlying the arguments. [Warner, 2000] In the third
publication summarized in Table 3-8, from a decidedly libertarian and anti-tobacco control
perspective, common arguments against the need or justification for tobacco control are
presented. [Sullum, 1998]
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Table 3-6. “Myths” and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate
“Myth”
“People have free choice whether or not
to smoke”

•
•
•
•
•

“Everyone knows how bad smoking is”

•
•

“Just a few cigarettes a day can’t hurt”

•
•

“’Light’ cigarettes are less harmful”

•
•
•

“It is easy to stop smoking: if people
want to quit they will”

•
•

“Cessation medications don’t work”

•
•
•

“Once a smoker always a smoker”
“Smokers may die earlier, but all they
lose are a couple of bad years at the end
of life”
“Environmental tobacco smoke may be a
nuisance, but it isn’t deadly”

•
•

“Tobacco is good for the economy”

•

•

•
“We’ve already solved the tobacco
problem”

•

“The tobacco industry no longer markets
to kids or undermines public health
efforts”

•
•
•

“Reality” / Rebuttal
Free will is subverted by advertising and nicotine addiction
In 2002, tobacco industry spent $12.5 billion on advertising and promotion in the
US (>18X spending on tobacco control)
Nicotine is highly addictive, a fact known and manipulated by tobacco companies
Most smokers want to quit but cannot do so easily due to addiction
Children, below the legal age of consent, are not legally competent to make
informed and rational decisions about whether to smoke
There is a general awareness that smoking isn’t healthy, but there is much less
knowledge about specific risks beyond lung cancer (e.g., heart disease, genderspecific risks)
Evidence that knowledge of risks varies from country to country and even within a
country across different population strata (e.g., rural vs. urban)
Relationship between tobacco use and lung cancer is relatively linear
But, relationship between exposure and cardiovascular disease is not, and
negative health effects start at very low doses and rise rapidly
There is no standard definition to what “light” means
Tobacco companies insist that the term is intended to refer to perceived taste and
not to tar or nicotine content
Any meaningful difference between regular and “light” cigarettes is lost due to
compensatory behaviors
Nicotine addiction makes cessation difficult
Nicotine has been likened to opium, heroin, cocaine and alcohol in terms of
addictive potential
Most smokers attempt quitting annually
Only 7% of smokers who attempt quitting without assistance succeed
Pharmacologic therapy double the chances of success, and combination therapy
can increase change of success beyond that
More than 50% of Americans who have smoked have quit
Average smokers loses 14 years of life, 95% of that time in non-smokers is spent
without disability
The negative health effects of exposure to secondhand smoke as been well
documented, including substantial increased risk for both respiratory and lung
disease
As supported by analyses done by the World Bank, a complete evaluation of both
the costs and benefits of tobacco in the economy shows that the net effect of
tobacco on the economy
For example, analysis in the US shows that elimination of tobacco from the
economy would result in a net increase of 130,000 jobs
While smoking prevalence is and has been declining in the developed world, about
20% of the population in developed countries still smoke and globally and
estimated 1 billion people will die this century from smoking related causes
The fiduciary responsibility of the tobacco companies – to preserve and expand
profits – is orthogonal to being supportive of and compliant with tobacco control
policies
Magazine ads for the 3 most popular brands reach 80% of children in the US
Adolescents 12-17 are twice as likely as adults to have been exposed to tobacco
advertising

Source: [Frieden & Blakeman, 2005]
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Table 3-7. Economic “Myths” and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate
“Myth”
Tobacco Industry: The cultivation and
manufacture of tobacco is crucial to the
country’s economy and tobacco control
will result in job losses, lost tax revenue,
and trade deficits

•
•
•
•
•
•

Tobacco Industry: Tobacco control will
cause severe hardships in other industries
(e.g., restaurants)

•
•
•

Tobacco Industry: Increases in tobacco
excise taxes cause increases in
smuggling and so result in lost
government revenue

•

•
Tobacco Industry: Tobacco taxes are
fundamentally unfair because they are
regressive not progressive, and unfairly
burden the poor
Tobacco Control Advocates:
Governments hypocritically promote
tobacco control and subsidize tobacco
growing, with the latter undermining health
and tobacco control efforts
Tobacco Control Advocates: Advances in
tobacco control in developed countries
has caused tobacco companies to move
into developing countries, thus advances
in developed countries “cause” hardship in
developing countries
Tobacco Control Advocates: Advertising
and promotion is the principal determinant
of smoking, especially of smoking
initiation by adolescents and young adults
vs.
Tobacco Industry: Tobacco advertising
has no effect on tobacco consumption –
their only function is between-brand
competition / marketshare

•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•

“Reality” / Rebuttal
While 33 million people farm tobacco worldwide, most do it part time / in
addition to other crops
Half of all global tobacco farmers are in China (15 million) followed by India
(3.5 million) and is a meaningful portion of the economy in another half-dozen
countries
In the vast majority of countries, tobacco manufacturing is <1% of
manufacturing employment
In the US, only 1.6% of jobs in the six-state “tobacco bloc” come from tobacco
farming or manufacturing, and only 1% of income comes from tobacco in
almost half of all US
This argument assumes that economic presence equates to economic
dependence, even though most studies show that jobs lost to tobacco control
or lost manufacturing/growing would be reallocated
A tobacco control program that does not include an increase in tobacco excise
taxes will result in lost revenue
No empirical evidence to support that bar / restaurant smoking bans result in
lost business
Bans – and supporting studies – criticized by restaurants and bars, but no
contrary evidence has been presented
Advertising bans result in industry-specific job losses but studies by the
advertising industry suggest that these are gross but not net job losses
Estimates in developed countries support that a 10% increase in taxes will
result in a 4% decrease in consumption, and estimates from developing
countries approximate an 8% decrease in consumption for a 10% increase in
taxes thus net government revenues should always increase with a tax
increase; this is further supported by the absence of any studies suggesting
the contrary
Smuggling is a legitimate concern and is often supported by the tobacco
industry, but there are established anti-smuggling measures that can largely
combat the practice
Tax is likely regressive, though a tax increase is likely less regressive because
evidence suggests that poorer smokers are more price sensitive
Concerns about regressivity can be overcome of a portion of the tax increase
is dedicated to cessation
This is likely true
While the economic importance of tobacco agriculture and manufacturing has
decreased over time, more than anything the price support system in the US
that started in the 1930s has created an entrenched political establishment
with a vested interest to oppose tobacco control
While compelling, the argument is not logical from a profit-maximizing
perspective: companies go where there are profits to be made
While correlated with declining tobacco consumption in developed countries,
tobacco industry expansion in developing countries is more causally
associated by globalization of trade and rising consumer income in these
countries sufficient to support purchasing of their product
Tobacco companies are still profitable in developed countries
Advertising and promotional activities clearly increase consumption, as is well
understood by the tobacco industry
However, per the 1989 Surgeon General’s report, the exact magnitude of the
impact on smoking and / or smoking initiation is not known and possibly
unknowable, though population-wide studies show that complete advertising
and promotional bans reduce consumption by 6%
Advertising is not the principal reason for smoking initiation in adolescents and
young adults – peer and parental behavior are stronger predictors of smoking
initiation

Source: [Warner, 2000]
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Table 3-8. Libertarian Perspective on the "Myths" and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate
“Myth”
“The tobacco companies hid the truth
about the hazards and addictiveness of
cigarettes from the American public”
“Tobacco is tobacco”

•

“People smoke because of advertising”

•

•
•

•
“Smoking imposes costs on society”

•

“Secondhand smoke poses a grave
threat to bystanders”

•

“If secondhand smoke really is
dangerous, smoking ought to be banned
everywhere, except in private
residences”

•
•
•
•
•

“States have a right to demand
compensation from tobacco companies
for the costs of treating smoking-related
diseases under Medicaid”

•
•
•

“The tobacco companies have been
secretly manipulating the nicotine in
cigarettes to keep smokers hooked”

•
•
•

“Smoking is ‘a pediatric disease’”

•
•

“Once people have started smoking,
nicotine addiction prevents them from
stopping”

•

“Reality” / Rebuttal
Concerns about smoking date back to the 1600s
Scientific evidence began to emerge in the 1930s and has received
consistent attention since the 1950s
Evidence suggests that cigars, pipes, and smokeless tobacco are much less
dangerous and so the same level of restriction [as cigarettes] is not justified
Evidence suggests that advertising affects which brand people smoke, not if
they smoke
Per the 1989 Surgeon General’s report, there is no “definitive answer to the
basic question of whether advertising and promotion increase the level of
tobacco consumption”
Smokers die earlier than non-smokers and so medical costs are offset, per
study results by Viscusi, and RAND
The evidence about the health effects of secondhand smoke is not as
conclusive as the evidence about the health effects of smoking
There is no evidence that secondhand smoke reduces life expectancy
Most epidemiologic evidence suggests that exposure to secondhand smoke
is most dangerous when it is a home-based exposure
That home smoking bans aren’t part of legislation suggest a concern for
property rights
But why aren’t the property rights of others – such as private employers,
restaurant and bar owners etc – given equal consideration?
Private property owners should be able to establish their own police and
market forces allowed to establish equilibrium
Focusing on recovering medical care costs ignores the net benefit from
shorter life spans and so states’ claims are unfounded
Why are cigarettes singled out for such compensation and why do states not
also pursue compensation from manufacturers of other “harmful” products
such as alcoholic beverages, fatty foods etc
The makers and consumers of cigarettes should not be punished because
“politicians decided to pay for health care with taxpayers’ money”
Nicotine has not been a secret
Nicotine-free cigarettes were introduced in the 1920s, and reduced nicotine
and tar brands in the 1950s
Ways that manufacturers have provided consistent nicotine in products has
long been discussed in trade journals
While most smokers start as teenagers, the vast majority of smokers are
adults
While smoking raises the risk of certain diseases it is a behavior –
something people choose to do – and not a disease
There are about as many former smokers as there are current smokers, so
this position is insupportable

Source: [Sullum, 1998]

These tables have summarized the point/counter-point arguments commonly employed in
tobacco control policy debates both domestically and internationally.

Subsequent research

studies have become available in the time since these studies (Tables 3-6—3-8) were
published, thus altering the interpretation of some of the information supporting the arguments
of the authors. Nonetheless, it is clear that both tobacco control advocates and tobacco control
opponents can and have creatively interpreted and presented some data to support what, at
times, feels like “positions” rather than reasoned arguments.

These arguments arise,

fundamentally, from the orthogonal philosophical interpretation of liberty-limiting tobacco control
policies: public health and tobacco control advocates feel that the limitations on liberty are
justified by the health and economic costs, whereas opponents do not. It is not likely that such
philosophical divides will be bridged, and thus such debates and arguments are likely to persist.

[68]

3.4

Looming Challenges
In the preceding sections, the philosophical arguments challenging tobacco control policy

implementation were presented.

Tobacco control policy also faces a series of specific

challenges, many of which are related to market dynamics and a creative industry that shifts
products and tactics in order to sustain profitability. These issues and challenges will be briefly
discussed here.
3.4.1

Specially Targeted Populations
As has been previously discussed, a substantial gradient both within (domestically) and

between countries (globally) has developed such that smoking is increasingly concentrated in
lower socioeconomic social strata. [Franks, et al., 2007], [World Health Organization, 2004]
Within the U.S., the Appalachian region has been reported as a sociogeographic cluster with the
correlated variables of high smoking prevalence, low income/high poverty, and low policy
coverage [Ferkeitch, Liber, Pennell, Nealy, Hammer, & Berman, 2010] as well as a much higher
probability that children will be exposed to secondhand smoke [Singh, Siahpush, & Kogan,
2010], a known risk for increased likelihood that of smoking uptake [Greenland, Liu, Kiefe,
Yunis, Dyer, & Burke, 1995] and so continue smoking-related disparity cycles. This evolving
gradient has differentially affected the social context of smoking and so the normative behaviors
within these socioeconomic strata [Paul, Ross, Bryant, Hill, Bonevski, & Keevy, 2010], further
aggravating concerns about the entrenchment of discrepancies in health equality. So, whether
the gradient in smoking is causative, symptomatic, or highly correlative with other causal
factors, the socioeconomic disparity in smoking and health is concerning from both a social
justice perspective and a practical perspective because of the additional challenges in realizing
cessation and preventing initiation in populations with lower levels of education and social and
economic resources.
Smoking rates in women, and particularly adolescent girls, is also a concern and
challenge facing the public health community. While tobacco companies have long had genderspecific products and advertising campaigns, a recent report has documented new advertising
campaigns promoting “purse packs”, pink colored cigarettes, and branded cellphone “bling”,
among others, in highly read fashion magazines. [American Cancer Society Cancer Action
Network, American Heart Association, American Lung Association, Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, with funding from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, 2009] Globally, some reports have found that smoking in adolescent girls now
exceeds that in women. [Warren, et al., 2008] These challenges highlight the need for specific
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and prescriptive policy, vigilant compliance monitoring and enforcement of existing policy, and
the need for particular attention to young women who represent a strong market growth
opportunity for tobacco companies.
3.4.2

Alternative and Smokeless Tobacco Products and the Harm Reduction Debate
As summarized in Table 3-9, there are numerous forms of tobacco products other than

cigarettes with which tobacco or tobacco-like doses of nicotine can be consumed. In the United
States, population estimates from the C.D.C. indicate that 3.3% of all adults (6.5% of men and
0.4% of women) and 7.9% of all high school students (13.4% in males and 2.3% in females) are
smokeless tobacco users, with higher use rates in young white males, American Indians/Alaska
natives, southern and north-central states, and lower socioeconomic status employment
occupations or unemployed. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] Moist snuff
has the largest U.S. market share (approximately 73%) followed by loose leaf chewing tobacco
(approximately 24.1%). [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] Use of smokeless
tobacco products has been reported to increase the risk for the development of oral,
esophageal, pancreatic and lung cancers to varying degrees, though somewhat inconsistently
Table 3-9. Smokeless Tobacco Products
Type
Chewing Tobacco†
Snuff†

Forms
•

Loose leave
Plug
Twist
Moist
Dry
Sachets

•
•
•

Electronic Cigarettes
(sometimes “e-cigarettes”
or “e-cigs)‡

Electronic device that looks and feels like
a cigarette but does not burn tobacco

•
•
•
•

Betel Quid (sometimes
“gutka”, “ghutka”, “gutkha”)*

Commercially in tins, foil packets, or
sachets

•
•
•
•
•

Water-pipes (sometimes
“hooka”, “shisha”, “goza”,
“narghile”, “hubble
bubble”)¥

Tobacco packets and device are acquired
separately

•
•
•

Hard-form

Lozenges, tables, tabs, strips, sticks,
other candy-like configurations

•

Description
Consumed by placing between the foil pouch
(loose leaf), leaf-wrapped packet (plug) or rope
(twist) between cheek and gums
Powder (dry) can be inhaled
Most users put a “pinch” or “dip” (moist) or
sachet between cheek/lips/teeth and gums
Snus, a Swedish moist snuff, has recently been
introduced in the US7
Device has a small battery-run electronic device
that produces a warm vapor mist of nicotine that
is inhaled
End of device “glows” like a cigarette
Flavorings can be added
Device comes with replacement cartridges;
nicotine dose can be varied
Betel quid is a combination of betel leaf, areca
nut, slaked lime, and sometimes with tobacco
added
Gutka is the commercial form of the product
Both are chewed or sucked on (saliva can be
swallowed or spit)
Regional and ethnic origins in Indian subcontinent, Asia, and Pacific Islands
Product is said to have stimulant and relaxant
effects
Tall, upright device
Tobacco is heated (vaporized) in a chamber
then smoke is inhaled after passing through a
chamber of water
Regional and ethnic origins in India and Arabic
countries
Sucked similar to candy

Sources: †(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]; ‡ [Etter, 2010]; * [Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2009]; ¥ [Knishkowy & Amitai, 2005], [Dugas, Tremblay, Low, Cournoyer, &
O'Loughlin, 2010]; 7 [Gartner, Hall, Vos, Bertram, Wallace, & Lim, 2007]
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internationally and dependent upon the study and study population [Boffetta, Hecht, Gray,
Gupta, & Straif, 2008], and preeclampsia in pregnant women. [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009] Potential cardiovascular effects associated with smokeless tobacco use are
unclear primarily due to lack of study. [Arabi, 2006]

Generally, the population-wide health

effects of smokeless tobacco products are believed to be less than those for smoking. [Boffetta,
Hecht, Gray, Gupta, & Straif, 2008]

Use of betel quid or gutka has been associated with

increased risk for precancerous oral lesions and oral and esophageal cancers. [Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] However, the potential health effects of alternative, nontobacco products such as electronic cigarettes are largely unknown because they are both new
products and largely unregulated, though a few countries have banned them outright. [Etter,
2010] Lastly, while population studies on the effects of hookah or water-pipe smoking have not
been conducted, a content analysis of the inhaled smoke from water-pipes suggests toxicity as
high if not higher than cigarette smoke, though it is acknowledged that the tobacco used in such
pipes is not well standardized. [Knishkowy & Amitai, 2005]
As the public and private implementation of smoking bans (i.e., in public and private
worksites, public and private indoor and outdoor spaces, and home and car bans) spread,
smokeless and alternate tobacco products are often viewed – or portrayed – as a means to
continue tobacco use without violating regulations and so its use is expected to grow. [Arabi,
2007]

Tobacco companies have developed and introduced new products and promotional

campaigns to take advantage of this potentially expanding market opportunity. [Mejia & Ling,
2010] Additionally, new products can often be introduced without the manufacturing regulations
or tobacco control policy restrictions intended for cigarettes, as illustrated by electronic
cigarettes [Etter, 2010] and hookah bars, both of which have proliferated in many states and the
latter whose operation is not well regulated and which is becoming associated with college-age
“party” activities including co-use of other illicit drugs and binge drinking. [Knishkowy & Amitai,
2005], [Dugas, Tremblay, Low, Cournoyer, & O'Loughlin, 2010], [Lyon, 2008] Thus, for the
public health community, the challenges of smokeless and alternate tobacco products are
twofold. The first challenge is practical: gathering and having access to sufficient, reliable data
to make informed policy decisions and having a policy infrastructure that can adapt and respond
to rapidly changing market conditions.

The second challenge is philosophical: with some

evidence that some of these products have fewer health effects, should they be promoted as
part of a cessation strategy or would the risk of such a promotion of these products be either
ineffective or unethical – as some have queried, “a gateway to smoking or a bridge to quitting”?
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[Arabi, 2007]

On this latter challenge, smokeless and alternate tobacco products are fully

embroiled in the “tobacco harm reduction debate” that is ongoing in the public health
community.
3.4.3

The Tobacco Harm Reduction Debate
At the core of this debate is whether smokeless and alternate tobacco products

represent a legitimate nicotine replacement product that will facilitate ultimate complete
cessation, or whether smokers will simply substitute one product for another. Some studies
report clear health benefits of switching to snuff, snus in particular [Hall & Gartner, 2009],
[Gartner, Hall, Vos, Bertram, Wallace, & Lim, 2007], and endorse the use of smokeless and
alternate tobacco products as a policy tool in tobacco harm reduction. [Rodu & Godshall, 2006]
However, many raise concerns about simple product substitution, dual-product use, or the
relative effectiveness of these products over existing strategies for cessation inducement and
nicotine replacement therapies. [McKee & Gilmore, 2007], [Lambe, 2007], [Mumford, Levy,
Gitchell, & Blackman, 2005] Other studies have suggested that the population health benefits of
promoting smokeless tobacco as part of a tobacco harm reduction strategy, after using
simulation modeling to account for different use patterns, would be negligible. [Mejia, Ling, &
Glantz, 2010]
There is a notable lack of consensus within the public health and tobacco control
community [Martin, Warner, & Lantz, 2004], and many studies enumerate the need for
additional, reliable information about: the products themselves including toxicologic profile;
physiologic effects; epidemiologic effects and risks; impacts on individual behavioral patterns;
population levels of knowledge about the products; legal and ethical challenges and concerns in
product regulation; short-term vs. long-term effects of use and on overall probability of
cessation; and understanding the demographic, socioeconomic, and/or sociogeographic
clusters with greater risk or greater possible benefit from the products. [Hatsukami, et al., 2002],
[Savitz, Meyer, Tanzer, Mirvish, & Lewin, 2006]

As has been previously pointed out, a

substantial challenge to systematically addressing these issues in the United States has been
the lack of a tobacco regulatory agency [Zeller, M; Hatsukami, D; and the Strategic Dialogue on
Tobacco Harm Reduction Group, 2009], though this may have been resolved with the recent
authority given to the F.D.A. in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control of 2009.
3.4.4

Globalization
The tobacco industry’s use of globalization, especially trade agreements, to expand and

develop new markets has been well documented. [Zatonski, 2003], [Szilagyi, 2006], [Shaffer,
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Brenner, & Houston, 2005] By design and intent, international trade agreements reduce the
barriers to the flow of goods and services as well as the ability of individual states to regulate or
impede the trade of products, including tobacco. Globalization has also been credited with the
rising income in many countries, which makes tobacco products more affordable. [Collin, Lee, &
Bissell, 2002] In addition to trade, the development and access to the internet has substantially
advanced the globalization of communication, information, and culture and some reports have
documented tobacco industry use of new media venues such as Facebook© to advertise and
promote their products. [Freeman & Chapman, 2010] As was discussed above, a primary
reason to develop the F.C.T.C. was to combat the globalization of the tobacco epidemic, which
includes the globalization of markets and marketing, and such studies highlight the importance
of a savvy, globalized response to a savvy, globalized, and motivated industry.
3.4.5

Tobacco-Control Challenges in the United States
Two challenges facing U.S. tobacco control efforts merit brief discussion.

The first

challenge is unique to neither the U.S. nor this policy area: maintaining funding for tobacco
control programs. The C.D.C. reports that the tobacco industry spent $34 million / day or $12.4
billion in 2006 on the advertising and promotion of cigarettes [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009] and $354 million in 2006 on the advertising and promotion of smokeless
tobacco products, an increase from $251 million in 2005. [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009] In the face of industry perpetually aspiring to obtain new customers and new
markets, tobacco control efforts can never be “over” or “done” if goals to protect and promote
public health, reduce health disparities, and advance human rights and social justice are to be
achieved. Thus, the tobacco control program activities as well as the funding and infrastructure
that supports them must remain intact and the efforts to maintain the necessary funding and
infrastructure must be sustained possibly perpetually and against ubiquitous and enduring fiscal
pressures for such funding to be used elsewhere. Such challenges are emphasized by a recent
report from the C.D.C. estimating that $24.4 billion were available to states in 2008 from
tobacco taxes and payments from legal settlements, yet states only spent 3% of those funds on
their tobacco control programs, not even reaching the 15% of revenues recommended by the
C.D.C.. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]

This challenge is clearly

recognized within the tobacco control community and efforts to both bring attention to and
develop strategies for sustainability are not uncommon. [Wisotzky, Albuquerque, Pechacek, &
Park, 2004], [Stoner & Foley, 2006], [Carver, Reinert, & Range, 2007]
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Finally, in a white paper released in 2001 Philip Morris announced that they would support
F.D.A. regulation of tobacco products provided that: a) cigarettes were regulated as a unique
product and not a medical device; b) regulation did not lead to prohibition; c) regulations aimed
at harm reduction do not reduce product-derived pleasure or enjoyment; d) communication
about reduced risk products should not encourage smoking or discourage quitting; e) that
regulations should address warning labels such that adults are fully informed about the risks
associated with the product’s use; and f) that tobacco products remain legal products (i.e., not
banned) or made, through regulated removal or addition of specified ingredients, so unpalatable
as to induce cessation. [Redhead & Burrows, 2009] This represented a reversal from all of
Philip Morris’ previous positions opposing such regulation (even though the white paper
emphasizes that it did not), including the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule that first asserted F.D.A.
jurisdiction over tobacco, and a split within the tobacco industry as all other tobacco companies
remain opposed to F.D.A. regulation of tobacco. [Redhead & Burrows, 2009] Philip Morris’
unfeigned motivation to support F.D.A. regulation of tobacco is not known, but suppositions
include capitalizing on their size to capture marketshare from competitors, improve their public
image, enhance its legitimacy, and an effort for a weaken-from-within strategy. [Redhead &
Burrows, 2009], [McDaniel & Malone, 2005] Regardless of their “new” tactic of cooperation,
tobacco control advocates are generally wary of this cooperation and are concerned about the
implications for and attempts to weaken tobacco control policies and programs. [McDaniel &
Malone, 2005]
3.5

Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a review of the tobacco epidemic from the public health

perspective. However, this review did not focus on the evidence establishing the biologic causal
link between exposure to tobacco and adverse health outcomes nor the very large, and ever
growing, body of public health literature establishing and advancing the understanding of
tobacco control policy “best practices” – i.e., that body of literature representing the cumulative
evidence for the effectiveness for various tobacco control programs and policies and the specific
circumstances surrounding the implementation of those programs and policies. Rather, this
review, after a overview of the evidence for tobacco control policy “best practices”, focused on
public health-lead efforts to enact these policies. That is, this chapter emphasized the public
health community’s extension of the positivist dimension of tobacco control policy (evidence for
program and policy effectiveness) into the normative sphere: the reasoning that the deleterious
health outcomes, social costs, and untoward conduct of the tobacco industry is sufficient to
warrant and justify the position that these effective policies should therefore be universally
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adopted. Thus, this chapter examined the transition from tobacco control policies to tobacco
control policy regimes and both the domestic and international efforts to adopt such policy
regimes, including the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
This review also discussed universal challenges to implementing tobacco control policy
regimes, especially the challenge of balancing different types of individual rights as well as that
of the public’s interest and health with these different types of individual rights. Other, common
arguments both for and against tobacco control policies were also discussed, including
arguments regarding measuring the true “cost” of tobacco use and lifespan issues, economic
dependencies, and libertarian vs. paternalistic perspectives on the balance between individual
choice and public health. Finally, pending challenges for the tobacco control policy community
were discussed, including the growing intra- and inter-country concentration of tobacco use in
already marginalized populations (impoverished, lower socio-economic strata, visible minorities)
and the yet-unresolved debate over tobacco harm reduction products and the efficacy as well as
the ethical dilemmas posed by the promotion of these products as a means to abate the
tobacco epidemic.
The public health community has contributed much to the tobacco control literature. This
perspective, in particular, has been largely responsible for the development of effective tobacco
control programs and policies and it has been well documented that there have been barriers
and challenges to the adoption and implementation of comprehensive tobacco control policies.
However, beyond the legerdemain of the tobacco industry in manipulating a faulty political
process for unseemly gains [the dominant viewpoint in the public health perspective], the public
health literature has contributed comparatively little to explanations for how and why the policy
process has worked in the pursuit of tobacco control policy adoption. This is the focus of the
next chapter.
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4

LITERATURE REVIEW: THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC FROM THE POLITICAL AND
POLICY SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE

4.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
Whereas a substantial portion of the tobacco control scholarship from within the public

health community, as befits its origins and focus (understanding and improving the public’s
health), has centered on the elucidating and documenting causal mechanisms between
smoking and health (both morbidity and mortality) as well as establishing an evidence base for
effective programmatic (ultimately policy) interventions, the more common focus of tobacco
policy scholarship from the political and policy science perspective has been understanding and
explaining the factors influencing tobacco control policy adoption. That is, existing political and
policy theories and frameworks have been applied to tobacco control policy to understand, from
a more expansive (and positivist) perspective, the factors that have influenced the evolution of
the tobacco epidemic and have facilitated or impeded the adoption of tobacco control policy.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to review these theories and frameworks, how they have
been applied to the tobacco epidemic, and the important findings from these studies. This
review will include: theories of the policy process, especially the agenda-setting theories
Multiple Streams Framework, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, and the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, that have been applied to inform tobacco control policy adoption; the role of science
and expert communities in the tobacco control policy process; the influence of the courts and
legal proceedings on the tobacco control policy process; the importance of policy type (typology)
on tobacco control policy adoption; how institutions and institutionalism explains tobacco control
policy adoption; the impact of social change, including elements of issue framing, on tobacco
control policy adoption; how policy learning, diffusion, transfer, and convergence explains
tobacco control policy adoption; and the political and policy science perspective on the
importance of networks in facilitating policy adoption.
4.2
4.2.1

Multiple Streams Framework
An Overview of the Multiple Streams Framework
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework [Kingdon, 1984] is a model of the policy process,

the agenda setting and decision making stages in particular, that was developed as an
extension of the “garbage can” models of choice. [Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972]; [Zahariadis,
2007] Kingdon’s Framework consists of three streams – the Problem Stream, Policy Stream,
and Politics Stream – which he viewed as flowing separately and with substantial independence
through the policy process. In the Problem Stream are the conditions and problems facing
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society and, in turn, policy makers. Problems are brought to the attention of the public and
policy makers through various mechanisms including the research and reporting on various
indicators, feedback from existing policies or programs, the media, and focusing events. Within
the Problem Stream, it is the attention on the problem, which is as or more important than the
nature of the problem itself, that influences the policy process. Kingdon envisioned the Policy
Stream as a milieu or “soup” of different ideas and policy solutions that compete for the attention
and favor of (and ultimate acceptance and adoption by) policy subsystems. Policy ideas in this
stream are usually generated by specialists in that topic area and often, rather than being
generated as the “best” solution to address a problem, are a solution that benefits, protects, or
promotes the interest of the group that the specialist represents. The Politics Stream consists of
three sub-streams: the national mood, pressure-group campaigns, and administrative or
legislative turnover. The national mood refers to public opinion of and public pressure for a
particular government action.

Pressure-group campaigns include the activities of interest

groups that act either in the public arena or within a particular policy subsystem, including
political action committees and industry lobby groups. Administrative or legislative turnover
refers to changes in the members of Congress or the White House that may impact the
ideological predisposition of the legislative, executive (including bureaucracies), or judicial
branches of the government. Policy choices are made when policy entrepreneurs, powerful
individuals or groups (or those acting on their behalf), are able to manipulate preferences,
perceptions, and situations and “link” the three streams. Kingdon described a “policy window”
or “window of opportunity” as the linking of the three streams by a policy entrepreneur resulting
in a policy decision. The Multiple Streams Framework is particularly adept at understanding
policy processes that are ambiguous due to any combination of fluid participation, unclear or
problematic preferences, unclear technology, and ambivalence. [Zahariadis, Comparing three
lenses of policy choice, 1998]
4.2.2

Application of the Multiple Streams Framework to Tobacco Control Policy
In a search of both public health and the political science literatures, two studies were

identified that applied the Multiple Streams Framework in order to explain the adoption of
tobacco control policy. The Multiple Streams Framework was used to conduct a policy analysis
of the factors influencing – and challenging – the adoption of smoke free ordinance in Lexington,
KY. [Greathouse, Hahn, Okoli, Warnick, & Riker, 2005] In analyzing more than two years of
activities in each of the streams, the authors identified several critical factors (including building
a strong coalition of supporters, and a comprehensive strategy that included a wealth of
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information and a strong legal team) that enabled the eventual enactment of the ordinance in a
pro-tobacco jurisdiction.
In another study, the authors provided an overview of the Multiple Streams Framework
and how it can be broadly applied to understand the adoption of tobacco control policies
(generally) in California. [Blackman, 2005] Thus study was designed to provide nurses with a
better understanding of the policy process, with tobacco control as a case example.
In summary, the systematic application of the Multiple Streams Framework has not been
widely employed in tobacco control policy studies. When it has, its apparent utility has been the
flexibility and so relative ease of organizing considerable information from many, disparate
sources and types, often over a substantial duration of time, into a coherent narrative. Key
concepts from the Multiple Streams Framework, specifically policy entrepreneurs and policy
windows, have been frequently used in tobacco control studies as well as other policy areas.
Thus, it is likely that these elements have been the key contributions of this Framework to the
theoretical understanding of causal contributors of policy change. However, the explanatory
value of the Framework and policy entrepreneurs and windows aside, it is unclear that the
Multiple Streams Framework is able to predict, in contrast to retrospectively explain, policy
change and so its ability to identify causal forces in the policy adoption process is unclear.
4.3

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

4.3.1

An Overview of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (P.E.T.) [Baumgartner & Jones, 1993], [Baumgartner &

Jones, 2007] was developed, at least in part, as an oppositional view to the prevailing, pedantic
view of the policy process as a series of ordered, logical stages: policy making was frequently
not ordered and logical but rather dynamic, with periods of frenetic activity after long periods of
seeming inactivity.

In this way, P.E.T. was among the first theories to emphasize the

longitudinal nature of policy making (or at least policy analysis), rather than static, crosssectional approaches. In the longitudinal view of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, policy
areas cycle through prolonged periods of relatively minor activity followed by a period –
“punctuation” – of significant activity, which then cycles back to a prolonged period of much
lower inactivity. The underlying factors influencing this cycling between equilibrium / pseudoequilibrium and punctuation, then, also cycle through their own characteristic phases.

In

pseudo-equilibrium, those favored by the status quo fiercely defend the status quo, and the
benefits being derived from it.

Negative feedback mechanisms and policy monopolies
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established by policy sub-systems ensure an incremental approach to policy change, if any.
Further, favored elites exert their dual-faces of power to ensure that only favorable issues reach
the agenda and unfavorable issues are kept from the agenda. [Bachrach & Baratz, 1962] In
displacing

pseudo-equilibrium,

there

is

an

expansion

and

mobilization

of

interest

[Schattschneider, 1960] and progression through the issue-attention cycle, [Downs, 1972] and
the issue begins to escape the control of the policy monopoly or subsystems, which in turn
begin to collapse. If the favored elite cannot re-establish pseudo-equilibrium, negative feedback
mechanisms give way to self-propelling positive feedback mechanisms, ensuring further
collapse of the status quo. In such a scenario (failure to re-establish pseudo-equilibrium), there
is rapid change as mobilization continues and policy monopolies and subsystems collapse.
Involvement in and control over and issue becomes very fluid as there is competition not only to
influence policy decisions but also to establish power and favor in new programs or subsystems that are likely to result from policy change; this is similar to or corresponds with a policy
window, with ample opportunities for policy entrepreneurs, from the Multiple Streams
Framework. [Kingdon, 1984] Finally, activity decreases and the dynamics of pseudo-equilibrium
are re-established with or without actual policy change.
In moving through the phases of P.E.T., there is a differentiation between attention and
activity, and issues that achieve “agenda status.” An issue can have attention or generic activity
paid it in any realm during any policy phase. However, an issue having achieved “agenda
status” is one that is on the public agenda (an issue acknowledged by the broader population as
requiring action), the formal agenda (being acted upon within the formal structures of
government), or the decision agenda (an issue about to be acted upon). While achieving status
on the public agenda is not always required (but frequently needed) for all policy changes,
achieving formal and decision agenda status. An issue’s “policy image,” first described in by
P.E.T. as how that issue or policy is understood and discussed, is a key determinant in how or if
an issue “moves through” the various agendas and / or cycles through the phases of the P.E.T..
Thus, the P.E.T. envisages that a fundamental component of cycling from pseudo-equilibrium to
punctuation is the competition to control or define the policy image. In attempt to control the
policy image and re-define pseudo-equilibrium, then, actors are mobilized so as to offer
competing, stronger policy images. Understanding policy change requires that one appreciates
the factors affecting the dynamics attempting to change or maintain the policy image and thus
the status quo.

These factors can include characteristics of the issue itself, the context

including both micro- and macro-political factors, and the actors and the venues. That is, the
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P.E.T. suggests that understanding the causes leading to policy change requires and
understanding for the magnitude of underlying factors as well as the relative mix of these
factors, and how they are changing over time.
4.3.2

Application of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to Tobacco Control Policy
In considering the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, a fundamental question is whether

tobacco control policy making has followed the characteristic pattern of pseudo-equilibrium
followed by punctuations. Using data from the Agendas Project, analysis by Baumgartner and
Jones documented this pattern of policy making within the federal government. [Baumgartner &
Jones, 1993]

These results were echoed in a later study that analyzed Congressional

committee hearings for evidence of subsystem dynamics, including positive and negative
feedback. [Worsham, 2006] In analyzing information from 1945-2005 on the number and types
of committees holding tobacco-related hearings, the types of witnesses testifying at these
hearings, and legislative sponsorship, the author concluded that the pre-1964 Surgeon
General’s Report agricultural-dominated policy subsystem largely persisted through the 1980s,
with evidence for substantial negative feedback and a relatively stable policy image. However,
beginning in the 1990s, the policy image began to change and competition over the policy
image (the previously overlooked health aspect) combined with legislative policy entrepreneurs
initiated positive feedback, disrupting the previously stable policy subsystems. As of 2005, the
close of the study, author concluded that [pseudo-] equilibrium had not yet been re-established
and so the final outcome was not yet apparent. [Worsham, 2006]
In contrast, other studies have suggested that tobacco control policy making at the statelevel does not necessarily follow the expected P.E.T. patterns. [Givel M., 2006], [Givel M., 2008]
Rather than demonstrating “cycling” -- periods of pseudo-equilibrium with [relatively] stable
policy images and subsystems followed by positive feedback and disruption of the policy
subsystem – the author of these studies argued that state-level policy making exhibited several
different patterns (e.g., linear, oscillating, exponential) but not the punctuated pattern predicted
by the P.E.T.. [Givel M., 2008], [Givel M., 2006]
Thus, there has not been consensus as to whether tobacco control policymaking has or
has not followed the pattern predicted by the P.E.T.. As with the Multiple Streams Framework,
key concepts from the P.E.T., specifically positive and negative feedback, subsystems, and
policy images, have been used widely within tobacco control policy as well as other policy
areas, often without the systematic application of the full P.E.T. framework. The P.E.T. has
also, as with the Multiple Streams Framework, provided a “lens” through which to organize and
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interpret considerable information into a reasoned explanation for the course of tobacco control
policymaking.

From this perspective, then, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory faces a similar

challenge as the Multiple Streams Framework in that it its ability to predict, rather than
retrospectively explain, causal forces in policy adoption is unclear.
4.4

Advocacy Coalition Framework

4.4.1

An Overview of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
As with the P.E.T., the Advocacy Coalition Framework (A.C.F.) expounds a far more

complex version of policy making compared to a “stages” paradigm. [Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1999], [Sabatier & Weible, 2007] A fundamental premise of the A.C.F. is that policy making is
sufficiently complex so as to necessitate that the processes and activities associated with policy
making occur in a policy subsystem with expertise sufficient for efficient, effective, and informed
policy decision making; in the A.C.F., it is this subsystem that is the primary unit of study and
analysis. That is, the A.C.F. places substantial emphasis on the role of experts and scientific
and technical information in the policy making process. Further, the A.C.F. forwards that groups
– coalitions – coalesce around common deep core beliefs, fundamental, steadfast, and
normative beliefs about how the world “should” operate. These coalitions, which the A.C.F.
forwards are more expansive than traditional “iron triangles” and can include legislators,
bureaucrats from all levels of government, scientists and other content or technical experts such
as consultants, members of the media, and interest groups, pool and marshal resources,
including human and other forms of capital, in an effort to translate their deep core and policy
values into policy, thereby dominating the policy subsystem. As multiple coalitions typically
exist within a given subsystem, the competition within the bounds of the existing rules and
system for resources, strategic advantage, and ultimate dominance of the subsystem (i.e.,
ability to translate policy values into policy) transpires over years or decades, and thus the
timeframe for the A.C.F. is substantial. [Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999], [Sabatier & Weible,
2007], [Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009] A diagram depicting the key elements of the
A.C.F. is shown in Figure 4-1.
4.4.2

Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework to Tobacco Control Policy
Two Japanese-based studies employed the A.C.F. to identify the emergence of a second

coalition – health advocates – to compete with the existing coalition – pro-tobacco – and alter
the dynamics of policy making in the subsystem in order to enact tobacco control policies. [Sato,
1999], [Sato, Araki, & Yokoyama, 2000]
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Figure 4-1. Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram
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Source: Adapted from [Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009]

Of the three agenda setting frameworks and theories discussed here, the A.C.F. is the
most detailed regarding the elements and factors influencing the dynamics of policy subsystems
(and, thus, policy change).

However and despite the apparent relevance of the Advocacy

Coalition Framework to tobacco control policy, few studies have systematically applied the
A.C.F. to investigations aimed at explaining or understanding the adoption of tobacco control
policies.

Future comparative studies might use the A.C.F. to explore how differences in

coalition resources or strategic decisions affect their ability to influence tobacco control policy
adoption, though a likely barrier to such studies will be the comparable data needed (and the
current paucity thereof) to perform such empirical analyses.
4.5

Policy Typologies

4.5.1

An Overview of Policy Typologies
Categorizing issues according to various characteristics or dimensions has been an

important tool for political scientists in their quest to understand – and ultimately predict – how
policy decisions are made. In this area of scholarship, Lowi’s typology is often regarded as
seminal. [Lowi, 1964] In his typology, Lowi forwarded a system that divides policy and agenda
setting into three distinct arenas, each with its own politics and power structures:

1) the

distributive arena of highly individualized decisions benefitting predominately individuals; 2) the
regulatory arena that targets largely entire sectors and creates clear winners and losers by
benefiting one sector at the expense of the other; and 3) the redistributive arena in which an
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entire social class is targeted with policy(ies) in an attempt to achieve equal possession. As
envisioned by Lowi, the policy type ordains the politics, not vice versa. [Lowi, 1964]
Morality policy has been forwarded as an extension of Lowi’s prominent three-category
policy typology and has been variously defined as social regulation [Tatalovich, R; Daynes, B
W; (Eds.), 1998] or the redistribution of values. [Meier K. J., 1999] And while the specific
boundaries of a distinct typology have been elusive [Smith K. B., 2002], [Mooney, 2000], a
series of characteristics of morality policy have been discussed (Table 4-1). In evaluating the
characteristics outlined here, and has been discussed by others, tobacco control policy does
partially overlap with dimension of morality policy [Studlar, 2008] and thus tobacco control policy
can be examined within the context of the typology of morality policy.
4.5.2

De-normalization, Morality Policy, and Tobacco Control Policy
Part of the opposition to tobacco control policy is based solely on its policy typology.

Tobacco control policies are partially regulatory in nature and use command and control
regulations, economic incentives, and information to influence and modulate individual behavior.
[Licari & Meier, 1997] The motivation for tobacco growers, manufacturers, and sellers to resist
the tobacco control policies which are intended to reduce the demand for their otherwise legal
product is obvious: naked economic self-interest. The subsequent collective actions directed
toward the political establishment and policy making systems are thus predictable. The broader
resistance to tobacco control policy within populations, however, is less intuitive and is plausibly
attributable to another of tobacco control policy’s typology: morality policy and the related
strategy of de-normalization.
To the extent that tobacco control policies are framed – or interpreted – as being about
right vs. wrong behavior, giving preferential treatment to one social group at the expense of
another group, or infringing upon core values, as predicted for policies with a morality
Table 4-1. Characteristics of Morality Policy
Author
Meier (1999)

Mooney (2000)

•
•
•
•
•

Smith (2002)

•

Characteristics of Morality Policy
Redistribution of values
Redistribution of state-accepted values onto those state-defined as perverse results in the socia
status elevation of some and social status reduction for others
Values of morality policies relate to demand for what has become to be labeled as “sin”
Fundamental conflict between significant groups over core values, or “first principles”, about
what is right and wrong
Characteristics of morality policy issues are 1) technical simplicity, 2) high public salience
because they threaten basic values, and 3) are more likely than other policy types to have high
levels of participation and engagement because of their technical simplicity and salience
Taxonomic classification based on patterns of political behavior identifies 1) higher levels of
participation, 2) weak role for experts, 3) low levels of compromise, and 4) higher probability of
judicial resolution of conflict
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dimension, levels of public participation in policy debates and conflict in these debates rises.
Thus, the components of tobacco control policy most likely to be considered as being morality
policy are not the policy elements justified with the harm principle or even soft paternalism, but
rather those policy elements perceived as being hard paternalism. Further, the emphasis on the
morality dimension in tobacco control policy has changed with the framing of the issue over time
and, arguably, between different advocacy groups. [Studlar, 2008] An emphasis on and the use
of de-normalization substantially amplifies the morality policy dimension.

Generically, de-

normalization is a process whereby normative standards for a particular action or behavior are
changed. The evolving emphasis on socially normative behavior in public health can be traced
to the epidemiologic transition and the shift from the leading causes of death being attributable
to infectious disease to the leading causes of death being attributable to chronic disease with
substantial causal contribution from social and behavioral determinants. [Cappuccio, 2004]
Social marketing has thus developed as a central feature of health promotion and healthy public
policy, and has as a core function the creation – changing – of social norms for acceptability and
desirability of particular individual behaviors and influence those behaviors in order to combat
chronic disease. [Gordon, McDermott, Stead, & Angus, 2006], [Grier & Bryant, 2005]

De-

normalization is thus a specific type of social marketing and tactic that emphasizes the
unacceptability and undesirability of certain behaviors. Within the context of tobacco control
policy, the tobacco industry as well as smoking and, to some extent smokers, have been the
target of de-normalization tactics such as exclusion from F.C.T.C. negotiations (tobacco
industry), reducing the number of places where the activity is acceptable (smoking and
smokers), and an increasingly negative depiction in the media and publications (tobacco
industry, smoking, and smokers). [Studlar, 2002]

However, de-normalization has been

controversial – adopted explicitly by some tobacco control programs (e.g., [Ontario Tobacco
Strategy Advisory Group, 2010]), but substantially de-emphasized by others because of the
associated risk [Studlar, 2002] even though there is some evidence linking de-normalization
with increased cessation in adult smokers. [Hammond, Fong, Zanna, Thrasher, & Borland,
2006] To the extent that tobacco control policy emphasizes the unacceptability of smoking,
smokers, or the tobacco industry, then, it invokes the morality dimension of the policy and the
ensuing conflict over values and social preference.

The allusions about the policy and its

proponents (public health advocates) are thus not only about paternalism but also about
economic and spatial social exclusion. [Feldman, 2009]

The latter concern is particularly

relevant given the addictive nature of smoking and the increasing concentration of smokers in
lower socioeconomic social strata. [Bell, Salmon, Bowers, Bell, & McCullough, 2010]
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Thus, the morality dimension of tobacco control policy is a source of important secular
opposition to these policies, economic and public health justifications aside, and the creation of
sympathy for the “persecuted” minority (tobacco users and the tobacco industry). Further, while
[American] federalism is structured such that local policy solutions can be developed to resolve
conflict and reflect local preferences in morality-policy issues, the increasing nationalization of
policy and interjection of the federal courts, as has been the case in tobacco control policy, has
interrupted this locally-based balance thereby increasing tension. [Mooney, 2000] This tension
created by loss of local control can also be seen on an international level, where the F.C.T.C.
can be interpreted as, if not in content but in aspiration, a global prohibition regime that formally
promotes substitution of local policy solutions for global policy convergence consistent with the
values and economic interests of the dominant members of the international community.
[Nadelmann, 1990] Thus, the F.C.T.C. is part global public health governance and part global
paternalism and would be expected to engender similar resistance internationally as do such
policies domestically.
4.6

Institutions and Institutionalism

4.6.1

An Overview of the Role of Institutions and Institutionalism in Public Policy
Institutionalism (and neo-institutionalism) is to political science is what Donabedian’s

structure-process-outcome axiom [Donabedian, 1966] is to public health and health care. An
innovator in the field of health care quality improvement, Donabedian was an early scholar and
leader and advocate for the adaptation of the rigorous quality assessment and improvement
processes developed in industrial settings to health care delivery. His simple, but adroit and
profound postulate has become the foundation for the field: one cannot understand or improve
upon outcomes without understanding the processes and structures from which they arise.
Translated to the policy process, policies (outcomes) are the products of policy processes which
occur within the rules and institutions (structures) that are an integral, all-encompassing part of
the fabric of communities and societies.
While there is not a single, succinct definition for “institutions” or “institutionalism”, [Offe,
2006] the construct can be broadly understood as the fundamental structures and fabric of
society existing along a spectrum of proximity to the policy making process itself.

While

institutions may initially be created to solve fundamental organizational needs of societies
including the provision of public goods, [Moe, 2006] once created institutions to not remain
neutral, benign entities but rather morph into actors within the society and the policy making
process itself, becoming agents of power distribution [Immergut, 2006], [Offe, 2006], [Moe,
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2006] within the society thereby defining the boundaries for government capability and shaping
and creating the very expectations of the society itself. [Offe, 2006] In acknowledging the
myriad form, functions, and effects of institutions, the construct can by depicted as “layers” as
shown in Figure 4-2. These tiers encompass the broadest social and governmental structures
and institutions including cultural values and beliefs (tier 1), institutionalized policy regimes (tier
2), and the structures and institutions closest to the policy making process (tier 3) such as
judicial review, aspects of legislative organization and voting rules, and entrenchment of social
cleavages.
Early 20th century scholarship conceptualized institutions as formal, legal entities whose
activities were largely confined to their constitutionally assigned responsibilities [March & Olsen,
1984] though this perspective, whether pluralist, elitist, or statist, left many policy choices
unexplained. [Immergut, 2006] New, or neo-, institutionalism has emerged in an attempt to
rectify these explanatory deficiencies, though neo-institutionalism largely rejects the rational
actor paradigms at the foundation of institutionalism, contending that institutions are more
complex than such models can explain. [Selznick, 1996] Rather neo-institutionalism replaces
the rational-actor or ‘logic of consequences and rational calculation’ paradigm of individual
behavior with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, [Olsen, 2001] a situationally-dependent paradigm
based on ‘rules’ incorporated through socialization. [March & Olsen, 1984]

Thus, neo-

institutionalism recognizes that institutions are simultaneously cause and effect, which greatly
complicates analytic assumptions of exogeneity, temporal and historic ordering, and institutional
Figure 4-2. Three-Tiered Institutional Typology

Tier 1
Presidential or Parliamentary System

Tier 2
-Reg ime Type
-Government Type

Tier 3
-Broad Fram ework Institutions
-Secondary Institution al Characteristics
-Political Conditions and Policymakers’ goals
-Socioeconomic and Dem ographic Conditions
-Past Policy Choices

Source: Adapted from (Weaver & Rockman, 1995)
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ability to affect social normative standards (leading to additional analytic complications
especially for longitudinal studies). [March & Olsen, 1984]
4.6.2

Institutions, Institutionalism, and Tobacco Control Policy
As regards tobacco control policy, two aspects of institutionalism have received particular

research attention: venues and federalism.
Venues, while institutions, are also inextricably linked to Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.
As described in P.E.T.,
“Policy venues are the institutional locations where authoritative decisions
are made concerning a given issue. Policymaking authority is not
automatically assigned to particular venues…Just as images may change
over time, so may issues fall within several venues.”
From: [Baumgartner & Jones, 1993]
This is the “venue shopping” described in P.E.T. That is, just as there can be efforts to change
a policy image, so too can there be efforts to change the venue in which policy decisions are
made.

Venue shopping, thus, is closely associated with mobilization, positive feedback

mechanisms, and changing policy images. These associations were empirically demonstrated
in a study of tobacco control policy adoption in Scotland, where the author reported that a
change in the policy image (rooted in a shift in attention from the Scottish Executive to the
Scottish Parliament) caused the change in venue – the decision for devolution from the U.K. to
Scotland – was a key factor in facilitating the adoption of legislation banning smoking in public
places in Scotland. [Cairney, 2007]
Changing policy venues – venue shopping – can be a valuable strategic choice not only
because it necessarily implies mobilization and issue expansion, but also because different
venues often have different procedural rules and norms, also part of the broader construct of
institutionalism, that govern the decision making process within those venues. The importance
of such institutional rules was documented in an analysis of tobacco control policy making in
New Sound Wales, New Zealand where the authors reported that reforms giving additional
powers to legislative councils and committees as well the influence to backbenchers were by
factors in successful policy adoption. [Hooker & Chapman, 2006] Additionally, a change of
institutions – venue shopping – is not necessarily limited to different venues within the same
country or jurisdiction. Thus the globalization of tobacco control policy, through efforts such as
those of the European Union, have been discussed by some as being, at least in part, venue
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shopping. [Princen, 2004] (Using similar criteria, the F.C.T.C. could also be considered, at least
in part, a venue-shopping effort, though the F.C.T.C. is not discussed in this study.])
Federalism is a form of governmental and institutional organization wherein multiple levels
or layers jurisdictions have constitutionally protected policy making authority. Federalism, such
as in the United States (central/national vs. states) and Canada (central/national vs. provinces),
is distinguished from a unitary system, such as in Britain, in which only one legislative body has
the authority to create policy. However, all federalist systems are not homogeneous as it does
not imply uniform institutional arrangements, either structurally or functionally. Many mid-range
theories and constructs have been developed, such as regulatory federalism, discretionary
federalism, parliamentary federalism, presidential federalism, and executive federalism among
others, to articulate the various forms of power-sharing arrangements and relationships between
the different jurisdictional policy making levels (central/national, state/province, and substate/province such as counties). [Kelemen, 2000], [Studlar, 2010] So, while federalism (or
unitarism) is a constitutional choice for a specific form of government, the specific form of
federalism (e.g., permissive or regulatory federalism) evolves over years (generations) of dual
or multifaceted (not always shared, and not infrequently competitive) policy making and the
implicit balance of power that emerges from this collective policy making history and experience.
Further, these balances of power – form of federalism – can vary between policy areas and can
also change over time as, for example, institutional arrangements or interest group involvement
changes.
The multiple levels of policymaking authority in federalist systems also necessarily imply
multiple levels of institutions and so opportunities for venue shopping with the related issue
expansion, mobilization of interest, etc. Several studies have focused on the impact of these
institutional layers and venue shopping in federalist systems on tobacco control policy adoption.
In a study of tobacco control policy adoption within individual states, the authors reported on
several institutional characteristics, including the professionalism of the state legislature and
government ideology, which impacted the between-state or local-to-state diffusion of tobacco
control policies. [Shipan & Volden, 2006] In a case-study evaluation of the Master Settlement
Agreement, another author noted that it was federalism-permitted venue shopping that
facilitated the states’ attorneys general to not only creatively engage the judicial system but also
to “shop” within the judicial system to find a venue –court – most favorable to their cause
(Michael Moore, the state attorney general for Mississippi and the first to file a suit against the
tobacco companies, and Richard Scruggs, a tort lawyer acting on behalf of the state,
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intentionally selected a judge-ruled chancery court so as to avoid a jury trial (juries had never, at
that point, ruled against tobacco companies)). [Derthick, 2001] Interestingly, this author also
commented that, while the initial venue-change to the courts was clearly consistent with
federalism, the ultimate result of the negotiated Master Settlement Agreement, which used a
contractual arrangement to impose de facto tobacco control policy, was likely inconsistent with
the federalist principles of the Founding Fathers as it circumvented the traditional, democratic
policy making process in its imposition of de facto policy. [Derthick, 2001]
Finally, federalism, with its constitutionally derived layers of policy making jurisdiction, is
often compared to multi-level governance, an evolving theory attempting to explain the
dynamics of policy making in an increasingly globalised world where countries willingly cede
some level of their policy making sovereignty to transnational agreements and organizations,
because of their functional similarities – multiple layers of governance, jurisdictions, and venues.
Development of multi-level governance as a theory and an applied construct has proceeded
particularly in response to the evolution of policy making in European Union, with its expanding
competencies and, therefore, acquis communautaire, and scholarship on advancing its
theoretical underpinnings continues. [Bulmer, 1994], [Bolleyer & Borzel, 2010] Within tobacco
control policy, studies comparing federalist systems or federalist systems to systems of multilevel governance, such as the European Union or the F.C.T.C., have been conducted.

In

comparing federalist systems with very different structural and power-sharing characteristics yet
very similar tobacco control policy regimes and tobacco-related population health outcomes
(Canada and the United States), the author reasoned that the flexibility of federalism can permit
similar policy outcomes despite very different institutional processes because of how
institutional arrangements can vary and adapt both between jurisdictions but also temporally
within a given jurisdiction. [Studlar, 2010] In analyzing the evolution of tobacco control policy
within the European Union, one study concluded that the expansion of the European Union’s
competencies to tobacco control, thereby instituting an arrangement of multi-level governance,
had the effect of opening new policy venues to tobacco control policy advocates, with a
functional effect typically ascribed to federalism, which in turn facilitated the development and
eventual adoption of tobacco control policy by the European Union. [Mamudu & Studlar, 2009]
However, because multi-level governance is a still-evolving construct, its explanations for
tobacco control policy adoption have, at times, found to be yet complete particularly when
contrasted to the explanatory (and more fully developed) capacity of federalism. [Asare,
Cairney, & Studlar, 2009]
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4.7

Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, and Convergence

4.7.1

An Overview of Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, and Convergence in Public Policy
Viewed most broadly, the policy learning, diffusion, transfer (and borrowing) are related

concepts wherein a policy enacted in one jurisdiction becomes enacted in another. As related
concepts, differences in definitions are subtle:
•

Policy transfer is the emulation of the policies, programs, institutions, or other policy
apparatus from one jurisdiction or time point in another jurisdiction or time period;
[Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996]

•

Policy diffusion is the spread of policy innovations (new policy solutions) from one
jurisdiction to another; [Shipan & Volden, 2008]

•

Policy learning is the process whereby a jurisdiction facing a similar policy problem
observes the policy solution in another jurisdiction, determines if that solution is
successful, and is more likely to adopt a similar policy solution if it is deemed a
successful and appropriate policy solution. [Shipan & Volden, 2008]

Similarly, policy convergence is the tendency over time, often through policy learning, diffusion,
or transfer, for jurisdictions to adopt increasingly similar policies, programs, and institutional
arrangements. [Bennett, 1991] Rose differentiated between “learning” or “transfer” to achieve a
politically-motivated policy short-cut and a genuine, analytically based “lesson drawing”, which
he defined as a distinctive type of program that draws upon foreign experience so as to permit
knowledge extraction in order to inform a solution to a domestically based problem. [Rose,
2007] Core to successful lesson drawing, then, is understanding under what circumstances the
foreign program succeeds and to what extent can that program be successfully applied
domestically. The incentive for lesson drawing increases with problem solving urgency, where
problems can appear due to changes in national or international circumstances, or because of a
successful challenge of the status quo, including current assumptions, and ability to forward that
the possibility for better solutions exist.

That is, the foreign example(s) is/are successfully

forward as a benchmark or best practice (or at least ‘better’ practice) in comparison to the
existing, domestic solution.

Such lessons, or benchmarks, can be drawn from historical

examples, though this is inherently limited, or from different but contemporary geographic
jurisdictions, near of far, similar or dissimilar. Further, there are an increasing number of forums
– national, international, global, continental, or regional – for government officials, policymakers,
and scientists that are designed to facilitate both awareness of the opportunity to learn about
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foreign lessons. Within tobacco control, the F.C.T.C. and the World Conferences on Tobacco or
Health, among others, are quintessential such examples.
That the F.C.T.C. and W.C.To.H. conferences are deliberate forums to promote policy
learning, transfer, and ultimately convergence is consistent with ideas developed from the
political science perspective where some have asserted that policy transfer is not a random
process. [Bennett, 1997] Rather, lessons are shared and reverberate (“ripple”) through policy
communities both formally and informally and jurisdictions can be motivated into policy transfer
for rational reasons of lesson drawing, quasi-rational reasons of solution searching, less-rational
legitimation, or harmonization. As research studies have reported on the circumstances of
policy transfer, learning, and diffusion, models differentiating between different types and
characteristics of such diffusion have been developed.

Berry and Berry have conducted

important scholarship in this area, articulating a framework of distinct diffusion and innovation
forms, as described below. [Berry & Berry, 2007], [Berry, 1994]
1) Diffusion Models
a) National Interaction Model – models of diffusion that are based national
communication networks among and between state policymakers, bureaucrats,
and public-sector employees regarding public sector programs and their
successes or failings. The probability a state will adopt a certain program is
proportional to the number of interactions State X has had interactions with the
already-adopted-in State Y.
b) Regional Diffusion Model – Adoption of policies across states is dependent upon
geographic proximity – aka ‘neighbor’ or ‘near neighbor’ models.
c) Leader-Laggard Models – A state (or country) takes on the role of ‘leader’, and is
thus pre-disposed to becoming a policy innovator, whereas other states take on
the role of ‘laggard’, thus being pre-disposed to be an adoptor.
d) Isomorphism Models – Models that emphasize “likeness of states” (vs.
geographic proximity) in their probability that a state will adopt a policy. That is,
states look to other like states for their policy cues.
e) Vertical Influence Models – Models that suggest that diffusion from national to
state levels are more important than horizontal diffusion across jurisdictions of
similar ‘rank’ (e.g., municipality to municipality etc).
2) Internal Determinants Models – These models suggest that internal factors, such as
the political, economic, or social environment within a state are the key factors
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determining whether a policy will be adopted. Definition of the dependent variable is
key in these models, as it has significant implications for framing the research
question (and subsequent analyses).
3) Unified Innovation Models that Include Elements of Diffusion and Internal
Determinants – This is a model forwarded by Berry and Berry that functionally
includes all variables, including internal determinants, resources, motivation, and
elements from diffusion models including neighbors etc, into one analytic model.
Analytically the model relies heavily upon event history analysis. As with many areas
of political science, data availability is often a limiting factor.
4.7.2

Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, Convergence, and Tobacco Control Policy
Not unexpectedly, policy learning, transfer, and diffusion have been used to explain the

spread of tobacco control policies between jurisdictions. Earlier studies reported diffusion of
tobacco control policies through jurisdictions in Canada and the United States and the role of
advocacy groups in facilitation the policy diffusion. [Studlar, 1999] Later studies contributed
additional empirical support to the importance of epistemic and transnational advocacy groups
in facilitation policy learning and transfer. [Studlar, 2006], [Studlar, 2005] However, despite
efforts such as the F.C.T.C. and other international tobacco control advocacy efforts, tobacco
control policies have by no means been universally adopted. While some studies continue to
emphasize the importance of advocacy networks for successful policy transfer and adoption,
[Wipfli, Fujimoto, & Valente, 2010] results from other studies suggest that other issues, such as
the policy image and ideas and institutional arrangements are also key factors in policy transfer.
[Cairney, 2009], [Studlar, 2007] That is, the transition from knowledge transfer to successful
policy transfer (adoption) remains a political one.
4.8

Social Change and Social Movements

4.8.1

An Overview of Social Change in Public Policy
A view of public policy is that it is the tool by which societies chose to engage their

government to deploy scarce public resources in order to reach a public solution to a problem it
faces. And so, if public policies are the means which a society distributes its resources and
public policy making the process by which a society affords and controls access to the decision
making (resource allocation) process producing those policies, public policies and the public
policy making process are the means by which a society apportions its values. To the extent
that one accepts this view of public policy, it follows that a change in public policy, absent a
fundamental change in the policy making process itself, reflects a change in either: a) the
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society’s understanding or view of the problem; b) the society’s view of whether the problem
should be addressed publicly or privately; or c) the society’s view of how [public] resources
should be allocated to address the problem. That is, policy change can be interpreted as a
change within the society – a social change, including as regards the society’s values and
preferences for resource allocation.
While some scholars rebuff socially-based explanations as being too naïve, (e.g.,
[Steinmo, 1994]) social and cultural values have nonetheless emerged as either complements
to or alternates for other explanations such as institutionalism. [Steinmo, 1994], [Kurdle &
Marmor, 1981] In using social and cultural explanations, cross-sectional comparative studies
attribute differences in policy regimes to differences in some combination of the three factors
identified above (understanding or view of the problem, preference for a public or private
solution, values informing resource allocation to address the problem). Likewise, in longitudinal
studies, changes in policy or policy regimes are attributed to changes in some combination of
these factors. Castles’ and Obinger’s “Families of Nations” or Epsing-Andersen’s “Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism” are illustrations of explanations for differences in patterns of public and
social welfare policy regimes attributable to differences in cultural and fundamental social
values. [Castles & Obinger, 2008], [Epsing-Andersen, 1990] Also within the realm of social
explanations are causal stories [Stone, 1989] and social constructions, [Schneider & Ingram,
1993] which are fundamental to how a society understands or views a problem and,
conceivably, its preference for a public or private solution to the problem. It is acknowledged,
that neither social constructions nor causal stories are likely discrete from the policy images of
the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.

Conceptual overlaps aside, it is straightforward to

understand how either changes (longitudinal) or differences (comparative or cross-sectional) in
the perceptions of power (“weak” or “strong”) or construction (“positive” or “negative”) altering
categorization as “advantaged”, “contenders”, “dependents”, or “deviants” in the social
construction paradigm, [Schneider & Ingram, 1993] or how similar changes in actions
(“purposeful” or “unguided”) or consequences (“intended” or “unintended”) leading to an
adjustment in the perceived classification as “mechanical cause”, “accidental cause”,
“intentional cause”, or “inadvertent cause” in the causal story paradigm [Stone, 1989] could
affect a fundamental shift in a society’s understanding of the problem or its preference for a
public solutions.
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4.8.2

Tobacco Control Policy Adoption as a Social Movement
In tobacco control policy, social explanations have been forwarded to account for adoption

of tobacco control policies and changes in tobacco control policy regimes. The changing and
selective framing of tobacco control policies has been examined and the success of public
health advocates in framing public smoking bans as protecting “innocent” victims has been
forwarded as a key factor in the spread of smoke-free policies. [Larsen, 2010] Additionally,
Nathanson in particular has contributed substantial scholarship to elucidating and reporting on
various elements of social change that have contributed to the substantial changes in tobacco
control policy regimes in developed countries. In particular, Nathanson notes that particularly in
the fragmented American context, the work of grass-roots advocacy groups to re-frame
smoking, the tobacco industry, and the need for and role of tobacco control policy has been
essential in affecting the sea-changes in tobacco control policy regimes. [Nathanson, 2007]
Further, Nathanson also concludes that the substantial declines in smoking prevalence are
primarily attributable to the transformation of smoking from social acceptable to socially
unacceptable due to the efforts of health-related social movements.

[Nathanson, 1999],

[Nathanson, 2005] However, while these empirical studies have identified the importance of
social movements and social change, rigorous quantitative studies have to be conducted so as
to better understand the relative importance of preferences for public vs. private solutions
compared to cultural values.
4.9

Science and Expert Communities

4.9.1

An Overview of Science and Expert Communities in Public Policy
Scientific information and expert communities are incorporated into multiple policy

frameworks, most notably the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the subsystems and policy
images of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. Scientific information can also be considered in
isolation as an instrument with a “central role in the framing and legitimation of policy.” [Ingram,
Schneider, & McDonald, 2002] So, while the importance of scientific knowledge and expertise
in the policy process has been recognized, the mechanisms of how this information exerts its
effects are complex. Two different classification systems have been developed to explain the
factors influencing the impact of scientific expertise in the policy process.
In Nathanson’s classification system [Nathanson, 2007], the ability of scientific information
and experts to influence the policy process is constrained by several contingencies including:
•

Characteristics of the political regime – both the scientific ideas and the experts
forwarding those ideas will, in a pluralist system with both cultural and
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institutional incentives for competition, will face more challenge and skepticism
than is encountered in a corporatist or hierarchical systems.
•

Social and political location (status) and the framing expertise of “knowledge
brokers” – incorporation of scientific knowledge or experts into the policy process
(e.g., though proposed bills, hearings etc.) depends, in no small measure, on the
normative beliefs of the policymakers, which is also related to how that scientific
information has been presented and “framed” by knowledge brokers.

These

brokers, such as the media and other journalists, play a crucial role in translating
this scientific information into policy images, causal stories, and socially
constructed notions of who does and doesn’t need or deserve protection through
constructions of culturally credible risk and victimization.
•

Beneficial intersections of timing and opportunity – while this contingency is
typically beyond the control of policy makers, knowledge brokers, experts, or
other actors in the policy process, it is nonetheless important: some ideas and
arguments, no matter how sound or creative, do not resonate and so they must
either change or wait until they are received more favorably.

In Weible’s framework, [Weible, 2008] intended to supplement the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, expert information can be used for learning, political purposes (e.g., the distortion
or misrepresentation of facts), or instrumentally as part of a rational policy process to develop
evidence-based policy. Further, how information is used is contingent upon the type of coalition
configuration as either unitary subsystems, collaborative subsystems, or adversarial subsystem.
Thus a series of propositions is forwarded on the use of expert information in subsystems:
1. The political use of expert-based information will be highest in
adversarial subsystems.
2. The instrumental use of expert-based information will vary from the
highest in collaborative, to an intermediate level in unitary, and to the
lowest in adversarial policy subsystems.
3. Learning will occur within conditions or among experts with similar
analytical approaches in all subsystems and will most likely occur
across coalitions or across experts with dissimilar analytical
approaches in collaborative systems.
From: [Weible, 2008]
Thus scientific information and experts is clearly important in the policy process, though
how the information is used and its impact is dependent upon the context of the policy process
itself.
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4.9.2

Science and Expert Communities in Tobacco Control Policy
The importance and role of scientific information and experts in tobacco control policy is

not in dispute. The causal role of this information in changing the fundamental understanding of
the problem, including the construction of risk and victimization, the policy images, the
perceptions of the tobacco industry, and the social changes that this information fueled has
been well documented both within the United States and globally. [Nathanson, 1999],
[Nathanson, 2007], [Asbridge, 2004], [Beaglehole, 1991], [Warner, 2005], [Bayer & Colgrove,
2002], [Mamudu, 2007] However, what has been less well understood, particularly within the
public health community, is why, despite overwhelming scientific evidence, policy has not
followed logically and rationally from this overwhelming scientific evidence. While some within
the public health and epidemiologic communities have attempted to better understand – and
modify – the approach to the intersection of science and public policy, [Savitz, Poole, & Miller,
1999], [Brownson, Royer, Ewing, & McBride, 2006], [Brownson, Chriqui, & Stamatakis, 2009] a
substantial proportion of the tobacco control advocacy community has and continues to respond
with disbelief and frustration, viewing a “failure” to adopt the “right” or “needed” policy as a
“failure” of the political system. [Larsen, 2008]

The response from the political science

perspective is that,
“The path from knowledge to policy is not straightforward; scientific
consensus does not lead automatically to policy consensus.”
From: [Nathanson, 2007]
That is, policy adoption is not a scientific exercise or process, but a political one.
4.10 The Judiciary
4.10.1 An Overview of the Role of the Judiciary in Public Policy
The description of the judiciary in the elementary school, introductory version of the threebranches-of-government form of American democracy is that the judicial branch interprets the
constitution. That is, it does not function to create policy, simply to ensure that policy created in
the legislative branch does not violate constitutionally protected rights. However, legal, political
and policy science scholars alike have long understood the naiveté of that view of the American
judiciary.

Within policy frameworks, the judiciary can alternately a venue (Punctuated

Equilibrium Theory), a strategic opportunity and / or resource or an external event (Advocacy
Coalition Framework), or an actor within society whose actions affect the society’s
understanding or view of the problem (including through framing, social constructions, or causal
stories), opportunities or constraints on public or private solutions to the problem or how
[96]

resources are allocated to address the problem. Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, the courts
were increasingly used as an avenue to affect social reform, and a substantial body of
scholarship has developed attempting to understand and better explain how legal mobilization
and the judiciary affect public policy
Legal mobilization is an umbrella-term encompassing instances when litigation – or the
threat of litigation – is proactively pursued to assert rights. As has been previously described,
[McCann, 2008]
•

Legal mobilization begins with “non-official” legal actors, private citizens, and
thus is often considered a “bottom-up” approach because it begins with those
outside the legal community, often, in cases of legal mobilization seeking social
reform, by those considered less powerful or socially marginalized.

•

In the broadest understanding of legal mobilization, actual litigation is but part of
a dynamic, complex continuum of interactions between disputing parties, ranging
from filing claims or charges, negotiations, legal proceedings, and postproceeding negotiations. Thus, legal mobilization, while a strategic decision, is
also a process, and the judiciary can have myriad policy-like effects at any and
all stages of this process.

•

The decision to employ legal mobilization is complex as are the possible
outcome and thus the policy repercussions are uncertain depending upon when,
how, and the form of resolution to the initiating dispute.

•

There are substantial socially-derived disparities in the ability or predisposition
(“legal consciousness”) to employ legal mobilization as a strategy to assert rights
related to the substantial capital and personnel resources needed to improve the
chances of success.

Additionally and as numerous scholars have identified, the inability of the courts to enforce their
decisions, termed by many as the “myth of rights”, combined with the observed “countermobilization backlash” has led to the questioning of legal mobilization as a strategy to affect
social change. [McCann, 2008] However, whether legal mobilization is viewed as effective or
successful may depend upon the evaluation time frame selected. [Epp, 2008]

The highly

fragmented, federalist system in the United States creates substantial incentives for legal
mobilization. However, while the inability of the courts to enforce or implement their decisions
(expansion or extension of rights to a new group) is very real as is the often well orchestrated
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mobilization backlash by opponents, the “myth of rights” may be a short-term phenomenon,
disappearing if a longer-term evaluation timeframe is taken. [Epp, 2008] That is, the social
policy impact of the courts may be realized through processes such as those articulated by the
Advocacy Coalition Framework or the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as well as what some
scholars have termed the “administrative professions”: the translation of judicial decisions to
real and palpable changes in [social] policy is virtually entirely dependent upon intermediaries –
coalitions, subsystem actors, bureaucrats, policy or cause advocates, or other motivated
experts who are both aware of and insist upon the realization of legal decisions in policies,
programs, and regulations and are prepared to re-engage the legal system (or threaten to do
so) if their requirements are not met. [Epp, 2008]
4.10.2 The Judiciary and Tobacco Control Policy
Legal mobilization has been an oft employed strategy in the “war on tobacco” and the
paths from the offices of tobacco control advocates and the tobacco industry to the courts are
well trod. An overview of key legal cases in the decades-long efforts to enact tobacco control
policies, as well as the relationships of these suits to policy, is included in Appendix 1. In
addition to the public health “three-waves” etiology, (e.g., [Douglas, Davis, & Beasley, 2006])
there was an increase in scholarship addressing the relationship between tobacco lawsuits and
tobacco control policy particularly surrounding the Master Settlement Agreement. Some of this
scholarship empirically explored some of the issues discussed above specifically related to
tobacco control policy including how the legal mobilization and events in the courts affected a
change in the policy image sufficient to motivate the tobacco companies to compromise.
[Mather, 1998] Additionally, while some of this scholarship was generally positive toward the
possibility that the Master Settlement Agreement could be an exception to the generally-held
belief that effective (or timely) policy does not come from the courts, [Jacobson & Warner, 1999]
other views were decidedly less favorable, considering the terms of the Master Settlement
Agreement to be undemocratic, a court-imposed tax, and state “nanny-ism”. [Melnick, 1999]
Now, more than a decade after the enactment of the M.S.A., retrospective analyses are
emerging.

Clearly, the “undoing” of the tobacco industry, as predicted by some, has not

materialized. [Kelder Jr. & Daynard, 1997] Further, evaluation of policy impacts of the legal
mobilization resulting in the M.S.A. is complicated because, as it has now been reasonably well
documented, the states did not implement the M.S.A. homogeneously nor all not quite
implemented as expected. [Jones & Silvestri, 2010] Most notably, states have substantially
diverted M.S.A. funds to uses other than tobacco control programs leaving state programs
underfunded, and, with the passage of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
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Control Act, it took more than 10 years to achieve the national-level regulatory regime contained
in the aborted Global Settlement Agreement. [Jones & Silvestri, 2010] In the end, a [not so]
quiet consensus that seems to emerge is that the disclosure stipulations, mandating the
creation of multiple tobacco industry internal documents (now available online) and the
scholarship and subsequent legal actions that this otherwise unattainable information has
afforded, may ultimately have the largest and longest-lasting impact on tobacco control policy.
[Miura, Daynard, & Samet, 2006], [Givel & Glantz, 2004]
The preponderance of scholarship on the role of litigation in tobacco control policy has
been focused on the Master Settlement Agreement. Few empirical and even fewer quantitative
studies have systematically investigated the effect of the larger body tobacco litigation on
tobacco control policy either at the national or lower-court level. This area of inquiry is well
suited for examination, especially as some policy and “legal mobilization” entrepreneurs are
suggesting that the “lessons” from tobacco litigation be applied to other areas of public health,
particularly obesity. [Alderman & Daynard, 2006]
4.11 The Political and Policy Science Perspective on Networks
Within political and policy science, three areas of scholarship have emerged with
overlapping language, definitions and constructs: epistemic communities; transnational
advocacy networks (sometimes called global advocacy networks); and the Advocacy Coalition
Framework. Early empirical work differentiated epistemic communities from interest groups and
social movements, disciplines and professions, and legislators and bureaucrats (and
bureaucracies) based on knowledge, beliefs, and interests. [Haas, 1992] According to this
work,
“…it is the combination of having a shared set of causal and principled
(analytic and normative) beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a
common policy enterprise (common interests) that distinguish epistemic
communities from various other groups. They differ from interest groups in
that the epistemic community members have shared causal beliefs and
cause-and-effect understandings…epistemic communities have exerted
their influence on decision makers in a wide variety of issue-areas.
Generally called upon for advice under conditions of uncertainty, they have
often proved to be significant actors in shaping patterns of international
policy coordination.”
From: [Haas, 1992]
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In expanding the notion of epistemic communities to include individuals beyond subject
specialists, advocacy networks, sometimes also discussed as coalitions, have been described
as:
“Advocacy networks are significant transnationally, regionally and
domestically. They may be key contributors to a convergence of social and
cultural norms able to support processes of regional and international
integration …. [They] are forms of organization characterized by voluntary,
reciprocal
and
horizontal
patterns
of
communication
and
exchange…Transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge
around those issues where: (1) channels between domestic groups and
their governments are hampered or severed where such channels are
ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion the ‘boomerang’
pattern of influence characteristic of these networks; (2) activists or
‘political entrepreneurs’ believe that networking will further their missions
and campaigns, and actively promote them; (3) international conferences
and other forms of international contacts create arenas for forming and
strengthening networks.”
From: [Keck & Sikkink, 1999]
In contrast to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which emphasizes stable and
enduring coalition formation around fundamental values and typically within a single subsystem,
the development of epistemic communities and advocacy networks has been more functional,
both arising from and focusing on what these more loosely-organized networks have
accomplished. [Farquharson, 2003] Within tobacco control, the development of these networks,
either within or between jurisdictions as well as globally, has been the explicit goal of, for
example, the World Conferences on Tobacco or Health as well as the C.D.C.’s National
Tobacco Control Program. These networks, because of their diverse membership from both
technical and lay communities, likely have more theoretical grounding in global advocacy
networks or the Advocacy Coalition Framework compared to epistemic communities due to the
emphasis of the latter on common understandings based on similar technical expertise.
[Farquharson, 2003]

Studies have reported on the success of these networks in taking

advantage of the multiple venues in multi-level governance arrangements to advance myriad
public health policies including tobacco control policies. [Princen, 2007] Further, numerous
other studies have reported on various characteristics of the network organization, including
strategic membership, community involvement, and use of the media, that have facilitated
network success in advancing tobacco control policies. [Chapman & Wakefield, 2001],
[Farquharson, 2003], [Farquharson, 2005], [Lewis, 2006]
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Thus these networks, whether originating from epistemic communities, loose associations
locally or globally based, or more the formal and organized structures consistent with the
Advocacy Coalition Framework, have and continue to be important facilitators of the policy
learning and diffusion as well as policy convergence, and the social changes associated with
tobacco control policy adoption.

A form of institution themselves, they have become

institutionalized through, for example, the C.D.C.’s N.T.C.P., and have also been able to
understand and utilize existing institutional arrangements to affect change.

In Donabedian

parlance, these networks have become the functional structures through which the processes to
change both tobacco control policy adoption and the reduction of smoking prevalence are
produced.
4.12 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a review of tobacco control policy from the political and policy
science perspective. This chapter has examined both the conceptual underpinnings (generally)
as well as the application to tobacco control policy (more specifically) for agenda setting
theories and frameworks, the role of science and expert communities, the impact of the courts
and legal proceedings, the effect of the morality-policy dimension of tobacco control policy,
institutions and institutionalism, the role of social change and issue framing, policy learning and
diffusion, and the effects of networks on tobacco control policy learning, diffusion, transfer and
convergence. As a generalization, each of these sub-fields or topic areas contributes, using a
common policy science phrase, a “lens” through which various aspects of the policy adoption
component of the tobacco epidemic can be organized and explained. No single “lens” is “best”
or provides the “right” explanation – each emphasizes slightly different causal factors and
elements of the policy process.

A comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing

tobacco control policy adoption requires a broad and integrated understanding of the
contributions from each of these “lenses”.
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5

AN INTEGRATED POLICY HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE TOBACCO
EPIDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE LENS OF IDEAS,
INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS

5.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
In the previous two chapters, the existing tobacco epidemic and tobacco control policy

literature, representing the cumulative understanding and knowledge contribution, from two very
different perspectives – that of the public health community and the political and policy science
community – was reviewed. From the positivist perspective, the cumulative contribution of the
public health community has been substantial, particularly as regards evidence establishing the
biologic and epidemiologic causality of tobacco use and deleterious health outcomes as well as
the development of “evidence-based” programs and policies to prevent tobacco use and / or
promote the cessation of its use. However, a considerable portion of the literature from the
public health perspective has a decidedly normative viewpoint. In particular, it is this normative
viewpoint that supports the outlook that, having established the harmful health effects caused by
tobacco use and exposure, the untoward and shady conduct of the tobacco industry, and the
effectiveness of programs and policies to abate tobacco use, these policies and programs
should therefore be universally and ubiquitously adopted so as to eventually abolish all tobacco
use and exposure and ultimately eliminate the tobacco industry in its entirety. That is, this
dimension of the public health perspective on the tobacco epidemic is rather dogmatic and
prescriptive regarding how individuals ought to behave – or at least how individuals ought to be
allowed to behave. This normative stance also typically interprets the absence of the policies
and programs that “should” be in place as a “failure” of the political system, usually attributable
to the undue influence of the tobacco industry.
Thus, this normative dimension of the public health perspective on the tobacco epidemic
is rather narrow. Most particularly, it is a very narrow construction of policy process and the
factors that influence it including, for example, a population’s tolerance for or acceptance of
governmental paternalism, trade-offs between social goods and individual rights, the relative
values of different individual rights. Further, the strong de-normalization element within the
public health community is, as has been discussed by others, anti-political and anti-democratic
(owing to the presumption that the tobacco industry is not legitimate and so should not be given
an legitimate voice in the policy process), which is an incongruous stance given the still-legal
status of the activity (tobacco use) and the industry, and the pluralist nature of most
industrialized societies.

Additionally, this narrow interpretation of events and the tobacco
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epidemic could also be considered unscientific.

Specifically, the reluctance to pursue

explanations for the pace of policy adoption beyond that of impediments imposed by the “evil
tobacco industry” could be viewed as some as the collection of data to support a position rather
than the more scientifically grounded collection of data to test an hypothesis. Regardless, this
normative dimension of the public health perspective flounders – perhaps because it is so
normative – to provide a comprehensive or inclusive explanation for the evolution of the tobacco
epidemic, particularly tobacco control policy adoption.
Explanations for the adoption (or lack thereof) of tobacco control policies are, however,
the strength of the political and policy science perspective. The political and policy science
literature has applied and contributed multiple theories and frameworks, particularly of the policy
adoption process, to the tobacco epidemic in an effort to provide explanations for the how, if,
when, and where tobacco control policies are adopted. Further, while the political and policy
science perspective tends to be more positivist and without the normativist dimension of the
public health literature, it is also not as well developed nor with the depth of the public health
literature. For example, while some of these policy process frameworks and explanations seem
particularly applicable, the scholarship to systematically and comprehensively apply them to the
tobacco epidemic has simply not occurred. Additionally, in focusing on policy adoption as the
primary outcome, the political and policy science literature typically overlooks or ignores that
which the policies affect: tobacco use. Thus, each perspective largely ignores contributions of
the other and, in their own way, each perspective also discounts the populace and its use of
tobacco on policy adoption of and, thus, the evolution of the tobacco epidemic.
Therefore, the intent of this empirical chapter is to incorporate the two perspectives and
literatures on the tobacco epidemic into an integrated narrative on the evolution of the tobacco
epidemic. The framework that will be used to organize this integrated policy history is that of
ideas, interests, and institutions.
5.2

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions
In presenting a framework with which to understand and explain the evolution of public

policy, Heclo (Heclo H. , Ideas, Interests, and Institutions, 1994) identified three fundamental
and inextricably intertwined constructs: ideas, interests, and institutions.
“At this point one begins to sense the liberating effect of seeing interests,
institutions, and ideas not as the proprietary battleground among different
social science “approaches” but as the shared patrimony of human
materials for getting a better view of the world. The interrelationships are
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complicated, to be sure, but not every complication is a contradiction. We
can recognize that interests, ideas, and institutions all “matter” in a very
fundamental sense without forcing ourselves to choose which type of factor
is analytically precedent ….”
Further, Heclo described each of these three pillars of policy evolution as:
“…self-interest probably explains more of the variance in political affairs
than any other single factor, but this does not mean it explains very
much…[but] individual choices are embedded in institutional settings that
privilege some options and delete others ….”
And
“…institutions are supposed to be the things that stay around, fostering
continuity and a long-term view of affairs….Institutions are the bearers of
such traditions and practices…Institutions may go beyond helping
individuals signal and coordinate preferences more effectively, beyond
privileging or deleting options, and beyond even the historical construction
of understandings that bequeath meaning to our options an practices. “
Heclo discussed the “reciprocity” between these constructs such that it is difficult to identify
discrete boundaries between them:
“…it is how to follow the strands of ideas, interests, and institutions as they
intertwine and enfold in dynamic processes…”
And,
“Political institutions can also provide the means for changing ideas about
our interests and preferences.”
Thus, Heclo advanced that understanding policy evolution required an understanding of
these three interdependent, dynamic constructs. It is this lens that will be used to examine the
evolution of tobacco control policy in the United States.
5.3

Ideas
In the 1950s, cigarettes in America were both ubiquitous and superlative symbols of

freedom and Americanism.

With few restrictions, smoking was common in workplaces,

Congressional committee rooms, by physicians at their patient’s bedside, in restaurants,
theatres, and airplanes – it was everywhere, and many, if not most, people did it. As symbols of
youth, freedom, and American cool, cigarettes were the perfect accessory for James Dean’s
jeans, white t-shirt and tosseled hair, and Joe Camel™ and the Marlboro Man™ were iconic
American brands. To evolve from products with such social prominence and acceptance to
ones highly restricted and with a negative social image, ideas about cigarettes by both the
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public and policy makers alike needed to cross two specific thresholds: a) that tobacco is a
“problem product” whose use has negative consequences and imposes harm and unfair costs
on society, and b) because of the nature of the product, society needs to be protected from
these negative consequences, harms, and costs by government action. That is, there was a
needed change in the ideas about the problem, the preference for a public or private solution for
the problem, fundamental values regarding public protection among other things, or some
combination of these ideas. The evolution of these ideas, then, is directly related to the reframing of tobacco in general and cigarettes specifically from iconic symbols of individualism
and American freedom to that of a social menace.
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Table 5-1. Smoking and Tobacco-Related Reports of the U.S. Surgeon General, 1964-2007
Year

Title

1964 Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service
1967 The Health Consequences of Smoking, A Public Health Service Review
1968 The Health Consequences of Smoking: 1968 Supplement to the 1967 Public Health Service Review
1969 The Health Consequences of Smoking: 1969 Supplement to the 1967 Public Health Service Review
1971 The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General: 1971
1972 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1972
1973 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1973
1974 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1974
1975 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1975
1976 The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Reference Edition
1979 Smoking and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General
1979 The Health Consequences of Smoking, 1977-1978
1980 The Health Consequences of Smoking for Women: A Report of the Surgeon General
1981 The Health Consequences of Smoking - The Changing Cigarette: A Report of the Surgeon General
1982 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Cancer: A Report of the Surgeon General
1983 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Cardiovascular Disease: A Report of the Surgeon General
1984 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease: A Report of the Surgeon General
1985 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease in the Workplace: A Report of the Surgeon General
1986 Smoking and Health, A National Status Report: A Report to Congress
1986 The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General
1986 The Health Consequences of Using Smokeless Tobacco
1988 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Nicotine Addiction: A Report of the Surgeon General
1989 Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking - 25 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General
1990 The Health Benefits of Smoking Cessation: A Report of the Surgeon General
1992 Smoking and Health in the Americas: A Report of the Surgeon General
1994 Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General
1994 Surgeon General's Report for Kids about Smoking
1998 Tobacco Use Among U.S. Racial/Ethnic Minority Groups: A Report of the Surgeon General
2000 Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of the Surgeon General
2001 Women and Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General
2004 The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General
2006 The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General
2007

Children and Secondhand Smoke Exposure-Excerpts from The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the
Surgeon General

In 1954 when approximately 45% of Americans smoked, only 39% of Americans
believed that smoking caused lung cancer, but by 1992, when 23% of Americans smoked, the
proportion of Americans who reported that smoking caused lung cancer was 92%, or a 140%
increase in this 38-year time period. (Morales, L; Gallup, Inc., 2008) Likely the single biggest
agent for change during this period was the continual emergence of scientific evidence
identifying an ever-increasing number of diseases, risk factors, and costs associated with
tobacco use. Prominent among this scientific evidence has been the U.S. Surgeon General’s
office which has, between 1994-2007, released 34 reports on various aspects of tobacco use,
cigarette smoking, exposure to secondhand smoke, and the health and economic
consequences thereof (Table 5-1). Through these reports, not only has the information from
individual scientific studies been summarized, synthesized, and presented in a publicly-
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digestible and actionable format, but the Surgeon General has given the information (i.e., results
from individual scientific studies) credibility and prominence not otherwise achievable.
While population surveys on the knowledge and attitudes about the harmful effects of
tobacco use and cigarette smoking have not been collected with the same frequency or
standardized methodological rigor as, for example, smoking prevalence, the 1989 Surgeon
General’s Report did summarize such results from several different sources. (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1989) An overview of selected
results from the “Adult Use of Tobacco Survey (A.U.T.S.)” is shown in Figure 5-1.

The

proportion of Americans who believe that smoking is harmful to your health, and that it causes
lung cancer and heart disease have all increased substantially since 1964, the year of the
seminal Surgeon General’s report affirming that tobacco is causative of deleterious health
outcomes. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964)
The results from the A.U.T.S. survey, the Gallup, Inc.® polls, and the decline of smoking
prevalence in the absence of substantive tobacco control policies until the 1980s (discussed in
the Policy Stream below) strongly suggests that the American public, and so one can only
assume policy makers as well, had an increasing understanding of the negative health

% of Respondents ("Adult Use of Tobacco Survey")

Figure 5-1. Overview of Results Regarding Knowledge and Attitudes about the Harmful Effects of Smoking
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Data Source: (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Surgeon General, 1989)
Note: AUTS Survey Results Only
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consequences of smoking and tobacco use. However, the transformation of cigarettes from a
harmful product left to strictly private decision making to a product requiring substantial
government regulation and restriction was likely strongly related to three factors: 1) the
emergence of evidence that secondhand smoke was also causative of deleterious health
effects, 2) the rise of the non-smokers’ rights movements, and 3) the demise of the tobacco
industry. The 1986 Surgeon General’s Report had as one of its principal conclusions that
exposure to secondhand smoke (termed “involuntary smoking” in the report) caused lung
cancer in healthy non-smokers. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Surgeon General, 1986) Results summarized in the 1989 Surgeon General’s report support the
evolution of the public’s view of this issue. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of the Surgeon General, 1989) In 1974, 46% of respondents agreed that smoking was
hazardous to nonsmoker’s health while 81% of respondents agreed with this statement in 1987,
though these data have different original sources. And has been discussed above, support for
“totally banning” smoking in public places such as restaurants, workplaces, and hotels and
motels has steadily increased from 1987-2005: for example, 17% reported supporting a total
smoking ban in restaurants in 1987 compared to 54% in 2005 (Moore, D W; Gallup, Inc., 2005).
The increasing evidence for the deleterious effects of secondhand smoke (culminating in the
1986 Surgeon General’s report) was a key impetus for the formation and expansion of the
nonsmokers’ rights movement, which began in the 1970s and expanded rapidly thereafter.
(Nathanson, 2007) These groups, such as G.A.S.P. (Groups Against Smokers’ Pollution), were
important agents in transforming and re-framing cigarettes, smokers, and the tobacco industry
as infringing on the public’s right to breathe clean air and jeopardizing the health of children, a
traditionally protected social group. In any policy area, the ability to successfully link a policy
image to a “right” is a powerful strategy in reframing a policy problem (Feldman & Bayer,
Unfiltered: Conflicts Over Tobacco Policy and Health, 2004) and this strategy has been
successfully employed by these nonsmokers’ groups.
Finally, while the favorable opinion of and prevalence of smoking had already begun to
decline, another key factor has been the declining influence of the tobacco industry. Despite
ample and credible scientific evidence to the contrary, including the 1988 Surgeon General’s
report (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1988),
as late as 1994 tobacco industry executives testified under oath before a Congressional
committee that nicotine was not addictive. This testimony was later undermined by documents
from the tobacco industry itself, released as part of a settlement in a Minnesota law suit, and the
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credibility of the tobacco industry suffered substantially. Thereafter, it became far more difficult
for the tobacco industry to position themselves as the “innocent victims” of aggressive targeting
by zealous public health activists.
Regarding public attitudes towards tobacco control policies, these attitudes can be
evaluated from different perspectives and at different levels of resolution. Unfortunately and
regardless of the perspective or resolution, very little information has been systematically
collected over regular, prolonged intervals and thus conclusions regarding the public ideas
about and attitudes towards tobacco control policies must be inferred. At the macro-level, there
have been periodic public opinion surveys regarding attitudes, defined broadly, toward
restriction on smoking and tobacco sales. The 1989 Surgeon General’s report summarized the
results from several surveys. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Surgeon General, 1989) While fully acknowledging the challenge of comparing results from
different survey sources (including slightly different instruments and companies/groups
administering the survey), in 1964 52% of all adults agreed that smoking should be allowed in
fewer places than it is now compared to 70% in 1975. In 1978 16% of adults favored a total ban
on smoking in public places compared to 60% in 1988, and in 1964 36% of adults agreed that
cigarette advertising should not be permitted compared to 55% of adults in 1988. Additionally,
as was discussed above, Gallup, Inc.® has reported that, amongst adults, 17% favored total
bans in restaurants and workplaces in 1987 compared to 54% and 41%, respectively, in 2005.
(Moore, D W; Gallup, Inc., 2005) Results from individual studies also support a trend of more
favorable attitudes towards restrictive tobacco control polices. In California and the U.S.A.,
there has been a 28.6% (from 58.5% to 75.8%) and a 23.2% (from 46.5% to 57.3%) respective
increase in support for a smoking ban in at least four of six venue sites (restaurants, hospitals,
indoor work areas, bars, indoor sports venues, indoor shopping malls). (Gilpin, Lee, & Pierce,
2004)

Finally, the National Social Climate Survey of Tobacco Control study, a recently

established study based on social institutional theory, has reported similar trends: in 2000 61%
of respondents felt that smoking should not be allowed at all in restaurants compared to 83.6%
in 2008; and 59.7% of respondents in 2005 felt that people should not be allowed to smoke
within twenty feet of a doorway compared to 65.1% in 2008. (American Academy of Pediatrics
Julias B. Richmond Center of Excellence, 2008) Thus, based on the information from these
disparate sources it is not unreasonable to infer that the social ideas have become more
favorable to increasingly restrictive comprehensive tobacco control policies.
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In summary, since the early 1950s tobacco and smoking has evolved from a widely used
and widely accepted product to one which the majority of the population views unfavorably and
as needing substantial regulation and restriction.

While increasing knowledge about the

deleterious effects of smoking and secondhand smoke has played an important role in the
transformation of this issue, so too has the nonsmokers’ rights movement and the actions of the
tobacco industry itself. Thus, the two predominant yet diametric and competing images or
“frames” regarding tobacco and smoking that currently exist are a) that cigarettes are an entirely
unsafe and addictive product promoted by a deceptive and untrustworthy industry resulting in
unjustifiable societal harm and cost and so should be banned outright vs. b) that provided the
tobacco industry complies with existing legislation and regulation to protect those who chose not
to smoke, then the government and society should leave the tobacco companies alone to sell
their legal products to those who chose to exercise their right to smoke. It is clear that many
ideas in the tobacco control debate have changed over time, including ideas about the health
effects of smoking, the tobacco industry, and even some ideas about where it is and is not
acceptable to smoke (and the subsequent support for smoking bans). However, it is less clear
whether these changes in ideas are due to changes in information about tobacco use and the
tobacco industry with associated changes in the understanding (construction) or risk and
populations deserving protection, or if these changes in ideas are due to more fundamental
changes in preferences for public vs. private solutions, or social values, which might, for
example, indicate in a change in the preference or tolerance for paternalism in favor of
unabridged individual rights. Neither is it clear if these ideas are distributed equally throughout
a population at a given point in time (they most likely are not), their temporal distribution within a
given society, or their relative distributions between societies at any given point in time.
Empirical studies evaluating these questions, but could provide valuable insights into the role
and importance of ideas in the adoption of tobacco control policy as well as tobacco use itself.
5.4

Interests
The struggle to enact tobacco control policy has, fundamentally, been a struggle

between two competing interests: the interest of the state to prevent its citizens from smoking
thereby improving health and avoiding unnecessary expenses, and the interests of the tobacco
industry to continue to sell and profit by its legal products. The interests of the state can thus be
interpreted as motivated by hard or soft paternalism and possibly (and more cynically) a desire
by the bureaucracy to protect its [expanding] role in the “war on tobacco”, and thus the state and
other public health advocates work to support the adoption of more restrictive tobacco control
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policies.

The interests of the tobacco industry can be understood as motivated by self

preservation and profit, and thus in opposition to the adoption of tobacco control polices.
5.4.1

Tobacco Industry Interests
The opposition of the tobacco industry to regulation in any form has been well

documented and specific details of activities have emerged in large measure because of the
public disclosure of documents from American-based tobacco companies and, while this has
clearly been a global phenomenon and strategy (Thomson & Wilson, 2002), (Hiilamo, 2003),
(Barraclough & Morrow, 2008), (Smith & Malone, 2006), (Smith, 2006), (Mamudu, Hammond, &
Glantz, 2008), (World Health Organization, 2008), many of the details have emerged because of
the public disclosure of documents from American-based tobacco companies. The American
release of these documents, which has resulted in the publication of many books and academic
manuscripts as well as their warehousing on multiple websites in both the U.S. and the U.K.,
have had multiple sources including documents leaked from a tobacco industry insider to a
university professor, as part of the disclosure and investigation for Congressional hearings, and,
perhaps most significantly for both volume and impact, as part of the terms of the settlement in
State of Minnesota v. Philip Morris (the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota sued Philip Morris for conspiracy and fraud regarding the hazards of smoking,
impeding the development of safer cigarettes, and intentionally targeting children as new
consumers (Bero, 2003), (Public Health Law Center, 2010)), and the extension of the
requirement for public disclosure of industry documents in the subsequent Master Settlement
Agreement.
A substantial portion of the legacy of the disclosure of these documents has been to
reveal tobacco industry strategies to defeat or impede tobacco control policies which can be
categorized as: making misleading and fraudulent claims to the public and policymakers
regarding both tobacco products (particularly health effects and nicotine addiction) and industry
conduct; intentionally failing to disclose or hiding information regarding tobacco products and
industry knowledge and strategies; creating controversies about scientific studies and public
health reports, their claims, and / or their authors; extensive involvement of lawyers and a
legalistic framework in scientific studies (or the critique thereof), marketing, and public relations;
creation and funding of third-party groups to act as a non-partisan “front” for political lobbying,
conducting scientific studies, conducting public relations campaigns, and funding public groups
such as “smokers’ rights” groups; global coordination amongst tobacco companies regarding
strategies and tactics to counteract the public relations and legal liability of scientific evidence
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linking smoking to deleterious health effects; various tactics and strategies designed to pressure
and influence other corporations and organizations into supporting tobacco industry positions;
and, of particular interest to epidemiologists and public health advocates, obstruction of
legislation requiring documentation of smoking on death certificates. (Bero, 2003), (Sweda Jr &
Daynard, 1996)
These now-disclosed documents have also, for example, brought “Operation Berkshire”
to light, the code name for a cooperative and conspiratorial strategy amongst international
tobacco companies dating back to 1977, in attempt to counteract anti-smoking campaigns and
legislation by continuing to create controversy over the veracity of study results linking smoking
to morbidity and mortality and refusal to accept any such evidence as definitive “proof”.
(Francey & Chapman, 2000) “Operation Berkshire” was accompanied by “Operation Mayfly”,
also a cooperative international effort designed to diminish the effect of the World Health
Organization’s report “Smoking or Health – The Choice is Yours”, and involved a series of field
tests and projects in Australia and New Zealand in and around 1981 to influence public opinion
to be more favorable to smoking and the tobacco industry. (Francey & Chapman, 2000) More
recently, analysis of industry documents and other sources identified “Project Sunrise”, a Philip
Morris (U.S.A.) strategy which was started in 1995 to counter industry (and smoking)
marginalization and bolster the social acceptability of smoking by “voluntarily and willingly”
working with moderate tobacco control advocates while working to undermine and ostracize
more strident tobacco control advocates, thus creating controversy and disagreement within the
tobacco control movement in a classic divide-and-conquer approach. (McDaniel, Smith, &
Malone, 2006) Additionally, a recent report detailed how the tobacco industry was able, by
providing funding to a study investigator, to obtain data from the Framingham Study in the early
1970s, now one of the most renowned and important longitudinal epidemiologic studies in
American history, thus enabling a tobacco industry consultant to re-analyze the data in an effort
to discredit existing Framingham-based studies on the associations between smoking and
coronary heart disease (tobacco industry funding was terminated after the dataset was
obtained). (Cataldo, Bero, & Malone, 2010)
These documents have also allowed researchers to document tactics used as part of the
tobacco industry’s vociferous opposition to the release of the risk assessment of environmental
tobacco smoke by the E.P.A., eventually released in 1993. (Muggli, Hurt, & Repace, 2004)
These tactics included: lobbying for an executive order to change the standards for risk
assessments by federal agencies to create a delay in the release of the E.P.A. report; lobbying
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for an executive order to transfer jurisdiction from the E.P.A. to O.S.H.A., thereby making the
E.P.A. report without weight or authority; creating controversy (and subsequent political
pressure) about and discrediting the E.P.A.’s methodology and assessment procedures;
working closely and directly with a single Congressman (Thomas Bliley, R-VA) to affect the
policy and procedural processes from the “inside”; and finally, filing suit against the E.P.A.,
again in the attempt to delay or stop the release of the report, and discredit its contents before
its release. While some tactics were not successful, others were – the release of the report was
delayed and controversy surrounded its findings largely persisted until the tobacco industry suit
against the E.P.A. was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, but that did not happen until
2002 (aspects of this case are discussed in more detail in the Judicial Stream below). (Muggli,
Hurt, & Repace, 2004)
Tobacco industry efforts to influence the policy process, either indirectly through
contributions to political campaigns or directly through opposing ballot initiatives and taxes, have
also been documented. At the central-level, a recent report documented that almost $7 million
from 17 tobacco industry political action committees was received by Congressional legislators
(almost $13,000 per member) during the period 1993-2000. (Luke & Krauss, 2004) Further,
while Republicans compared to Democrats received more money (respective mean
contributions of $22,005 vs. $6,057) and were more likely to vote pro-tobacco on the 49
tobacco-related bills between 1997-2000 (73% for Republicans vs. 23% for Democrats), it was
Democrats whose voting was more influenced by contributions compared to Republicans
(Democrats were 9.8% more likely to vote pro-tobacco for every $10,000 received compared to
3.5% more likely for every $10,000 in contributions to Republicans).

Tobacco industry

contributions to legislators have also been shown to influence voting patterns in state
legislatures. (Monardi & Glantz, 1998) Also at the state-level, in 1997 the Tobacco Institute, a
tobacco industry lobbying group, spent almost $3 million on state lobbyists. (Givel & Glantz,
2001)

However, these “common wisdom” findings – that money=influence – has been

challenged by a study reporting that longer-term voting patterns of U.S. Congress members
were more related to political ideology, as measured by the Americans for Democratic Action
voting score, than tobacco industry contributions or connections to the tobacco agricultural
“bloc”. (Wright, 2004) (This finding of the importance of political ideology is echoed in the
findings from two Canadian studies that reported that ideology, as measured by a general
orientation towards favoring government intervention in health promotion, was a significant
predictor in Canadian legislators’ support for tobacco control policies, though these studies were
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not assessing tobacco industry financial contributions or lobbying. (de Guia, et al., 2003),
(Cohen, de Guia, Ashley, Ferrence, Northrup, & Studlar, 2002)) Other key tactics employed by
the tobacco industry at the state-level have included: lobbying and campaign contributions,
particularly to those identified as “legislative leaders” regardless of their opinion toward smoking
and / or the tobacco industry; gifts and honoraria; strategic alliances with like-minded or
sympathetic interest groups or groups that could then work to indirectly advance the interests of
tobacco (for example legislative groups); covert funding of front groups that were ostensibly
unaffiliated with the tobacco industry while, in fact, being operated by the industry (for example,
funding of groups who asserted to represent a restaurant or motel industry group though they
were owned and funded by the tobacco industry); making every attempt to delay votes on
legislation until time for the legislative session expired thus requiring the bill to be re-introduced;
working to defeat or undermine legislation after enactment; and advocating for inclusion of preemption clauses in state legislation thus preventing localities from implementing stronger
restrictions. (Givel & Glantz, 2001)
In single issue areas, such as taxes, or single events, such as ballot initiatives, the
tobacco industry has also been very adept at both understanding the specifics and nuances of
and manipulating the process in their favor. For example, the industry has extensively funded
citizen groups in order to facilitate issue re-framing favorably for the industry, such as funding
groups to argue that tobacco taxes are socially unfair and regressive thereby re-framing the
issue to create opposition toward increases in tobacco excise taxes. (Campbell & Balbach,
2009)

Additionally, the tobacco industry has been successful in defeating individual ballot

measures when and where public health advocates have not been prepared for industry tactics
including exploiting subtleties in procedural rules, developing tobacco-industry sponsored
alternative ballot measures, and promulgating misinformation and voter confusion campaigns.
(Tung, Hendin, & Glantz, 2009)
The motivation for the tobacco industry to act with such vigor and with such resources is
patently obvious: to protect their revenues and profits by preventing litigation, regulation, or
marginalization. (Bero, 2003)

Despite a decade of legal fights and a sharp increase in

regulations, restrictions, and taxes, the tobacco industry continues to be very profitable. Altria,
the parent company of Philip Morris, has recently reported a 27% increase in revenue, a 3.6%
increase in total sales, and a 27% increase in their stock value over the past year. (Becker, N;
Dow Jones Newswire, 2010) Further, while cigarettes sales volume has decreased by 0.7%,
the sales volume of smokeless products has increased by 22%. (Becker, N; Dow Jones
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Newswire, 2010) Each smoker represents a tremendous lifetime revenue stream for tobacco
companies.

For example, some authors have estimated that each smoking-addicted high

school senior represents $20,000 in lifetime revenues and that the 27% decline in the
prevalence of smoking amongst high school seniors between 1997-2002 (from 36.5% to 26.7%)
represented $4 billion in forgone future revenues for tobacco companies. (Healton, Farrelly,
Weitzenkamp, Lindsey, & Haviland, 2006) In another series of estimates and calculations,
images of smoking in movies are projected to entice 390,000 adolescents to start smokin which
results in estimated lifetime revenues of $4.1 billion and estimated lifetime profits of $894 million
for tobacco companies. (Alamar & Glantz, 2006) Finally, as an example of the cost to the
tobacco industry of comprehensive tobacco control programs, from 1989-2004 the California
Tobacco Control Program was estimated to have prevented the sale of 3.6 billion packs of
cigarettes representing $9.2 billion in pre-tax revenues for the tobacco industry. (Lightwood,
Dinno, & Glantz, 2008) Thus, when such tobacco control programs are understood from this
financial perspective, it is not difficult to see that, for the tobacco industry, a “few million” spent
in an attempt to defeat tobacco control initiatives remains a cost effective, prudent investment.
5.4.2

Public Health and State Advocacy Interests
Countering the tobacco industry are anti-tobacco advocates.

Groups opposing the

tobacco industry have evolved substantially over time in number, focus, resources, and
organization, the result of significant legal mobilization and social mobilization of interests
efforts.

What began as a few groups that formed in response to the mounting scientific

evidence of the deleterious health effects and substantial (and avoidable) societal costs caused
by tobacco products, has evolved (expansion) into a series of organizations and bureaucracies
that support a (now) fairly extensive and overlapping network of coalitions. While it is beyond
the scope of the present analysis to provide a detailed account of evolution of each these
groups and networks, a broad overview and timeline is shown in Table 5-2. The C.D.C., the
nation’s leading public health agency, was established very early as a hub for the synthesis and
dissemination of credible scientific information and support and technical information for groups
and organizations promoting the adoption of anti-tobacco polices, including “how-to” and “best
practices” for the organization, operation, and sustainability of coalitions.

The C.D.C.’s

promotion of a “coalition” or “network of coalitions” model is not unique to tobacco control, but
rather is the most common model used by the C.D.C. and other public health agencies (e.g., the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) in chronic disease prevention and health promotion
activities. The C.D.C. regards a coalition as a group of individuals and organizations with a
diverse array of skills, expertise, resources, and spheres of influence that come together to
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advance a specific cause (in this case, adoption of anti-tobacco policies) and who collectively
can leverage these assets to affect change in ways the members could not individually. As
discussed in Chapter 2, community-based coalitions are central to the C.D.C.’s strategy for
implementing the National Tobacco Control Program. (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2007)
In additional to the strategic, scientific, and financial that the C.D.C. provides to statelevel tobacco control programs and, in turn, these community-based coalition networks, the
C.D.C. also provides support and advice on the structure, function, and sustainability of the
community-based organizations and coalitions themselves. (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2007) Many of these C.D.C. “best practice” strategies and approaches have been
accumulated and assembled from the experiences – successful and otherwise – of the early
anti-tobacco groups such as the Group Against Smoking Pollution (G.A.S.P.), the Action on
Smoking and Health (A.S.H.), American Non-Smokers’ Rights (A.N.R.), the collective
experiences of the California anti-tobacco movement including the California Tobacco Control
Program (widely considered to be pioneers in the anti-smoking campaign and the tobacco
control policy movement), as well as from the formal, funded scientific trials assessing
community-based approaches to implementing anti-tobacco policy trials such as the COMMIT,
ASSIST, IMPACT, and SmokeLess States programs. In addition to these public coalitions,
there are myriad other groups and coalitions, variously funded by private foundations and
Table 5-2. Overview of the Development of Anti-Tobacco Groups and Coalitions
Era
Grassroots / State Coalition
Movement
(1960s-1980s)

National Movement
(1980s-2000s)

Era of Coalition Funding
(1990s – Present)

Year
1963
1965
1967
1970s
1981

•
•
•
•
•
•

1986
1985-1993

•
•

1991-1998

•
•
•

1994-2000

•

1995

•
•

1998

•

1999
1999

•
•

2007

•

Event
Colorado state coalition forms
CDC establishes the National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health
National Clearinghouse later becomes the Office on Smoking and Health
Action on Smoking and Health is formed
GASP (Group Against Smoking Pollution) networks form nationwide
Coalition on Smoking or Health forms (includes American Lung Association,
American Cancer Society, and the American Heart Association)
American’s for Non-Smoker’s Rights (ANR) is established
National Cancer Institute funds the COMMIT (Community Intervention Trial for
Smoking Cessation)
National Cancer Institute and American Cancer Society fund ASSIST
(American Stop Smoking Intervention Study for Cancer Prevention) trial
ASSIST is supplemented by the IMPACT (Initiative to Mobilize for the
Prevention and Control of Tobacco Use) trial by the CDC
ASSIST and IMPACT trials later become incorporated into CDC’s National
Tobacco Control Program
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in conjunction with the American Medical
Association fund the Smokeless States initiative
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation launches the Center for Tobacco Free Kids
This Center plays an important role in the negotiations leading up to the
Master Settlement Agreement
American Legacy Foundation is created by and funded from the Master
Settlement Agreement
National Tobacco Control Program is launched at the CDC
The CDC, Office on Smoking and Health, National Tobacco control Program
publishes the first “Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control
Programs”
The CDC, Office on Smoking and Health, National Tobacco control Program
publishes and updated “Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control
Programs”

Source (in part): (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007)

[116]

organizations whose mission is directly and solely tobacco-related (primary) or is also but
indirectly tobacco-related (secondary), that also interact with all other types of organizations,
coalitions, and networks. Based on the number of agencies who have listed themselves on the
Action for Smoking and Health website, it is not unreasonable to estimate that the number of
groups and individuals self-identifying as an anti-tobacco coalition (or part thereof) approaches
1,000 nationally (most states average 7-12 listed groups, but other states list many more groups
– e.g., California has 69 groups and individuals listed). (Action for Smoking and Health, 2010)
Thus, the current, cumulative picture of anti-tobacco coalitions is that of a large,
complex, and overlapping network of public agencies, private organizations and foundations, as
well as individuals and groups at the national, state, and local levels. A schematic overview of
these coalition networks and how they interact is presented in Figure 5-2.

The

interconnectedness, interdependence, and fluidity of these groups cannot be overemphasized.
A recent social-network analysis of five C.D.C.-funded state coalitions examined how the
network structure, communication style, and funding stability affects network productivity.
(Krauss, Meuller, & Luke, 2004) In addition to identifying that both communication style and
funding stability were important in facilitating network productivity, the analysis illuminated the
complexity of the social interactions – individuals and groups can act alone, in conjunction with
Figure 5-2. Schematic Representation of Current Anti-Tobacco Coalition Networks
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G.A.S.P., A.N.R.,
American Legacy
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Campaign f or
Tobacco Free Kids,
etc.

Secondary: E.P.A.,
O.S.H.A., N.I.H., etc.
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American Heart
Association,
American Lung
Association, Robert
Wood Johnson
Foundation, etc.
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National Supporting
Agencies
(Private)

Branches of national, primary agencies (e.g.,
state-wide G.A.S.P., A.N.R., Campaign for
Tobacco Free Kids, etc.
Branches of national, secondary agencies
(e.g., American Heart Association, American
Lung Association, American Cancer Society,
etc.
Individuals, organizations, and groups
advocating for tobacco control policies (e.g.,
public health officials, municipalities, workers’
groups, etc.)

other members of a given coalition, as part of a collective coalition action, or as part of another
(overlapping) coalition. (Krauss, Meuller, & Luke, 2004) This interconnected network, then,
serves not only as the functional component that implements the goals and initiatives of the
C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program, but also as the apparatus to counteract and
oppose tobacco industry interest groups. That is, this apparatus and its constituent elements,
fostered and developed as part of the National Tobacco Control Program, has evolved to be the
political groups that challenge to the issue framing and interests of the tobacco industry in the
public and policy arenas.
In summary, interest and advocacy groups have had substantial influence on the
evolution of tobacco control issue expansion, mobilization, and counter-mobilization backlash,
have most certainly affected the public’s perception of tobacco and smoking as a problem
(Problem Stream), opposing interest groups competing for control over issue framing, policy
image, and policy subsystem at multiple venues within the American federalist structure have
dominated the Politics Stream.
5.5

Institutions
If the starting point for the evaluation of the evolution of tobacco control policy is the

1940s-1950s, the dominant subsystem coalition (A.C.F.) or controller of the subsystem and
policy image (P.E.T.) was the tobacco industry (which includes tobacco farmers). Thus, the
tobacco industry, the then benefactors of the status quo, where highly motivated to maintain the
policy image and venue / institutional arrangements, promote negative feedback, and prevent
mobilization. In contrast, public health activists were highly motivated to impel matters in a
diametrically opposite direction. As discussed above, public health advocacy networks and
coalitions employed strategies such as framing and social construction, substantially aided by
both scientific information and information gleaned from tobacco industry documents, to change
the policy image and society’s ideas about smoking and the tobacco industry in an effort to
mobilize interest in order to disrupt the subsystem and pseudo-equilibrium and thereby affect
policy change. An additional strategy employed by these public health advocacy networks was
changing venues, thereby disrupting the institutional arrangements supporting the status quo
and benefiting the tobacco industry. This strategy, implemented in numerous ways, has been
greatly aided by the pluralist and federalist American system.
First, as reported by others, the primary central-level policy making venue in the tobacco
industry controlled subsystem / pseudo-equilibrium was agriculturally-based committees and
forums in Congress. (Baumgartner & Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 1993),
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(Worsham, 2006) With re-framing and other efforts meant to expand the issue, public health
advocacy networks and coalitions were able to gradually erode this policy monopoly and
mobilize different Congressionally-based venues, such as health and welfare related
committees. The ultimate result of this positive feedback was certainly the destruction of the old
policy monopoly, which was institutionalized, in part, by the elimination of agricultural subsidies
as part of the Master Settlement Agreement (and so agriculturally-based committees are no
longer important policy making venues).

Whether a new pseudo-equilibrium and policy

monopoly has yet been re-established is still unclear; perhaps there will be an extended period
of Weible’s adversarial subsystem before a dominant coalition emerges. (Weible, Expert-based
information and policy subsystems: a review and synthesis, 2008)
A second example of a venue-change strategy employed by the public health advocacy
networks and coalitions has been the establishment, through the National Tobacco Control
Program, of a network of community-based advocacy coalitions.

In so doing, the C.D.C.

compelled a change from central (national) level policy making venues to state and local policy
making venues. Additionally, funding provided through the C.D.C. to state-level departments of
public health has functionally institutionalized this venue change and, in so doing, has attempted
to instill an oppositional voice to the tobacco industry in virtually every jurisdiction in the country.
A third and important venue-change strategy has been legal mobilization. Seminal cases
in this legal mobilization are summarized in Appendix 1 (summarized in Table 5-3).

As

predicted by scholars of the role of the judiciary in policy, the trajectory of this mobilization has
been complex, has met with much counter-mobilization backlash, and the implications for
tobacco control policy are, in many instances, still uncertain. (Epp, 2008), (McCann, 2008) With
the numerous different types of cases and legal bases for suits, the trajectory of this legal
mobilization has not been as consistent or unidirectional – the resolution in some cases has
represented advancement for tobacco control policy, while the resolution in other cases has
represented clear restriction for tobacco control policy. Regardless of the ultimate resolution of
a case, tobacco industry documents and scientific evidence have played increasingly important
roles in cases over time, and the effective use of both internal industry documents and scientific
evidence has also been an increasingly important factor in achieving a final judgment against
the tobacco industry.

Further, it is also clear that the tobacco companies have engage in

substantial counter-mobilization backlash and have maintained their strategy of defending (or
prosecuting) each case to the fullest extent possible using all means at their disposal, which are
not unimposing. Given the revenue streams at stake for the tobacco companies, litigation is an
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Table 5-3. Summary of Seminal Legal Cases Discussed in Appendix 1
Category
Suits with Individual Plaintiffs
Claiming Personal Harm

Example Cases
Cipollone v. Liggett Group

•
•

Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al.

Class Action Suits Claiming
Personal Harm
Suits Claiming Harm from
Exposure to Secondhand or
Environmental Tobacco Smoke

•
•

Helling v. McKinney, No. 91-1958
Thaxton v Norfolk Southern Railroad Co., 239 Ga
Gainsborough St. Realty Trust v. Haile, No. 9802279

Suits Seeking Reimbursement
for Tobacco-Attributable
Expenses

Suits Disputing Scope of Action

Broin v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al
Moore v. American Tobacco, et al.
Case No. 94-1429. followed by others, then the
Master Settlement Agreement

•
•

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip
Morris U.S.A Inc

•

Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas v. American
Tobacco Co.)

•

Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip
Morris Inc
Philip Morris v Day One

•

F.D.A. et al. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp

•

Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corporation et al. v. the United States
Environmental Protection Agency No. 98-2407
Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. Reilly, Attorney
General of Massachusetts et al, No. 00-0596
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., et al. v. FDA et al.
No. 1:09-CV-117-M

•

Impact on Policy
Unclear direct effects
Possible secondary impacts:
•
Establishing precedent and case law particularly related to
liability and industry wrongdoing
•
Making public previously unknown information through the
discovery process
•
Product and industry framing in the Problem Stream
•
Policy images in the Policy Stream
Unclear direct or secondary effects (these suits almost
universally unsuccessful)
Direct impacts:
•
Established the legal precedent for the harmful effects of
secondhand smoke
•
In establishing liability for not protecting non-smokers from
exposure to secondhand smoke, de facto requirements
(policy) for smoke-free environments created
Complex impacts
The M.S.A. represented de facto policy by contractual
agreement with enforcement through civil contractual law
dispute mechanisms
Important secondary impacts:
•
Establishment of the tobacco industry document library
•
Creation of the American Legacy Foundation
•
Controversial aspect:
Failure of states to use M.S.A. settlement payments to
adequately fund state tobacco control programs
Very complex, often with yet unclear impacts (cases still
ongoing or only recently concluded)
Some actions (F.D.A. et al. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp, Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. Reilly, Attorney General of
Massachusetts et al.) succeeded in greatly restricting
government scope of action that, as in the ruling in the latter
case on First Amendment commercial free speech standards,
functionally created enduring restrictions on the scope of
government policy
Some actions failed to restrict scope of government action
(Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation et
al. v. the United States Environmental Protection Agency)

Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a
NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al.
Civil Case No. 09-771 (RJL))
Altria Group, In., et al. v. Good et al
United States of America v. Philip Morris U.S.A,
Inc., et al.

important tactic to delay implementation of a regulation or stop an industry practice thereby
maintaining a revenue streams, even if temporarily while a case proceeds through the legal
system.
Finally, an element of institutions that is most fundamental and also the least studied as it
impacts tobacco control policy is cultural values. Cultural values are intimately intertwined with
all aspects of policy making, yet little is understood about how a society’s values regarding
public vs. private solutions to problems, or the protection of individual human rights vs. property
rights has impacted either tobacco control policy adoption or tobacco-related population health.
Further, it is fairly patent that the ultimate goal of tobacco control advocates is the complete
elimination of all tobacco products. The ability to attain this goal may well depend upon its
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consistency with pervading cultural values balancing individual freedoms with collective public
health.
5.6

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions and Policy Change
In additional to Heclo’s ideas, interests, and institutions, several elements of Kingdon’s

Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1984) supplement the understanding of the changes in
tobacco control policy regimes, particularly policy entrepreneurs and policy windows which are
discussed here.
5.6.1

Focusing Events & Policy Entrepreneurs
Within the context of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework, focusing events are

significant events, often “crises”, that serve to focus much attention on a problem or issue and
which Kingdon viewed as critical in opening the “policy window”. Similarly, policy entrepreneurs
are creative policy problem solvers who are able to recognize (or facilitate the creation of) a
focusing event and the opening of the policy window and are able to “join” the streams in an
open policy window to create policy and / or policy change.
The effort to enact comprehensive tobacco control policies has been a collection of
myriad efforts, many of which have been cumulative and interdependent and pursued over the
past 50-75 years. In such a long-standing, complex progression and because so many have
participated, it would be tempting to list the many people and organizations who have
contributed to or any event that may have impacted the evolution of tobacco control policies.
However, the identification of a policy entrepreneur or focusing event is intended not to diminish
the contributions of those not so designated, but rather to identify those people and events
whose contributions were decisive.

Therefore, five categories of policy entrepreneurs

(politicians, advocacy organizations, non-governmental organizations, bureaucracies, and
individuals) and three types of focusing events can be identified, each of which are discussed
below.
Collectively, the Surgeon General’s reports can be considered focusing events,
particularly the 1964, 1986, and 1988 Surgeon General’s reports (establishing that smoking
causes morbidity and mortality, exposure to secondhand smoke causes morbidity and mortality,
and that nicotine is addictive, respectively).

While not a single event, their almost annual

release and the commitment of the government to research and produce these reports on
multiple different aspects of tobacco, smoking, and health, has had an unquestionable impact
on the evolution of ideas about the problem. Further, as previously discussed, not only did
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these reports have the explicit endorsement of the government, but the attention they received
gave prominence and attention to the findings of individual studies not otherwise obtainable,
thus altering the perception of the problem and the problem image.
Also a series of events to be considered collectively, the release of tobacco industry
documents from the various sources has had unquestionable effects on the evolution of ideas,
interests, and institutions. The content of these documents, including the timeline of what the
tobacco companies knew when, and the strategies and tactics routinely employed by the
industry has had far reaching consequences that are still unfolding. In addition to influencing
the image of the industry, the information gleaned from the study of these documents has had a
profound impact on the outcome of myriad legal actions. Almost uniformly, these documents
have greatly facilitated the ability of the government or other actors in holding the tobacco
companies accountable as these documents have provided a unique form of “evidence” and
“proof” of the willful actions of the tobacco companies.
Finally, the M.S.A. has also been studied by others as a focusing event. (Wood, 2006).
However, given that the M.S.A. is de facto policy, it is unclear that policy itself can also be a
focusing event. It is more likely that the events leading up to the M.S.A. would agree with
Kingdon’s conception of a focusing event. Specifically, the M.S.A., signed in 1998, can be
viewed as being the culmination of a series of events over 5-7 years all of which served to focus
attention on tobacco, smoking, and, perhaps more importantly, the tobacco industry. The series
of events, all discussed above, in the 1990s included: the Synar Amendment in 1992; the
release of the E.P.A. Risk Assessment in 1992 and the subsequent very public fight and filing of
suit by the tobacco industry; the release of thousands of Brown & Williamson internal
documents and their subsequent publishing in a series of articles in the Journal of the American
Medical Association in 1995 and then in book form (“The Cigarette Papers”) in 1996; the
announcement of the intention of the F.D.A. to regulate tobacco in 1995 and the Final Rule in
1996 followed by substantial legal action; and, also very importantly, a series of Congressional
hearings conducted by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) that variously summoned tobacco industry
executives (who famously testified that smoking is not harmful for your health), and former
tobacco-industry scientists and insiders.

These events, coupled with a series of T.V.

documentaries (the afore discussed “Smoke Screen” on A.B.C.’s “Day One” program) and
Pulitzer Prize-winning magazine articles (Freedman, 1995), (Freedman, Philip Morris memo
likens nicotine to cocaine, 1995) served to intensify scrutiny on both smoking but also the
conduct of the tobacco industry.

In the middle of these events, individual state Attorneys
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General began to file lawsuits on behalf of the states (Mississippi, the first state to do so, filed in
1994). The initial national settlement was announced in 1997, the McCain Bill failed in early
1998, and the M.S.A. signed in late 1998. Alternatively, then, the M.S.A. could be regarded as
a needed alternate after the failure, in spite of all the attention and evidence, of the legislative
process. Hence, the M.S.A. could be considered as an event that focused attention on the still
powerful political influence of the tobacco industry. This time period – almost a decade-long
period of sustained, multi-faceted activity and attention on this policy area – has also received
substantial scholarly attention, being the subject of multiple books from both a public health and
policy perspective. The ‘tobacco wars’ as the time period is commonly described, is widely
regarded as being an extraordinary nexus of events and juncture in public policy making. This
time period and these extraordinary, intertwined events are also the subject of multiple literary
investigations that document and interrogate both the events and the actors in far more depth
than can be discussed in this analysis.
In addition to focusing events, five categories of policy entrepreneurs are considered as
being critical factors facilitating the advancement of tobacco control policies. Among politicians,
Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA), the late- Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Sen. John McCain
(R-AZ) have performed critical roles in the advancement of tobacco control policies. As the
Chairman for the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (House Committee on Energy
and Commerce), Rep. Waxman was among the first to conduct hearings on tobacco issues in a
Committee or setting outside of the agricultural policy subsystem (subsystems are discussed in
detail in the next chapter), including the 1986 Committee hearing on the health effects of
environmental tobacco smoke. In particular, the hearings conducted in 1994 (Rep. Waxman
was then the ranking Majority member) with testimony from tobacco company executives and
former scientists were particularly seminal. Rep. Waxman was also closely associated with the
Synar Amendment and was a sponsor of the proposed Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act of 2007, an earlier version of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act enacted in 2009. Sen. John McCain worked to develop and then introduced the
Universal Tobacco Settlement Act of 1997 (S.1414.PCS, also known as the “McCain Bill”), the
legislation needed to enact the original 1997 proposed national settlement agreement to create
a legislative framework for an aggressive, national, comprehensive tobacco control policy
regime. The McCain Bill, however, did have enough votes to in the Senate and thus ultimately
failed leading to the need to adopt the 1998 Master Settlement agreement, a much weaker,
state-by-state, contractually-based approach to tobacco control. While postulated reasons for
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the failure of the McCain Bill have included the Senator’s leadership style and legislative skills,
the Bill and the Senator also had substantial opposition from within the Republican party as well
as opposition from the tobacco industry. (Hook, 2000)

Regardless of the outcome of the

McCain Bill, many within the tobacco control advocacy community have acknowledged
McCain’s efforts to advance tobacco control policies. (Kranish, 2008) Finally, the late Sen.
Edward Kennedy was also a long-standing proponent of tobacco control polices. Throughout
his long political career, the Senator sponsored several tobacco bills, though many ultimately
failed. In 2007, Kennedy introduced to the Senate the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2007, the predecessor-bill sponsored by Rep. Waxman that ultimately became
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.
Advocacy organizations have also been critical in working to draw attention to the issue
and advance tobacco control policies. These groups are non-profit, independent organizations
that have formed for the singular purpose of advancing tobacco control policies.

Most

prominently, these groups include the Action for Smoking and Health, Americans for
Nonsmokers’ Rights, and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, all of which formed very early in
the anti-tobacco movement (1967, 1976, and 1995 respectively) and have been active,
prominent and outspoken advocates of tobacco control polices and equally outspoken
opponents of “big tobacco”.

More recently, the American Legacy Foundation was formed

pursuant to the M.S.A. and can also be considered member among this group of advocacy
organizations. In addition to direct policy advocacy, these groups have functioned to continually
maintain issue prominence by releasing reports and press releases, documenting events, and
functioning as a source of information countervailing the messages, marketing, and tactics of
“big tobacco”. These groups have also frequently been involved in litigation, either as the
initiators (plaintiffs), a named defendant, or author to an amicus brief in an ongoing legal
proceeding. These advocacy organizations are differentiated from state-level, C.D.C.-funded
tobacco coalitions by their duration and longer history of action, the independence of their
funding and thus their ability to function more independently, innovatively, and vigorously to
advance their organization’s cause.
A similar group of advocacy organizations that have functioned as policy entrepreneurs
are a group of non-governmental organizations including the American Cancer Society, the
American Lung Association, the American Heart Association, and the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation.

While these groups have functioned similarly to the advocacy organizations

(above) as related to policy advocacy, publishing and disseminating reports and information,
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and filing amicus briefs, a fundamental difference is that these non-governmental organizations
have a primary mission other than tobacco control and so tobacco control advocacy is a
secondary, supportive component of their mission.

This difference has had important

implications for these groups, particularly as related to prioritization of resources and activities
as well as engaging in activities that may jeopardize the larger mission of these groups. A
secondary but important difference between these non-governmental organizations and the
advocacy organizations (above) has been the functioning of these groups as grant-funding
agencies. All four of these organizations have long-standing general grant programs and have,
periodically, created tobacco-specific grant funding programs (e.g., the SmokeLess States
program funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation). Thus, these non-governmental
organizations have also systematically supported the advancement of the body of scientific
knowledge underpinning tobacco control policies. Both of these types of groups have had
important, if slightly different, entrepreneurial roles in the advancement of tobacco control
policies in large measure because of their ability, as previous studies of the entrepreneurial
potential of non-governmental organizations have identified, to enlist and direct resources,
including public opinion and trust, in ways that government cannot. (Magnusson, 2009)
The advocacy and non-governmental organizations are also distinguished from the
government agencies and bureaucracies that have also had an important role in the
advancement of tobacco control policies, including the National Cancer Institute (N.C.I.), C.D.C.,
F.D.A., and E.P.A. While some might question the designation as entrepreneurial for fulfilling
the mission of the bureaucracy itself, the impact of the sustained efforts of these agencies
cannot be in question. The C.D.C., F.D.A., and N.C.I. all reside within the Department of Health
and Human Services (formerly the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) with the
N.C.I. administratively within the N.I.H. Both the N.C.I. and the C.D.C. became enmeshed in
tobacco control efforts almost from the inception of this public health effort. The C.D.C. was
integrally involved in all, including the early, Surgeon General’s reports and, as lung cancer was
the first adverse health outcome to be causally associated with smoking, the N.C.I. was also
very early to adopt anti-smoking and cessation as part of their mission and agenda. Both the
N.C.I. and C.D.C. have also been the leading grant-making agencies, thus being important
facilitators in not only understanding the physiologic consequences of smoking but the
development of efficient, effective, and evidence-based tobacco control policies, all of which
have served not only to advance the knowledge of the field but have been critical in defending
against the legal challenges of tobacco control legislation and regulation. The F.D.A. is notable
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because of its exclusion in the early tobacco control efforts. The announcement in 1995 by
then-President Clinton and Dr. David Kessler (then-F.D.A. Commissioner, discussed below) to
assume F.D.A. jurisdiction over tobacco, while ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court
served to “force” a conversation within the tobacco control community, including supportive
legislators, about how best to develop and implement a comprehensive, national, tobacco
control policy regime in the United States.

The ultimate result was the Family Smoking

Prevention and Tobacco Control Act enacted in 2009, which legislated jurisdiction of tobacco
regulation to the F.D.A. Finally, while the E.P.A. has had a comparatively small role in the
evolution of tobacco control policy, it has been important.

The E.P.A.’s insistence on

proceeding with their environmental tobacco smoke risk assessment while facing substantial
political, industry, and industry-supported public opposition followed by almost a decade of legal
challenges served to bring substantial attention to the deleterious effects of environmental
tobacco smoke. The 1992 risk assessment was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court and, in
while also being a vindication for the E.P.A., served to create a de facto requirement for smokefree environments.
Finally, there have been a series of individuals whose contributions have been
entrepreneurial – innovative, creative, novel, risky, and with results that have substantially
impacted the trajectory of tobacco control policy. These individuals and their contributions are
identified below:
•

Dr. David Kessler, a pediatrician, was the F.D.A. Commissioner from 1990-1997. With
then-President Clinton, Dr. Kessler assumed F.D.A. jurisdiction over tobacco regulation
and issued a Final Rule that was heavily focused on the prevention of use initiation by
youth and adolescents. This strategic decision for policy focus continues to affect and
influence problem and policy images and policy formulation. Although the 1996 Final
Rule was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court, there is a direct connection
between Dr. Kessler’s actions in the early-mid 1990s and the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act enacted in 2009.

•

Michael (Mike) Moore was the Attorney General for Mississippi from 1988-2004. He was
the initiator of the state-led lawsuits against the tobacco companies seeking restitution
for Medicaid expenditures for tobacco-related medical treatment. Mississippi was the
first state to file their lawsuits, with other states following shortly thereafter.

Moore

became the de facto leader of the Attorneys General and the chief negotiator in the
subsequent settlement agreement discussions.
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•

Merrell Williams was working as a paralegal in 1988 for a firm in Kentucky which had a
sub-contract with Brown & Williamson to screen and code internal documents that might
be damaging in a product liability suit. During the course of his work, Williams was
assigned thousands of documents including documents about the company’s knowledge
about the health effects and addictiveness of smoking and marketing efforts aimed at
children. Williams began smuggling documents out at night by strapping them to his
waist under a girdle, copying them, and returning them in the morning. He kept a copy
of the documents and also sent a copy to a friend in case anything happened to him.
The path to the eventual release of the documents was complex, but they eventually
ended up in the hands of Dr. Stanton Glantz (discussed below) – the infamous “Mr.
Butts” mailing – as well as in the hands of Congress. Williams was sued by Brown &
Williamson, but eventually settled with them a sealed agreement.

•

Matthew Myers has been the President of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids since
2000 after being the organization’s legal counsel for several years. Myers has a long
history with tobacco control advocacy, including representing the Action for Smoking OR
Health and being a negotiator in the 1998 M.S.A. discussions.

Since the strategic

decision by Kessler and the F.D.A. to focus policy on youth and adolescents, the
Campaign and Myers have had increased prominence and were active in the formulation
and advocacy for the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.
•

Dr. Jeffrey Wigand was the Vice-President of Research and Development at Brown &
Williamson in the early 1990s. Wigand became the famous “whistleblower” in the 1995
(and again in 1996) 60 Minutes (C.B.S.) documentary program on tobacco companies
during which he asserted that tobacco companies were knowingly manipulating tobacco
leaf blends in order to alter nicotine delivery. Wigand later made similar testimony to
Congress. Wigand was the first tobacco industry “insider” to turn and testify against the
tobacco companies; his story was told, in part, in the 1999 movie of the same name
(“The Insider”, Touchstone Pictures).

•

Dr. Stanton A. Glantz is a professor of medicine at University of California San Francisco
and is a well-known, long-time tobacco control activist. Currently, PubMed lists 277
publications for “Glantz SA” and, while his early publications reflect is initial training and
research focus (cardiac function), as early as 1984 Dr. Glantz had begun to focus and
publish on the health effects of secondhand smoke. (Glantz, What to do because
evidence links involuntary (passive) smoking with lung cancer, 1984)

Dr. Glantz

received national attention when he became the receiver of the mailing from “Mr. Butts”
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of thousands of Brown & Williamson documents, which he promptly published in a series
of articles as well as a book (discussed above). Dr. Glantz has also been integrally
involved in California’s tobacco control efforts, a state known for its comprehensive
policies and smoking prevalence rates among the lowest in the nation.
The above list of policy entrepreneurs is likely smaller than could be developed. Again,
in any policy effort that has lasted decades countless individuals and groups will have
contributed. Particularly omitted from the above list are individuals and groups that have been
entrepreneurial in state-level policy activities, especially those in California and Minnesota which
are widely regarded as “leader” states in the adoption of tobacco control polices. This omission
is, in part, due to the focus of this analysis on national level efforts to adopt a comprehensive
tobacco control policy regime.
5.6.2

Policy Windows
In Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework, policy window are those unique opportunities

for policy change which open infrequently and only for short periods of time. That is, policy
windows are when new policy is adopted but because this can only be determined
retrospectively (i.e., policy changed so a policy window must have been “open”), the Multiple
Streams Framework cannot be considered true theory. However, as the present analysis is a
retrospective application of the Framework its utility in understanding the trajectory of national
tobacco control policy adoption in the United States is not jeopardized.

Further, in a

retrospective analysis, both the windows that “opened” and the windows that remained “closed”
can be identified. Discussed below are the traditional policy windows that resulted in policy
adoption through legislation, pseudo-policy widows that resulted in policy adoption through nonlegislative means, and failed policy windows –attempts to adopt legislation that failed.
5.6.2.1 Traditional Successful Policy Windows
These policy windows are those that resulted in policy through traditional, legislative
means. These legislated Acts, as previously discussed, include:
•

Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984 which required warning labels on
cigarette packages and the Surgeon General to report annually to Congress on the
advertising practices of the tobacco industry and the health consequences of
smoking;
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•

Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 which required
more and stronger warning labels on cigarette packages and that tobacco
companies submit a list of product ingredients to the government;

•

Synar Amendment to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration
(A.D.A.M.H.A.) Reorganization Act of 1992 which required that all states adopt and
enforce restrictions on the prohibition of sales of tobacco products to minors; and

•

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 which legislated
jurisdiction of tobacco regulation to the F.D.A. and required substantial new and
more restrictive regulations on the sales and marketing of tobacco products.

As also discussed above, other pieces of legislation, regulation, and Executive Order
have also occurred, but the above five Acts are the most significant and those that have
addressed comprehensive tobacco control.
5.6.2.2 Non-Traditional, Non-Legislative Policy Windows
These policy windows are those events that resulted in de facto tobacco control policy
through non-traditional, non-legislative means. As discussed above, these events are almost
exclusively related to litigation. These non-traditional, non-legislative policy windows include:
•

Protection from environmental tobacco smoke. The series of individual and classaction lawsuits combined with the 1992 E.P.A. risk assessment that classified
environmental tobacco smoke as a class A carcinogen (also upheld in litigation)
created the expectation for smoke-free environments and liability for those not
providing such environment;

•

The Master Settlement Agreement of 1998.

Though a contractual agreement

between the tobacco companies and the individual states, these agreements created
restrictions on advertising and promotion that had a comparable effect to similar
restrictions that might have been enacted through legislation.
•

Release of tobacco industry documents and tobacco industry practices.

As has

been discussed above, these documents and practices have been released through
various means, almost all related to activities resulting from legal mobilization.
Former tobacco industry executives and scientists have testified at Congressional
hearings and as expert witnesses in legal proceedings, all of which are now part of
the public record.

Tobacco industry documents have been leaked directly (“Mr.

Butts”) as a result of legal proceeding and, most significantly, as part of the
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Minnesota settlement with the tobacco industry in 1998 and again as part of the
Master Settlement Agreement of 1998. While the testimony or documents do not
directly or indirectly constitute policy or even pseudo-policy, the knowledge gleaned
from these sources has been critical in developing and justifying new tobacco control
policies, especially in light of developments of case law and the expansion of First
Amendment commercial free speech rights. In reading the full text of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 and the 2010 FDA Final rule,
the importance of this information becomes manifest – it is critical in justification of
the regulations and the demonstration that they have not unnecessarily or unduly
infringed upon the rights of the tobacco companies.
5.6.2.3 Failed Policy Windows
Failed policy windows are attempts to achieve, through legislation or regulation,
comprehensive tobacco control policy that failed. The two most patent examples of such failed
policy windows are the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule, which was overturned by the Supreme Court in
2000, and Universal Tobacco Settlement Act of 1997 (McCain Bill), which failed to clear the
Senate and resulted in the failure of the 1997 proposed national settlement and the adoption
instead of the Master Settlement Agreement.

There were, however, many other failed

legislative attempts at achieving a national comprehensive tobacco control regime.

As a

testament to both the challenges and complexity of achieving a national tobacco control policy
regime, the THOMAS database at the Library of Congress was used to search the records from
the 101st – 111th Congress (January 1989 – present, the only dates available online) using the
terms “tobacco prevention”, “smoking prevention”, and “tobacco control”. (The Library of
Congress, 2010)

The results, after removal of duplicate records, are the 120 records

representing each bill introduced into either the Senate or House of Representative summarized
in the table below (Table 5-4). While it is acknowledged that each of the entries in this table are
not truly independent, what is apparent in examining this table is that while some Congressional
sessions have been more active than others, all Congressional sessions since 1989 have
attempted to enact tobacco control policies. That is, the opponents of tobacco control policies
have been comparatively successful in resisting regulation.
Table 5-4. List of Failed Tobacco Control Legislation (1989-2010)
Congress #
101st
(Jan. 1989-Jan. 1991)
101st
101st
101st
101st

Title
Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1989

Action
Introduced in Senate

Reference
[S.1527.IS ]

Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1989
Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act
Tobacco Deregulation Act of 1990
Tobacco Product Education and Health Protection Act of 1990

Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate

[S.1528.IS ]
[H.R.5041.IH ]
[H.R.4965.IH ]
[S.1883.IS ]
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Congress #
101st
102nd
(Jan. 1991-Jan. 1993)
102nd
102nd
102nd
103rd
(Jan. 1993-Jan. 1995)
103rd
103rd
103rd
104th
(Jan. 1995-Jan. 1997)
104th
104th
104th
105th
(Jan. 1997-Jan. 1999)
105th
105th
105th

Title
Tobacco Product Education and Health Protection Act of 1990
Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1991

Action
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate

Reference
[H.R.3943.IH]
[S.561.IS ]

Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1991
Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act
Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act
Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act

Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate

[S.560.IS ]
[H.R.4361.IH ]
[S.2191.IS ]
[S.629.IS ]

Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act
Smokeless Tobacco Distribution Control Act of 1993
Women's Health Equity Act of 1993
Tobacco Products Control Act of 1995

Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate

[H.R.1439.IH ]
[H.R.3025.IH ]
[H.R.3075.IH ]
[S.1262.IS ]

Women's Health Equity Act of 1996
Women's Health Equity Act of 1996
Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1995
Bipartisan NO Tobacco for Kids Act of 1998

Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[H.R.3178.IH ]
[S.1799.IS ]
[H.R.2414.IH ]
[H.R.3868.IH ]

105th
105th

Minority Community Tobacco Reduction Act
National Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act

105th
105th
105th
105th

PAST Act
Pregnant Mothers and Infants Health Protection Act of 1997
PROTECT Act
PROTECT Act

105th
105th
105th
105th

Public Health and Education Resource (PHAER) Act
Public Health and Education Resource (PHAER) Act
Teen Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 1998
To establish a responsible United States international tobacco policy,
to prevent tobacco companies from targeting tobacco products to
children, to ensure no government promotion of...
Tobacco Market Transition Act
Tobacco Market Transition Act
Tobacco Products Control Act of 1997
Universal Tobacco Settlement Act
Universal Tobacco Settlement Act
Universal Tobacco Settlement Act

Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Engrossed Amendment
as Agreed to by Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Placed on Calendar in
Senate
Introduced in House
Senate Amendment
Ordered to be Printed
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Placed on Calendar in
Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[H.R.3868.IH ]
[H.R.4600.IH ]
[H.R.2264.EAS ]

105th
105th
105th
105th
105th
105th

Bipartisan NO Tobacco for Kids Act of 1998
Common Sense Smoking Prevention Act of 1998
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998
Drug Demand Reduction Act
Healthy and Smoke Free Children Act
Healthy and Smoke Free Children Act
Healthy Kids Act
Healthy Kids Act
KIDS Act

Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Reported in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Placed on Calendar in
Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[S.1582.IS ]
[H.R.3437.IH ]
[S.201.IS ]
[S.1415.RS ]
[S.1415.IS ]
[S.1414.PCS ]

Children's Smoking Prevention, Health, and Learning Trust Fund Act
of 1999
FDA Tobacco Jurisdiction Act of 2000
KIDS Act
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Reauthorization Act
Tobacco Use Prevention and Public Health Act of 1999
Youth Smoking Prevention and Public Health Protection Act
Youth Tobacco Possession Prevention Act
Child Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 2001

Introduced in Senate

[S.584.IS ]

Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[H.R.4042.IH ]
[S.2379.IS ]
[S.1823.IS ]
[H.R.1289.IH ]
[S.2568.IS ]
[H.R.144.IH ]
[H.R.1044.IH ]

FDA Tobacco Jurisdiction Act of 2001
KIDS Act
Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001
Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Reauthorization Act
Tobacco Equity Elimination Act of 2002
Tobacco Livelihood and Economic Assistance for our Farmers Act of
2002
Tobacco Livelihood and Economic Assistance for Our Farmers Act of
2002

Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[H.R.1043.IH ]
[S.247.IS ]
[S.940.IS ]
[H.R.1990.IH ]
[S.437.IS ]
[H.R.5035.IH ]
[H.R.3940.IH ]

Introduced in Senate

[S.2764.IS ]

105th
105th
105th
105th
105th
105th
105th
105th
106th
(Jan. 1999-Jan. 2001)
106th
106th
106th
106th
106th
106th
106th
107th
(Jan. 2001-Jan. 2003)
107th
107th
107th
107th
107th
107th
107th
107th

Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1997
Youth Tobacco Possession Prevention Act
Child Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 2000
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[S.2647.IS ]
[S.1492.IS ]
[H.R.3028.IH ]
[S.1638.IS ]
[H.R.3474.IH ]
[S.1889.PCS ]
[H.R.4189.IH ]
[S.1415.AS ]
[S.1648.IS ]
[S.938.IS ]
[S.1530.IS ]
[S.1530.PCS ]
[S.1343.IS ]
[H.R.2764.IH ]
[H.R.3889.IH ]
[H.R.3738.IH ]

[H.R.516.IH ]
[H.R.3655.IH ]
[H.R.4041.IH ]

Congress #
107th
107th
108th
(Jan. 2003-Jan. 2005)
108th

Title
Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2002
Youth Smoking Prevention and Public Health Protection Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th
108th

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
HeLP America Act
Leave No Child Behind Act of 2003
Leave No Child Behind Act of 2003
Quit Smoking Incentive and Opportunity Act of 2003
Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2004
Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2004
Tobacco Equity Elimination Act of 2003
Tobacco Livelihood and Economic Assistance for our Farmers Act
Tobacco Market Transition Act
Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2003
Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2003

108th

Tobacco Reduction, Accountability, and Community Enhancement
Act of 2003
Youth Smoking Prevention and State Revenue Enforcement Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

108th
109th
(Jan. 2005-Jan. 2007)
109th
109th
109th
109th
109th
110th
(Jan. 2007-Jan. 2009)
110th

Action
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Engrossed as Agreed to
or Passed by Senate
Considered and Passed
by Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Placed on Calendar in
Senate
Introduced in House

Reference
[H.R.4753.IH ]
[S.2626.IS ]
[S.2974.ES ]

Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate

[H.R.1839.IH ]
[S.666.IS ]

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
HeLP America Act
HeLP America Act
Smoke Free Mothers and Babies Act of 2006
Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2005
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Reported in House

[H.R.1376.IH ]
[H.R.5951.IH ]
[S.1074.IS ]
[S.3915.IS ]
[H.R.1377.IH ]
[H.R.1108.RH ]

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

Engrossed as Agreed to
or Passed by House
Referred to Senate
Committee after being
Received from House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[H.R.1108.EH ]

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

110th

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

110th
110th
110th
110th
110th
110th
110th
110th

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
HEALTH Act
Lung Cancer Mortality Reduction Act of 2008
Secondhand Smoke Education and Outreach Act of 2007
Smoke Free Mothers and Babies Act of 2007
Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2008
Stop Adolescent Smoking Without Excessive Bureaucracy Act of
2008
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
Federal Tobacco Act of 2009
Lung Cancer Mortality Reduction Act of 2009
Lung Cancer Mortality Reduction Act of 2009
Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R.
1256) entitled `An Act to protect the public health by providing the
Food and Drug Administration with certain authority...
Smoke Free Mothers and Babies Act of 2009
Smoke-Free Federal Workplace Act
STOP Act
STOP Act
Stop Adolescent Smoking Without Excessive Bureaucracy Act of
2009
To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products, to
amend title 5, United States Code, to make certain...
To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug

111th
(Jan. 2009-Jan. 2011)
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
111th
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Engrossed as Agreed to
or Passed by House
Placed on Calendar in
Senate
Public Print

[S.2974.CPS ]
[S.2461.IS ]
[H.R.4433.IH ]
[S.2461.IS ]
[S.2558.IS ]
[S.448.IS ]
[H.R.936.IH ]
[H.R.2876.IH ]
[S.2642.IS ]
[H.R.4820.IH ]
[H.R.245.IH ]
[H.R.140.IH ]
[H.R.986.IH ]
[S.1490.IS ]
[S.1490.PCS ]
[H.R.3160.IH ]

[H.R.1108.RFS ]
[S.625.IS ]
[H.R.1108.IH ]
[S.1834.IS ]
[S.3187.IS ]
[S.2005.IS ]
[S.1013.IS ]
[H.R.5689.IH ]
[H.R.5513.IH ]
[H.R.2997.EH ]
[H.R.2997.PCS ]
[H.R.2997.PP ]

Engrossed Amendment
as Agreed to by Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Reported in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Engrossed Amendment
as Agreed to by Senate

[H.R.2997.EAS ]

Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in Senate
Introduced in House
Introduced in House

[S.670.IS ]
[H.R.4131.IH ]
[S.3288.IS ]
[H.R.5178.IH ]
[H.R.1432.IH ]

Enrolled as Agreed to or
Passed by Both House
and Senate
Placed on Calendar in

[H.R.1256.ENR ]

[S.982.IS ]
[H.R.1256.IH ]
[H.R.1256.RH ]
[S.579.IS ]
[S.332.IS ]
[H.R.2112.IH ]
[H.R.1256.EAS ]

[H.R.1256.PCS ]

Congress #
111th
111th

5.7

Title
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products, to
amend title 5, United States Code, to make certain...
To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products, to
amend title 5, United States Code, to make certain...
Youth Prevention and Tobacco Harm Reduction Act

Action
Senate

Reference

Engrossed as Agreed to
or Passed by House

[H.R.1256.EH ]

Introduced in House

[H.R.1261.IH ]

Chapter Summary & Contribution
Using Heclo’s ideas, interest, and institutions framework, and Kingdon’s Multiple Streams

Framework this chapter has integrated the political and policy science viewpoint with the public
health perspective on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic to provide a more comprehensive
policy history analysis of critical factors in this evolution, including the adoption of tobacco
control policies. A persistent observation has been the tension between oppositional forces –
those motivating progression towards comprehensive tobacco control policy and those forces
opposing such policy adoption.

The forces motivating more comprehensive policy have

included the advancing knowledge of the health consequences of smoking and exposure to
secondhand smoke whereas the opposing forces have included social norms and expectations
for the appropriate role of government and tolerable balance between individual and property
rights.

Changes in the ideas and images toward smoking and the tobacco industry has

motivated the adoption of more restrictive policy while opposing interest groups have vied for
the attention and favor of legislators.

Additionally, policy adoption has alternately been

facilitated and opposed by activities resulting from legal mobilization. The ability of tobacco
control advocates to achieve their ultimate goal – elimination of all tobacco products – will likely
depend upon a fundamental change in pervading cultural values balancing individual freedoms
with collective public health.
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6

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES, PROGRAMS,
AND POPULATION TOBACCO-RELATED HEALTH IN THE U.S. STATES

6.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
Based upon the literature reviews and analyses in the previously presented chapters, it is

clear that the trajectory of the tobacco epidemic in industrialized countries is intertwined with
substantial social change. This social change is particularly notable in Heclo’s sphere of ideas,
as discussed in the previous chapter. As social change is entwined with secular decrease in
tobacco use and increase in tobacco control policy adoption, it is reasonable to inquire as to the
temporal relationship between policy adoption and population-level tobacco use. The public
health perspective assumes that policy drives changes in tobacco use, largely discounting the
role of social change, in particular ideas and cultural values (institutions), as factors facilitating
or impeding the adoption of tobacco control policy. The political and policy science perspective,
despite the theoretical if not empirical understanding that smoking prevalence is an important
political outcome and factor in the policy adoption process (e.g., (Marmor & Lieberman, 2004)),
in essence ignores the effect – or effectiveness – on the population on whose behalf the policies
are adopted.

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of the temporal

relationship between tobacco control policy adoption and population-level tobacco use.
6.2

Background
Tobacco use is widely regarded as the single most preventable cause of death world-

wide. (World Health Organization, 2008) Its deleterious health effects are well known: smoking
has been shown to cause almost a dozen cancers and chronic diseases such as cardio- and
cerebrovascular disease, aneurysms, and periodontitis among others. (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2009) Additionally, exposure to second hand smoke has been causally
linked to sudden infant death syndrome, respiratory illness, lung cancer, cardiovascular disease,
and low birth weight. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009) More recently, it has
also been demonstrated that exposure to the toxins in so-called “third hand smoke”, the residue
deposited on fabrics and surfaces by cigarette smoke and that remain after the cigarette is
extinguished, causes adverse health outcomes. (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2006) The World Health Organization (WHO) has
estimated that, by 2030, tobacco use will cause 8 million deaths annually and result in 1 billion
cumulative deaths during the 21st century. (World Health Organization, 2008)
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The public health case, then, for enacting strict tobacco control policies or even an
outright ban on tobacco is straightforward: the causal links between smoking and disease and
death were definitively established in the 1960s with the publishing of the US Surgeon General’s
Report “Smoking and Health” (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964), and
the vigor of that scientific evidence has only strengthened in time, including the expansion to
non-tobacco users involuntarily exposed to second- and third-hand tobacco smoke. (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2006), (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009)

Further, the estimated 6-8% of all health care

expenditures spent treating smoking-related diseases is entirely preventable. (Warner, The
economics of tobacco: myths and realities, 2000)
The toxic contents of cigarettes are also well established. Of the 200-250 poisonous
gases and chemicals in cigarettes, many are severely restricted or banned in all other
applications. For example, eleven of the chemicals are classified as type 1 carcinogens (the
most lethal classification), one is radioactive, and others, such as lead, are known to cause
mental retardation and developmental delays in children. (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2006)
Finally, nicotine is a potent psychostimulant similar to amphetamines or cocaine, with a
significant addictive potential. (Balfour, 2002) Research has demonstrated that the addiction is
established very early – possibly as soon as the first cigarette – in use, (DiFranza, 2008) and
review of tobacco industry documents has shown that cigarette contents have been intentionally
manipulated in order to circumvent nicotine content regulations while increasing the
addictiveness of nicotine through ‘freebasing’, a chemical process virtually identical to and with
the analogous effects of freebasing cocaine as ‘crack cocaine’. (Stevenson & Proctor, 2008)
In their 2000 decision in the case of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. et al, the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed with almost all of the arguments regarding the toxicity and danger
of cigarettes and then, ironically, denied the F.D.A. the authority to regulate cigarettes. Citing
the F.D.A.’s own primary directive to assure the safety and effectiveness of products for their
intended use, the Supreme Court rationalized that under these criteria the F.D.A. would be
required to ban all tobacco products, which was clearly contrary to the intentions of Congress in
light of the ‘alternate regulatory scheme’ and thus regulation of cigarettes was ruled as outside
the jurisdiction of the F.D.A.. Thus, within the U.S. (and elsewhere), tobacco remains classified
as a consumer product, not a drug or hazardous compound, and its regulation within the
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purview of the Congress or other legislative body. Enacting tobacco control policies, therefore,
has and continues to require the action of the policy making apparatus of a given jurisdiction.
The challenge in the U.S., then, as in other industrialized countries, has been to enact tobacco
control policies so as to avert the substantial personal and societal costs associated with
tobacco use. Despite the profound change in the information known about tobacco use and the
tobacco industry as well as the associated policy images, tobacco control policy adoption,
especially at the central level, has lagged. According to two models developed to characterize
the tobacco epidemic, the Phases of Tobacco Control (Studlar, Tobacco Control. Comparative
Politics in the United States and Canada, 2002), (Studlar, U.S. tobacco control policy: public
health, political economy, or morality policy?, 2008) and the Tobacco Epidemic Model (Lopez,
Collishaw, & Piha, 1994), adoption of tobacco control policies does not begin until decades after
the onset of the epidemic and well after the entrenchment of tobacco use in the society.
However, as has been observed in all industrialized countries, smoking prevalence begins to
decline before policy adoption, leading to the question of the temporal association and
relationship between smoking prevalence, tobacco control policies, and tobacco control
programs and regimes.
There is a substantial body of scientific literature that has developed the evidence base for
effective tobacco control policies. (e.g., as summarized in (Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, The
effects of tobacco control policies on smoking rates: a tobacco control scorecard, 2004))
Further, three large research programs contributed substantially to the knowledge base for the
development of effective tobacco control programs:
•

COMMIT (Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation)


Funded by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of
Health



Focused on heavy smokers



Ended in 1992



Participating

communities:

Vallejo,

CA

,

Hayward,

CA,

Cedar

Rapids/Marion, IA, Davenport, IA, Fitchburg/Leominster, MA, Lowell, MA,
Paterson, NJ, Trenton, NJ, Santa Fe, NM, Las Cruces, NM, Yonkers, NY,
New Rochelle, NY, Utica, NY, Binghamton/Johnson City, NY, Raleigh,
NC, Greensboro, NC, Medford/Ashland, OR, Albany/Corvallis, OR,
Bellingham, WA, Longview/Kelso, WA, Brantford, Ontario, Canada,
Peterborough, Ontario, Canada
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•

ASSIST (American Stop Smoking Intervention Study)


Funded by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of
Health



Planning phase (October 1991 – October 1993) and implementation
phase (November 1993 – September 1999)



17 participating states (Colorado, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin)

•

Smokeless States


Funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation



48 state-wide coalitions (plus 2 additional non-state coalitions) from 19932004

These programs were all funded by government-sponsored research funding institutes or
private research foundations and the C.D.C’s National Tobacco Control Program was
developed using findings and recommendations from these research programs. That is, in the
U.S., the central government, even though it lagged in central-level policy adoption, was
instrumental in developing the multi-level network of community-based advocacy coalition
structure in place in the U.S. today.
In the United States, tobacco control programs are implemented by the individual states.
This organizational arrangement facilitates inter-state analyses comparing features of either
tobacco control programs and / or policies implemented at the state-level and measures of state
population health (e.g., smoking prevalence). California followed by Massachusetts, Arizona,
Oregon, and Florida were the first states to implement state-level tobacco control programs and
thus early evaluations of “state tobacco control programs” were case-study based approaches
to examining the structures and processes implemented in these early-adopter states and the
subsequent progress in the reduction of smoking prevalence. (Siegel, 2002), (Wakefield &
Chaloupka, Effectiveness of comprehensive tobacco control programmes in reducing teenage
smoking in the USA, 2000), (Pierce, 2007)

Population-based analyses have also been

undertaken. (Luke, Stamatakis, & Brownson, State youth-access tobacco control policies and
youth smoking behavior in the United States, 2000), (Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson,
2008), (Tauras, et al., 2005) Generally, state spending on tobacco control programs has been
reported to be statistically significantly and negatively associated with smoking prevalence.
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Interestingly, the associations were much stronger when individual-level rather than populationlevel smoking prevalence was outcome and dependent variable, thus allowing for direct
adjustment for socioeconomic status and demographic variables. (Tauras, et al., 2005),
(Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 2008) Additionally, statistical methods that allowed for
weighting of previous spending on tobacco control increased the association between current
spending and declines in smoking prevalence, though the authors could not determine the
reason for this observation or the important (causative) aspects of a state’s tobacco control
program. (Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 2008)
A primary challenge with these studies that may account for the perhaps more tepid than
expected results is the implicit assumption in the directionality of causality from tobacco control
program to smoking prevalence.

In other words, while it is typically assumed that

comprehensive tobacco control programs cause a decrease in smoking prevalence, in fact it
may be that a lower smoking prevalence, which can conceivably serve as a proxy for the social
acceptability of smoking and / or socially-based institutionalized values, may precede tobacco
control policy adoption and represent reduced barriers to such policy adoption. That is, some
social changes may occur before policy changes, thereby creating a feedback mechanism. Any
such feedback mechanism would not be detectable in a precede-proceed evaluation model or
before-and-after study design. Further, these feedback mechanisms, or “social conditioning”
and creation of social predispositions to tobacco control policy, may be heightened in the case
of states that were early innovators and participants in the scientific studies that served as the
basis for the best-practice comprehensive tobacco control programs. Therefore, the primary
purpose of this study is to assess the timing of changes in smoking prevalence (social change)
compared to policy change.

It is hypothesized that lower prevalence in advance of policy

change supports the notion that social change precedes policy change.
6.3

Materials and Methods
All fifty states as well as the District of Columbia were included in this study. Population-

level smoking prevalence was used as the health outcome variable as well as a proxy variable
for social changes leading to a reduction in barriers to adoption of tobacco control policy. Six
tobacco control policies were selected for their range in direct impact on individual behavior and
thus perceived “intrusiveness” as well as uniform data availability. The six selected policies
were:
1. Smoke-free indoor air policies at government worksites
2. Smoke-free indoor air policies at private worksites
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3. Smoke-free indoor air policies at restaurants
4. State cigarette excise tax
5. Youth access to cigarette vending machine policies
6. Policies requiring licensure for tobacco retail locations
Data on state-level policy and smoking prevalence were obtained from the C.D.C’s
STATE data system (publicly available at www.cdc.gov). Annual smoking prevalence data were
obtained from 1990 to 2009 and, to account for slight variations in year-to-year data availability,
state prevalence was averaged for each state for the 5-year intervals of 1990-1994, 1995-1999,
2000-2004, and 2005-2009 (a 4-year interval but the last year for which data were available was
2009). For the six tobacco control policies, annual policy status (whether a specific policy had
been adopted) was obtained from 1995 to 2004.

To correspond with the 5-year intervals

established for smoking prevalence, a variable was created characterizing the absolute status
for each policy (whether a policy had been adopted and the type of policy adopted) for the years
1995 (the start of the study period) and 2004 (the end of the study period). For each policy for
each state, an additional variable was created that categorized, for the time periods 1995-1999
and 2000-2004, whether a state had: a) no baseline policies and did not add any policies during
the time period; b) no baseline policies but did add policies during the time period; c) did have
baseline policies but did not add any policies during the time period; or d) did have baseline
policies and added policies during the time period.
In addition to these tobacco control policy and population smoking prevalence data, data
for three additional, variables were obtained: a) the percent of the state’s population living below
the poverty level from the 1989 and 1999 Census Abstract; b) the state’s educational
attainment, specifically the proportion of the population having achieve a high school education
or higher, from the 1990 and 2000 Census Abstract; and c) the magnitude of the state’s tobacco
agricultural industry, as estimated by the number of tobacco acres harvested, from C.D.C.’s
STATE data system.
All data were obtained from the aforementioned public data sources.

Data were

®

downloaded and manipulated in Microsoft Office Excel and then exported to S.P.S.S.® (I.B.M.
S.P.S.S. Statistics Version 19, I.B.M. Corporation, Somers, N.Y.) for statistical analysis. To
assess whether changes in population smoking prevalence preceded or followed tobacco policy
adoption, differences in the average state-level adult smoking prevalence was calculated for
each type of policy adoption categories described above for the time periods before, during, and
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after the 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 policy adoption evaluation timeframe. This was assessed
in univariate analysis using A.N.O.V.A..

The assessment was repeated with multivariable

analysis using general linear models (G.L.M.) A.N.C.O.V.A. with the above described variables
for educational attainment, poverty, and tobacco agriculture as covariates and the categorical
tobacco policy adoption categorical variable as a random factor.

For simplicity, in the

A.N.O.V.A. and G.L.M. A.N.C.O.V.A. analysis, statistically significant differences between the
mean smoking prevalence at different levels of the tobacco policy adoption categorical variable
(unadjusted mean in A.N.O.V.A. analysis and covariable-adjusted estimated marginal mean in
G.L.M. A.N.C.O.V.A.) was assessed using the 95% confidence intervals rather than post-hoc
tests.
6.4

Results
The descriptive characteristics of the fifty-one jurisdictions included in this analysis are

shown in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. State tobacco excise taxes were the only policies in place in all
jurisdictions and were also the policies most likely to be changed (37% of jurisdictions increased
taxes in 1995-1999 and 66% of jurisdictions increased taxes in 2000-2004). In contrast, smokefree indoor air policies for private work sites and restaurants were the least common in both time
periods as well as the least likely to be adopted. Policies requiring licensure for tobacco retail
sales also had a low adoption rate. For the 1995-1999 time period, the average state tobacco
excise tax was $0.34±0.19 (standard deviation) increasing to $0.55±0.36 in 2000-20004.
The averaged adult smoking prevalence declined from the 1990-1994 to the 2005-2009
time period: 23.27%±2.77 in 1990-1994, 23.26%±2.73 in 1995-1999, 22.73%±3.01 in 20002004, and 19.79%±3.12 in 2005-2009.
Results from univariate A.N.O.V.A. analysis are shown in Table 6-3. All policies except for
the youth access to vending machines and retail licensure policies demonstrated a statistically
significant (p<0.05) or a trend toward a statistically significant (0.05<p<0.1) association between
smoking prevalence and policy adoption category. In general, smoking prevalence was lower in
all time periods, including before the policy adoption timeframe, in jurisdictions with policies at
baseline and in jurisdictions that adopted policies compared to those jurisdictions either without
baseline policies or that did not adopt policies during the timeframe. For example, in the 20002004 policy adoption timeframe, seven states had neither baseline nor did they adopt smokefree indoor air statues at government worksites. At the opposite end of the policy adoption
categorization, seven states had both baseline policies and adopted additional government
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worksite smoke free air policies during the 2000-2004 timeframe. From 1990-1994 to 20052009, the former “policy inactive” states were observed to have an averaged adult smoking
prevalence of: 25.93% (95%CI 23.60-28.27), 25.77% (23.26-28.29), 25.62% (22.99-28.25), and
22.93% (20.01-25.85), respectively. In contrast, the latter “policy active” states were observed
to have an averaged adult smoking prevalence of: 22.62% (95%CI 21.01-24.24), 22.69%
(21.32-24.05), 21.95% (20.21-23.69), and 19.00% (17.00-20.99), respectively. It is noted that,
while the confidence intervals between these two groups overlap, the absolute value of the
overlap is small and it is not unreasonable to attribute this to the sample size in each group
(n=7) and thus interpret this as a strong trend towards statistically significant differences
between these groups at each timeframe. That is, there was a strong trend towards “policy
active” states having lower smoking prevalence compared to “policy inactive” states before
policy adoption, a difference which grew in the timeframes after policy adoption. This latter
observation of a lower and growing difference in smoking prevalence implies bi-directional
feedback between smoking prevalence and policy adoption.
These univariate analyses were repeated using multivariable G.L.M. A.N.C.O.V.A. analysis
to assess whether the associations observed in univariate analysis would persist after
accounting for other known covariates of policy adoption, educational attainment, poverty, and
tobacco agriculture. No statistically significant observations were observed (results not shown).
It is noted that, given the cell sample and the number of covariables, it is unclear whether these
null results are attributable to the absence of reliable association or lack of sufficient statistical
power.
6.5

Discussion
This study assessed the temporal association between smoking prevalence and tobacco

control policy adoption. This association was assessed for multiple different policy types and
timeframes. Results from this analysis suggest that lower smoking prevalence precedes policy
adoption, increasing the likelihood of policy adoption. Policy adoption, in turn, may contribute to
a differentially larger decrease in smoking prevalence in policy adopting compared to policy
non-adopting states. Further, the results from this study suggest that the association between
smoking prevalence and policy adoption depends upon the type of policy. Policies that have a
more direct impact on individuals, such as smoke free air policies in restaurants and worksites,
were observed to have a stronger association with prior population smoking prevalence
compared to policies that have more indirect impacts on the majority of the population, for
example retail licensure and youth access polices.
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The present analyses have several limitations and the results should be interpreted
cautiously and regarded as preliminary. First, the observations from univariate analysis were
not replicated in multivariable analysis. However, it is unclear whether this is the result of
insufficient statistical power or errant and / or unreliable results in univariate analysis. Given,
however, that univariate statistical significance was observed for multiple policy types and
timeframes, this latter explanation seems less plausible than the former. Future studies should
aim to increase the statistical power by increasing the number of jurisdictions and or timeframes
evaluated.
An additional important limitation is the relative simplicity of the statistical models
employed in this analysis. If, in fact, the temporal association between smoking prevalence and
policy adoption is bidirectional and recursive, linear statistical models are likely inadequate.
Future studies should incorporate more complex statistical models that reflect these complex
causal associations.
Finally, the number and type of covariates included in the present analysis is likely
incomplete. Future studies should attempt to include a more comprehensive set of factors
associated with both policy adoption and smoking prevalence, including interactions with
different jurisdictions, particularly jurisdictions with different tobacco control policy regimes.
6.6

Chapter Summary & Contribution
This chapter has provided quantitative evidence that lower smoking prevalence may

precede policy adoption, possibly functioning to – or signaling – lower society-originating
barriers to tobacco control policy adoption. This evidence diverges from the predominant public
health perspective that policy precedes prevalence reduction, and not vice versa. It is, however,
consistent with the theoretical contributions of, for example, Marmor and Lieberman who
asserted the interactive feedback between policy and prevalence. (Marmor & Lieberman, 2004)
The observations reported in this chapter also point to the importance of social factors in
tobacco control policy adoption, factors that have been largely overlooked by both the public
health and political and policy science communities.
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Table 6-1. Descriptive Characterization of Tobacco Control Policies During Study Timeframes

Smoke-free Indoor Air
Policies at Government
Worksites

1995, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 199599
Smoke-free Indoor Air
Policies at Private
Worksites

1995, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 199599
Smoke-free Indoor Air
Policies at Restaurants

1995, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 199599
State Cigarette Excise
Tax

Policy
Change, 199599

Youth Access to
Cigarette Vending
Machine Policies

1995, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 199599
Policies Requiring
Licensure for Tobacco
Retail Locations

1995, 4th
Quarter

No Provision
In Designated Areas
In Separate Ventilated Areas
Banned
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Provision
In Designated Areas
In Separate Ventilated Areas
Banned
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Provision
In Designated Areas
In Separate Ventilated Areas
Banned
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Restrictions
Limited Restrictions and No Supervision
Not Allowed in Youth-Accessible Areas
Unless Supervised and-or Locked
Banned from Youth-Accessible Areas
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Retail Licensing Requirements
Retail Licensing for Vending Machines
Only
Licensing for Over-the-Counter Retail
Sales Only

n

%

10.0
31.0
2.0
8.0
9.0
1.0
39.0
2.0
30.0
20.0
1.0
0.0
30.0
0.0
21.0
0.0
21.0
29.0
0.0
1.0
21.0
0.0
29.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
32.0
19.0
16.0
1.0
18.0

19.6
60.8
3.9
15.7
17.6
2.0
76.5
3.9
58.8
39.2
2.0
0.0
58.8
0.0
41.2
0.0
41.2
56.9
0.0
2.0
41.2
0.0
56.9
2.0
0.0
0.0
62.7
37.3
31.4
2.0
35.3

16.0
8.0
8.0
27.0
8.0
16.0
4.0

31.4
15.7
15.7
52.9
15.7
31.4
7.8

1.0

2.0
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2004, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 200004
2004, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 200004
2004, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 200004
Policy
Change, 200004
2004, 4th
Quarter

Policy
Change, 200004
2004, 4th
Quarter

No Provision
In Designated Areas
In Separate Ventilated Areas
Banned
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Provision
In Designated Areas
In Separate Ventilated Areas
Banned
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Provision
In Designated Areas
In Separate Ventilated Areas
Banned
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Restrictions
Limited Restrictions and No Supervision
Not Allowed in Youth-Accessible Areas
Unless Supervised and-or Locked
Banned from Youth-Accessible Areas
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Retail Licensing Requirements
Retail Licensing for Vending Machines
Only
Licensing for Over-the-Counter Retail
Sales Only

n

%

7.0
24.0
5.0
15.0
7.0
0.0
37.0
7.0
24.0
19.0
3.0
5.0
24.0
5.0
17.0
5.0
19.0
23.0
2.0
7.0
19.0
2.0
23.0
7.0
0.0
0.0
17.0
34.0
4.0
1.0
14.0

13.7
47.1
9.8
29.4
13.7
0.0
72.5
13.7
47.1
37.3
5.9
9.8
47.1
9.8
33.3
9.8
37.3
45.1
3.9
13.7
37.3
3.9
45.1
13.7
0.0
0.0
33.3
66.7
7.8
2.0
27.5

32.0
4.0
3.0
43.0
1.0
9.0
3.0

62.7
7.8
5.9
84.3
2.0
17.6
5.9

2.0

3.9

Policy
Change, 199599

Retail Licensing Required for Over-theCounter and Vending Machine Sales
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

n

%

30.0

58.8

12.0
4.0
33.0
2.0

23.5
7.8
64.7
3.9
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Policy
Change, 200004

Retail Licensing Required for Over-theCounter and Vending Machine Sales
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

n

%

37.0

72.5

9.0
2.0
40.0
0.0

17.6
3.9
78.4
0.0

Table 6-2. Descriptive Characterization of Continuous Variables During Study Timeframes

State Cigarette Excise Tax, 1990
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 1995
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 2000
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 04
State Cigarette Excise Tax, State Average for 1995-99
State Cigarette Excise Tax, State Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 1990
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 1995
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 2000
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 2005
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 1995-99
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 2005-09
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 1990
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 1995
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 2000
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 2005
Agricultural Acres Harvested, Average for 1990-94
Agricultural Acres Harvested, State Average for 1995-99
Agricultural Acres Harvested, State Average for 2000-04
Agricultural Acres Harvested, State Average for 2005-2008
Educational Attainment of High School or More (Census), 1990
Educational Attainment of High School or More (Census), 2000
Percent Below Poverty Level (Census), 1989
Percent Below Poverty Level (Census), 1999

n

Missing

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

51
51
51
51
51
51
45
50
51
51
51
51
51
51
49
49
49
46
50
49
49
46
51
51
51
51

0
0
0
0
0
0
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
5
1
2
2
5
0
0
0
0

0.21
0.30
0.42
0.74
0.34
0.55
23.99
22.78
22.85
21.02
23.37
23.26
22.73
19.79
14965.51
13541.33
9580.00
6478.70
14830.60
14684.06
8769.06
7348.97
76.22
81.87
13.14
12.11

0.20
0.27
0.34
0.60
0.32
0.44
23.60
22.45
23.30
20.60
22.74
23.30
22.42
19.48
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
76.70
82.13
12.42
11.42

0.09
0.17
0.28
0.48
0.19
0.36
2.78
2.81
3.01
3.13
2.77
2.73
3.01
3.12
49590.28
44725.50
31023.38
22021.53
48719.64
48903.60
28973.96
26274.47
5.59
4.37
4.13
3.31

0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
17.10
13.20
12.90
11.50
15.48
14.20
12.28
10.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
64.30
72.86
6.42
6.55

0.40
0.75
1.11
2.05
0.75
1.34
29.50
27.90
30.50
28.70
29.93
30.16
30.48
27.32
284200.00
261100.00
167400.00
126000.00
268720.00
265840.00
162640.00
157275.00
86.60
88.33
25.21
20.22
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Table 6-3. Univariate Association (A.N.O.V.A. Analysis) Between Smoking Prevalence and Tobacco Control Policy Adoption During Different Study Timeframes

n
Smoke-free
Indoor Air
Policies at
Government
Worksites

Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1995-99
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2005-09

Smoke-free
Indoor Air
Policies at
Private
Worksites

Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1995-99
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2005-09

Smoke-free
Indoor Air
Policies at
Restaurants

Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1995-99

No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

9
1
39
2
9
1
39
2
9
1
39
2
9
1
39
2
30
0
21
0
30
0
21
0
30
0
21
0
30
0
21
0
21

Policy Adoption Timeframe
1995-99
Std.
95% CI
95% CI
Mean
Dev. (Lower) (Upper)
25.25
2.66
23.21
27.29
20.46
23.08
2.71
22.20
23.96
21.98
0.79
14.86
29.10
25.32
2.52
23.38
27.26
19.36
22.96
2.61
22.11
23.80
21.76
0.82
14.39
29.13
25.49
2.48
23.58
27.39
19.68
22.30
2.84
21.38
23.22
20.26
1.39
7.81
32.71
23.04
2.75
20.93
25.15
16.46
19.23
2.80
18.32
20.14
17.83
1.63
3.22
32.44
23.96
2.80
22.92
25.01

Stat.
Sig.
0.100

0.035

0.010

0.003

0.065

22.51

2.56

21.35

23.67

23.93

2.59

22.96

24.89

22.30

2.69

21.08

23.53

23.52

2.82

22.47

24.58

21.60

2.98

20.24

22.96

20.70

3.06

19.56

21.84

18.50

2.80

17.23

19.77

24.19

2.47

23.07

25.32

0.093

29
1
21

22.90
19.42
24.34

2.84
.
2.30

21.82
.
23.29

23.98
.
25.38

0.013

29
1

22.65
18.08

2.70
.

21.63
.

23.68
.
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0.035

0.024

0.012

n
7
0
37
7
7
0
37
7
7
37
7
7
0
37
7
24
5
17
5
24
5
17
5
24
5
17
5
24
5
17
5
19
2
23
7
19
2
23
7

Policy Adoption Timeframe
2000-04
Std.
95% CI
95% CI
Mean
Dev. (Lower) (Upper)
25.93
2.52
23.60
28.27

Stat.
Sig.
0.026

23.02
22.63
25.77

2.76
1.75
2.72

22.10
21.01
23.26

23.94
24.25
28.29

0.028

22.89
22.69
25.62

2.70
1.47
2.84

21.99
21.32
22.99

23.79
24.05
28.25

0.020

22.33
21.95
22.93

2.96
1.88
3.16

21.34
20.21
20.01

23.32
23.69
25.85

0.013

19.35
19.00
24.38
22.44
22.26
23.19
24.30
22.13
22.13
23.21
23.87
21.62
21.54
22.45
20.91
19.20
18.52
19.35
24.23
23.88
22.65
23.23
24.42
23.60
22.50
22.50

2.98
2.16
2.86
2.13
2.69
1.78
2.69
1.42
2.91
1.41
2.80
2.67
3.23
2.05
2.98
3.49
3.05
2.51
2.51
2.97
3.11
1.97
2.41
0.40
3.08
1.60

18.36
17.00
23.17
19.80
20.87
20.98
23.16
20.37
20.64
21.45
22.68
18.30
19.88
19.90
19.65
14.86
16.96
16.23
23.02
-2.80
21.31
21.41
23.26
20.04
21.17
21.02

20.35
20.99
25.59
25.09
23.64
25.40
25.43
23.89
23.63
24.96
25.05
24.94
23.20
25.00
22.17
23.54
20.09
22.47
25.44
50.56
24.00
25.05
25.58
27.16
23.83
23.99

0.085

0.060

0.074

0.099

0.336

0.121

21

Policy Adoption Timeframe
1995-99
Std.
95% CI
95% CI
Mean
Dev. (Lower) (Upper)
24.17
2.72
22.93
25.41

Stat.
Sig.
0.002

0.001

n
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2005-09
State
Cigarette
Excise Tax

Youth
Access to
Cigarette
Vending
Machine
Policies

Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1995-99
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2005-09
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1995-99
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2005-09

Policies
Requiring
Licensure
for Tobacco
Retail
Locations

Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1990-94
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 1995-99

19
2
23
7
19
2
23
7
17
34

Policy Adoption Timeframe
2000-04
Std.
95% CI
95% CI
Mean
Dev. (Lower) (Upper)
24.19
2.79
22.84
25.53
24.01
2.84
-1.53
49.55
21.82
3.09
20.48
23.15
21.40
1.88
19.66
23.14
21.48
3.04
20.01
22.95
22.14
4.41
-17.50
61.78
18.69
2.84
17.46
19.92
18.18
1.45
16.84
19.51
24.10
2.59
22.77
25.43
23.00
2.82
22.01
23.98

0.013

17
34

23.62
23.08

2.69
2.77

22.24
22.11

25.00
24.04

0.506

24.59
22.63

0.002

17
34

23.51
22.34

3.14
2.92

21.90
21.32

25.12
23.36

0.194

19.97
16.45

21.86
19.38

0.001

17
34

20.65
19.37

3.19
3.04

19.00
18.31

22.29
20.43

0.170

21.66
22.36
21.80
21.85
21.87
22.35
21.68
21.63
21.31
21.45
20.96
20.96
18.34
17.99
18.06
17.64
21.46
19.67
22.54
3.18
21.55
19.06
22.33

25.35
25.47
24.48
24.99
25.70
24.80
24.32
24.92
26.13
24.19
23.78
24.78
23.97
20.84
20.78
22.54
24.84
24.67
24.66
43.08
25.33
23.99
24.32

0.920

4
3
43
1
4
3
43
1
4
3
43
1
4
3
43
1
9
2
40
0
9
2
40

22.65
23.73
23.35
25.98
22.83
24.00
23.23
23.88
22.76
23.77
22.58
26.02
20.17
20.75
19.57
25.26
22.85
22.90
23.50

2.16
2.14
2.89
.
1.42
2.88
2.87
.
2.92
2.77
3.08
.
2.75
3.60
3.10
.
2.30
4.92
2.84

19.21
18.40
22.46
.
20.57
16.85
22.35
.
18.12
16.88
21.63
.
15.79
11.81
18.61
.
21.08
-21.32
22.60

26.08
29.05
24.24
.
25.08
31.15
24.12
.
27.40
30.66
23.53
.
24.55
29.68
20.52
.
24.62
67.12
24.41

0.761

23.24
22.56
23.30

2.31
6.34
2.72

21.46
-34.36
22.43

25.01
79.48
24.17

0.935

No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

29
1
21

21.90
16.48
21.54

2.70
.
3.06

20.88
.
20.15

22.93
.
22.93

29
1
32
19

18.72
14.26
23.92
22.43

2.48
.
2.68
2.74

17.78
.
22.95
21.11

19.66
.
24.89
23.75

Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

32
19

23.98
22.05

2.41
2.87

23.11
20.67

24.84
23.43

Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

32
19

23.72
21.07

2.42
3.24

22.84
19.51

Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

32
19

20.91
17.91

2.63
3.04

No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change

8
8
27
8
8
8
27
8
8
8
27
8
8
8
27
8
12
4
33
2
12
4
33

23.51
23.92
23.14
23.42
23.79
23.58
23.00
23.27
23.72
22.82
22.37
22.87
21.15
19.42
19.42
20.09
23.15
22.17
23.60
23.13
23.44
21.53
23.33

2.21
1.86
3.38
1.88
2.29
1.47
3.33
1.97
2.88
1.64
3.56
2.29
3.37
1.70
3.44
2.93
2.66
1.57
2.99
2.22
2.97
1.55
2.80
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0.062

0.891

0.747

0.566

0.794

0.566

n

Stat.
Sig.
0.035

0.006

0.183

0.948

0.658

0.311

0.800

n
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2000-04
Adult Smoking
Prevalence, State
Average for 2005-09

Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added
No Baseline Policies, No Change
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added
Baseline Policies, No Change
Baseline Policies, Policies Added

2
12
4
33
2
12
4
33
2

Policy Adoption Timeframe
1995-99
Std.
95% CI
95% CI
Mean
Dev. (Lower) (Upper)
24.48
0.71
18.13
30.83
22.78
3.28
20.69
24.86
21.72
2.44
17.83
25.61
22.72
3.09
21.62
23.81
24.68
0.11
23.66
25.70
20.35
3.69
18.01
22.69
19.28
3.01
14.49
24.07
19.48
2.99
18.42
20.54
22.66
0.59
17.32
28.00
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Stat.
Sig.
0.743

0.486

n
0
9
2
40
0
9
2
40
0

Policy Adoption Timeframe
2000-04
Std.
95% CI
95% CI
Mean
Dev. (Lower) (Upper)

Stat.
Sig.

22.53
21.57
22.83

2.29
7.20
3.03

20.78
-43.10
21.86

24.29
86.24
23.80

0.832

19.85
19.61
19.79

2.59
7.57
3.11

17.86
-48.37
18.80

21.84
87.59
20.78

0.995

7

TOBACCO

CONTROL POLICY AND RELATED POPULATION HEALTH

OUTCOMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF E.U.
ACCESSION ON POPULATION HEALTH
7.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
The previous chapter provided quantitative evidence for the importance of lower smoking

prevalence in facilitating tobacco control policy adoption, leading to additional reduction in
tobacco use. These observations point to the importance of social factors and changes in both
policy adoption and reduced tobacco use. However, the necessity of these social factors and
changes in the successful abatement of tobacco use is unclear and the effect of international
efforts such as the F.C.T.C. is predicated on their non-requirement. The purpose of this chapter
is to assess the impact of tobacco control policies on societies that have not undergone social
changes to the same degree as in industrialized countries, specifically the mostly ex-Soviet bloc
countries that acceded to the E.U. in 2004 and 2007.
7.2

Background
The deleterious health effects of primary and secondary exposure to tobacco smoke,

including almost a dozen cancers and chronic diseases such as cardio- and cerebrovascular
disease, are well known. While tobacco use is the second leading cause of death worldwide,
predicted to cause one billion cumulative deaths during the 21st century, is it also the most
preventable cause of death. (World Health Organization, 2008) As the cost of treating and
caring for those afflicted by tobacco use or exposure continues to rise and place enormous
burdens on societal resources, reducing tobacco use and its subsequent adverse health
consequences through tobacco control policies (T.C.P.) is paramount.
Though causal links between smoking and health were definitively established in the
1960s, (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964) T.C.P. did not proliferate in
industrialized countries until the mid-1980s after a sustained period of “policy hesitancy”
(Studlar, Tobacco Control. Comparative Politics in the United States and Canada, 2002) whilst
smoking prevalence and consequent health effects reached epidemic proportions. The barriers
to implementing effective T.C.P. in the industrialized world, often supported by the tobacco
industry, (Bero, Implications of the tobacco industry documents for public health and policy,
2003) have been formidable, though they are slowly being overcome and more restrictive
policies are garnering public support and being implemented. As comprehensive T.C.P. are
gradually enacted and the societal benefits progressively realized in industrialized countries,
[149]

public health efforts are increasingly focused on the developing world: the tobacco epidemic in
the industrialized world has unfolded over almost three quarters of a century, but is it possible
for the policy and public health lessons learned in industrialized countries to be transferred to
developing countries, truncating the duration of the epidemic and forgoing some of the
enormous societal costs in countries least able to absorb such avoidable costs? (Jha,
Chaloupka, Corrao, & Jacob, 2006)
The Tobacco Epidemic Model (T.E.M.) is a four-stage natural history model that
characterizes the tobacco epidemic based on trends and progression in smoking prevalence
(male and female), smoking related mortality, and tobacco control policies. (Lopez, Collishaw, &
Piha, 1994) While smoking prevalence is low in early stages, it rises sharply to a peak before it
declines, with prevalence in men peaking before prevalence in women. Due to a prolonged
latency period, smoking-attributable mortality rates lag that of prevalence, not peaking until well
after prevalence has begun to decline. Tobacco control efforts are nascent until the final stages
of this model, when they become more organized, successful, and comprehensive.
An implicit public health goal for T.C.P. transfer, then, is reducing the 30-50 year lag (as
characterized by the T.E.M.) between the initial stages of the tobacco epidemic and adoption of
comprehensive T.C.P..

A substantial body of scientific evidence exists regarding the

effectiveness of specific T.C.P. elements (Jha, Chaloupka, Corrao, & Jacob, 2006), (Levy,
Chaloupka, & Gitchell, The effects of tobacco control policies on smoking rates: a tobacco
control scorecard, 2004) and policy learning and diffusion has emerged as a key mechanism for
the trans-jurisdictional adoption of similar policy elements as well as the knowledge about
needed infrastructure and strategies to make the T.C.P. successful. (Rose, 2007), (Dolowitz &
Marsh, 1996) International treaties and transnational tobacco control agreements have become
important instruments in policy learning and diffusion, thus aspiring to facilitate international
convergence of T.C.P., the most prominent example of which is the W.H.O. Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (F.C.T.C.). However, while the treaty has in excess of 160
signatories, it is yet unclear how successful the F.C.T.C. will be in implementing common,
effective policies throughout the diverse membership. Further, the F.C.T.C. process remains
the target of intense tobacco industry efforts to weaken its success. (Mamudu, Hammond, &
Glantz, Tobacco industry attempts to counter the World Bank report Curbing the Epidemic and
obstruct the WHO framework convention on tobacco control, 2008)
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A second example of facilitated international policy diffusion is the European Union (E.U.)
T.C.P. acquis communautaire, the common laws and policies in effect throughout members of
the E.U.. Until 1987, member states of the E.U. were individual actors in T.C.P., each having
exclusive authority over its own domestic policy.

The E.U. T.C.P. acquis communautaire

establishes minimum policy requirements which all members must adopt, though individual
members may adopt more restrictive policies in a process of multilevel governance. (Hooghe &
Marks, 2001) The Single European Act of 1987 was the first expansion of E.U. jurisdiction into
public health, with the justification that health is important to economic integration.

This

expanded in 1993 in the Treaty of the European Communities (Maastricht). Development of the
E.U. T.C.P. acquis communautaire started in 1989 with a directive banning T.V. advertising and
has grown to also include: 1989 and 1992 directives on product labeling; a 1990 directive on
maximum tar levels; and three directives on minimum tax levels in 1992 (2) and 1995. The
most comprehensive directive, a virtual ban on direct and indirect advertising, started
development 1989 and was eventually implemented in 1997 after much debate, controversy,
and compromise. This directive was immediately challenged by Germany in the European
Court of Justice, which annulled it in 2001. The E.U. subsequently adopted a narrower directive
in 2002, which banned only direct cross-border advertising. (Duina & Kurzer, 2004)
E.U. accession is an elaborate process, leading from formal application to acceptance of
candidacy status, negotiations regarding progression toward membership requirements in
different policy areas, formal votes on entrance by E.U. institutions, and formal votes within
individual candidate countries. (Glenn, 2004), (Grabbe, 2003)

For the twelve countries

acceding to the E.U. in 2004/2007, most applied for candidacy between 1994-1996, meaning a
ten-year period in which to absorb and adopt the E.U. T.C.P. acquis communautaire. The E.U.
T.C.P. acquis communautaire would be expected to have considerably more influence on policy
adoption and population health outcomes in newly joining members without a substantial history
and infrastructure in this policy area. Thus it is hypothesized that, by both proximity and the
process of E.U. accession, the E.U. could be an obvious source of policy learning and diffusion
for accession countries to abbreviate stages of the T.E.M..
The purpose of the present study is to:
1. Assess the extent to which T.C.P. convergence has taken place coincident with
the 2004/2007 accession and characterize the nature of convergence, if any;
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2. Assess the extent to there has been convergence in tobacco-related population
health outcomes, specifically prevalence of smoking, tobacco consumption, and
mortality from smoking-related causes;
3. Extend the understanding of the accession process on T.C.P. adoption and
related population health, if any, by comparing accession countries to Europeanneighborhood countries on the same indicators.
7.3

Materials and Methods
All fifteen “existing countries” 1 (members of the E.U. before 2004) and twelve “accession

countries”

2

(those acceding to the E.U. in 2004 or 2007) were included in this study except

Cyprus, excluded due to the absence of data for almost all indicators at all time points. The four
non-E.U. “European-neighborhood” comparison countries selected based on both cultural
similarity and data availability were Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and Albania.

Donabedian’s

structure-process-outcome conceptual model (Donabedian, 1966) guided the selection of
variables for this study.

Selected outcome variables were smoking prevalence (percent of

population aged 15+ years that were regular daily smokers; total, female, and male population),
consumption (number of cigarettes per person per year; total population), and smoking-related
mortality (standardized death rate from selected smoking-related causes per 100,000; total,
female, and male population). Selected process variables included the price of cigarettes (2001
only), and an assessment of the number, timing, and type of T.C.P. instrument adoption
(described below).

Finally, structural variables were real GDP (rGDP; $PPP, USD), and

spending on health care as a percent of G.D.P..
Data were obtained from common, publicly available data sources assembled and
maintained by the W.H.O. Regional Office for Europe (European Health for All database, (World
Health Organization, 2009) and the Tobacco Control database (World Health Organization,
2009). Data were downloaded and reconstituted in a Microsoft Office Access® database for
manipulation and processing, then exported into S.P.S.S.® (formerly S.P.S.S., Chicago, IL; now
I.B.M. S.P.S.S. Statistics, I.B.M. Corporation, Somers, N.Y.) for statistical analysis.

To

compensate for different collection and reporting years in different countries, values were
averaged across five year intervals for each country. The period 1990/94 was the baseline time
1

Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Finland, Austria, Sweden

2

Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria
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period as it corresponded with time of application for accession for several countries and the
first time period for which complete data were available.

The subsequent time periods of

1995/99, 2000/04 and 2005/07 (the last year for which data, though not from all countries, were
available) were also considered.
Countries were grouped aggregately as “existing” or “accession” countries.

While

variation in all indicators exists within these groups, the primary goal of this analysis was
assessing the convergence of accession countries to the average, established community
standard.

One-way ANOVA analysis was used to determine the presence of statistically

significant differences between existing and accession countries at each time period. Within
each country group, paired-sample t-tests were used to determine if there had been a
statistically significant change between the baseline and the final, full-data time period
(2000/04). For each indicator, the rate of change within country group was determined using
simple regression, where the selected indicator was the dependent variable and time was the
independent variable. The estimated β coefficients for existing and accession countries were
compared using Student’s t-test.
Information about T.C.P. status and activity was obtained from the W.H.O.-Europe
Tobacco Control Policy database. (World Health Organization, WHO Regional Office for
Europe, 2009) Five policy areas were included: direct advertising (6 specific topics), indirect
advertising (2), product distribution (3), smoke-free public spaces (7), and smoke-free public
transit (4). A simple score (T.C.P.-s) was calculated that assigned 0.5 points if the specific topic
was addressed by a policy restriction and 1.0 points if the specific topic was addressed by a
policy ban. A total of 22 points – one for each policy element – were possible. A country’s
T.C.P-s (a score out of 22) was calculated for each of the four study time periods. The duration
of T.C.P. activity was calculated for each country by subtracting the year of the first policy
element listed from 2007. The number of unique legislative events was determined as the
number of unique times that tobacco control legislation was enacted (which could include a
single or multiple policy elements). The authors acknowledge that other scores for this purpose
have been developed, specifically the Tobacco Control Scale (T.C.S.). (Joossens & Raw, 2006)
It is not our intent to replace or improve upon the T.C.S., but because the T.C.S. was calculated
from non-publicly available data sources and for a short time period, we developed an alternate
score that would allow us to quantify policy and policy change over time including in jurisdictions
not included in the T.C.S..

Additionally, while the price of cigarettes is an acknowledged

important element of TCP, taxes were excluded from the current study because most accession
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countries received derogations (delays) on tax harmonization upon their entry into E.U.
membership. (European Commission, 2004)
7.4

Results
The selected structural variables for existing and accession countries are compared in

Table 7-1. As anticipated, existing countries had higher rG.D.P. and spent more on health care
at each time point than did accession countries. Both existing and accession countries had
statistically significant change (growth) in both variables between 1990/94 and 2000/04. The
rate of growth of rG.D.P. was statistically significant in both existing and accession countries,
though the rate of growth of rG.D.P. in existing countries approached being statistically
significantly larger than the growth of rG.D.P. in accession countries (p for Student’s t-test for
difference between simple regression β = 0.064). Finally, while the rate of growth in health care
spending was statistically significant in existing countries, it was not in accession countries (p for
simple regression β = 0.099).
Results for the comparisons of prices and T.C.P.-s between existing and accession
countries are shown in Table 7-2. Price for the cheapest/most popular brand of cigarettes was
statistically significantly lower in accession compared to existing countries, though there was no
difference in the 2001 price of the most popular international brand.

For the T.C.P.-s,

comparisons showed that existing countries had implemented more total policy elements during
the baseline time period, but for the remaining study time periods there was no difference in
score between existing and accession countries. Further, while both country groups had a
statistically significant increase in T.C.P.-s during the study period and a statistically significant
rate of change in T.C.P.-s, the rate of change for adoption of policy elements was statistically
significantly higher in accession countries. Existing countries had a longer history of T.C.P.
activity, including more unique legislative events, likely related to a longer history of policies
establishing smoke free public areas and advertising restrictions.
Table 7-3 summarizes results from comparisons in the selected measures of population
health outcomes. Our analysis suggested that there was neither difference between nor change
within country groups in per capita cigarette consumption. Neither were there any differences in
the overall population smoking prevalence (except for the 2005/07 time period where existing
countries had an approaching-significantly lower prevalence (p=0.079), though it should be
noted that data were available for fewer countries during that time period). And, while there was
a statistically significant decrease in the within-group prevalence for both country groups, the
rate of change in prevalence was not significant for either country group. Different patterns,
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however, were noted for gender-specific smoking prevalence.

For all time periods, the

prevalence of female smoking in accession countries was statistically significantly lower than
that in existing countries (except in the last time period, though the same, previous caveats
regarding data availability apply).

The results suggest that female smoking prevalence

remained “flat” in both country groups (statistically not significant within-group change or rate of
change) throughout the study time periods. A statistically significantly lower proportion of men
(or approaching statistical significance) in existing countries smoked compared to men in
accession countries, though there was a statistically significant within-group reduction in male
smoking prevalence in both country groups. However, neither the within-group rate of change
nor the between-group rate of change comparison was statistically significant.
The estimated standardized mortality rates for selected smoking-related causes for the
total population, female population, and male population were lower at all study time periods in
existing compared to accession countries. Both the within-group change and rate of change in
smoking-related mortality decreased statistically significantly in existing countries for all
population strata (total, female, male).

In accession countries, there was a statistically

significant decrease in the within-group mortality rates (all population strata) but not in the rate
of change in mortality rates. It is noted that variance estimates for mortality rate parameters in
the accession countries were substantially larger than for existing countries.
In Figure 7-1, the percent change in smoking prevalence from 1990/94 to 2000/04 is
shown for individual countries in both country groups, where a negative percent change
corresponds to a decrease in smoking prevalence and a positive percent change to an
increased smoking prevalence. While most countries, both existing and accession, showed
decreased smoking prevalence, some countries from both groups demonstrated increased
smoking prevalence during the study period. Within existing countries, Belgium had increases
in total and female smoking prevalence, Luxembourg in total and male smoking prevalence, and
Italy, France, and Spain in female smoking prevalence. Within accession countries, Latvia and
Lithuania had increases in smoking prevalence in all population strata (total, female, male) with
particularly high increases in female smoking prevalence. Slovakia, Estonia, and Romania also
experienced increases in total smoking prevalence (Slovakia) and female smoking prevalence
(Estonia, Romania).
Comparisons between existing, accession, and European-neighborhood countries are
shown in Figure 7-2. Existing E.U. countries had substantially larger and increasing rG.D.P.
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compared to both accession and European-neighborhood countries; accession countries were
indistinguishable from European-neighborhood countries during the baseline time period but
had modestly higher rG.D.P. (but still substantially lower than existing countries) by 2005/07. It
is clear that the period 1990/94 to 1995/99 was a time of T.C.P. adoption for most countries,
with existing countries, as previously discussed, having more policies (higher T.C.P.-s) in place
during the baseline time period. However, it appears that existing, accession, and the Ukraine
continued to adopt T.C.P. after 1995/99, whereas Turkey did not and Russia did not adopt new
policies after 2000/04. Albania had the lowest T.C.P.-s and lags substantially behind all other
countries.

Russia and Albania had similar smoking prevalence to existing and accession

countries during the baseline period, but a trend of increasing prevalence throughout the
remaining study time periods. Turkey and Ukraine, while having a higher smoking prevalence
than either existing or accession countries throughout the study time periods, had lower
smoking prevalence during the final study time period compared to their population smoking
prevalence during the baseline time period (though still higher than E.U. existing or accession
countries).

Mortality rates for smoking-related causes were only available for Ukraine and

Albania. While smoking-related mortality rates in both existing and accession decreased during
the study period, tobacco-related mortality increased from the baseline study period through two
additional study time periods in both Ukraine and Albania. While mortality rates were lower in
Albania compared to accession countries at all study time periods (and existing countries at the
baseline time period), mortality rates in Ukraine were higher than those in existing or accession
countries at all study time periods.
7.5

Discussion
This study assessed convergence between E.U. existing and accession countries on

measures of T.C.P. and related population health outcomes and the extent to which any
convergence may be attributable to the E.U. accession process.

Results from this study

support the ability of the E.U. and E.U. accession to support and accelerate T.C.P. adoption,
with subsequent benefits to related population health outcomes.
Accession countries, while more similar to European-neighborhood countries in rG.D.P.,
were more similar to existing than European-neighborhood countries in the other parameters
studied here. There was clear convergence between existing and accession countries in the
number and type of T.C.P.; only Ukraine demonstrated a similar pattern of sustained T.C.P.
adoption. Consistent with a priori expectations, existing countries had more policies in place
during the study baseline period, but there was no difference in the number of polices for the
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remainder of the study time periods. Results suggested that baseline differences were related to
a longer history with T.C.P. activity, especially restrictions and bans on smoking in public areas
and direct advertising.

Also, while existing, accession, and two European-neighborhood

countries had similar total population smoking prevalence at the baseline time period, only
existing and accession countries demonstrated a consistent decline in smoking prevalence
throughout the study time periods. Evaluation of individual country results showed Latvia and
Lithuania as consistent laggards in reductions in smoking prevalence. Likewise, only existing
and accession countries realized a decline in smoking-related mortality throughout all study time
periods.
The tendency to policy convergence across E.U. member states over time has come be
called “Europeanization” (Radaelli, 2003), (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005) and results from this
study support the role of the E.U. as a policy transfer platform, allowing progressive countries to
influence E.U. policies through uploading and laggard states to catch-up (converge) through
policy downloading. (Borzel, 2002) Given that most accession countries had no or only very few
T.C.P. during the baseline time period, the process of E.U. accession was a de facto mandatory
policy diffusion (download) of the E.U. tobacco acquis communautaire to acceding countries,
permitting these countries to at least shorten the extended periods of nascent and ineffective
T.C.P. advocacy and implementation as predicted by the T.E.M..
An additional important finding tentatively supported by the current study’s results is the
ability of such “mandatory” policy adoption to influence population behavior in the unclear
presence of considerable public support for such policies. The trajectory of enacting restrictive
T.C.P. in Western democracies, and the basis for predictions in the T.E.M., has historically been
that T.C.P. are implemented in an atmosphere of permissive consensus, with politicians only
acting when it is “safe” to do so. (Studlar, U.S. tobacco control policy: public health, political
economy, or morality policy?, 2008) Public support for T.C.P. has been demonstrated to be
related to both the implementation and enforcement of restrictive and comprehensive T.C.P.
(Hyland, et al., 2009) in Western democracies.

Further, particularly well documented and

discussed in the United States, public support for such T.C.P. has been built primarily by the
work of advocacy groups through a sustained effort to reframe T.C.P. partially on the basis of
the arguments of morality policy and de-normalizing the product, act of smoking, and sometimes
even the tobacco industry itself. (Studlar, U.S. tobacco control policy: public health, political
economy, or morality policy?, 2008) For many accession countries, this prolonged period of
advocacy and de-normalization, with subsequent change in societal attitudes towards smoking
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and T.C.P., was likely not present. Of the twelve countries acceding to the E.U. in 2004/2007,
ten were Central and Eastern Europe (C.E.E.) countries emerging from collapsed communist
regimes and decades of social, political, and economic oppression. Thus E.U. accession
represented a way to advance and stabilize democracy and free markets, as well as advance
public health, standards of living, and quality of life. In pre-collapse communist societies, the
tobacco market was typically a monopoly of a domestic producer, and tobacco advertising was
virtually immaterial, as was advertising for any consumer good. The government-controlled the
price of the cigarettes, the revenue stream from which was not insignificant, and smoking was a
nearly ubiquitous cultural norm, especially for men. As late as 1983 in Poland, cigarettes were
included as rations with worker paychecks, and while early official statistics are difficult to find,
some have estimated that 65-75 percent of men in Poland smoked. (Zatonski, 2003) Further,
the health care system, health information, and the public health agenda were controlled by the
government, and while it was not forbidden for physicians or other public health or policy
makers to discuss an alternate agenda, such groups and messages received little if any
reinforcement, and the impact from any such campaign was minimal. In the societal vacuum
left by the departure of the communist regimes in C.E.E., Western-based transnational tobacco
companies, concurrently pressured by shrinking markets in the West, saw tremendous market
potential. Research based on tobacco industry documents have reported the many strategies
employed by the industry to exploit these markets, including the explosion of advertising, often
targeted at women and children, in societies previously unaccustomed to the promotion of
consumer goods. (Zatonski, 2003), (Lipand, A; for the World Health Organization Tobacco Free
Initiative, 2007), (Szilagyi, 2006) Thus, in societies where advocacy and de-normalization had
likely not yet taken root, results from this study suggest that changes in population behavior
patterns may have been driven by T.C.P. implementation. This directionality (policy → social
change) is opposite to that previously argued, that T.C.P. adoption reflects social change and a
population willing to accept such mandated behavioral restrictions. (Nathanson, Disease
Prevention as Social Change: The State, Society and Public Health in the United States,
France, Great Britain, and Canada, 2007)
The limitations of this study are threefold. First, as this study used an epidemiologic
approach with cross-sectional data, the reported results represent associations and not
causality. Second, publicly available data were used and so results are only as reliable as the
data reported to and data compilation procedures of these sources. Finally, the present study
assessed only enacted policies, not policy enforcement. While the authors acknowledge that
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differences between enacted legislation and on-the-ground policy enforcement exist within the
E.U. (Nathanson, Disease Prevention as Social Change: The State, Society and Public Health
in the United States, France, Great Britain, and Canada, 2007) and that these differences
impact the realization of policy effectiveness, it was beyond the scope of the present study to
determine T.C.P. enforcement over time and in all the jurisdictions included in this study.
7.6

Chapter Summary & Contribution
This results reported in this chapter provide prima facie support for the ability of the E.U.

and the E.U. accession process, as a de facto mandatory policy diffusion, to advance population
health and shorten phases in the tobacco epidemic. That is, this chapter provided quantitative
evidence that both policy adoption and reductions in population-level tobacco use can occur
absent substantial social changes. This is oppositional to the findings reported in the previous
chapter, thus highlighting the bi-directional nature of the relationship between policy adoption
and tobacco use.

These seemingly-contradictory findings also likely highlight both the

complexity and the importance of contextual factors in understanding the dynamic between
tobacco use and policy adoption.
Specifically regarding this study, results suggest that the challenge particularly for
accession countries will be to continue to foster healthy public policy advocacy to entrench new
normative behavior.
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Table 7-1. Comparisons and Changes in Structural and Institutional Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession
Countries

Real G.D.P.

% of G.D.P. as Health Care
Expenditure

Within Country Change

Accession Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error)
11 / 6705.4±744.9
11 / 8746.0±1157.9

Statistical Difference

1990-1994
1995-1999

Existing E.U. Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error)
15 / 17244.7±1079.1
15 / 22241.2±1388.0

2000-2004

15 / 28606.24±2435.14

11 / 12227.6±1169.7

pF<0.0001

2005-2007
1990-1994

15 / 32564.1±2285.1
15 / 7.7±0.3

1995-1999
2000-2004

15 / 8.0±0.3
15 / 8.6±0.3

11 / 15574.1±1283.2
9 / 5.2±0.5
10 / 6.1±0.5
10 / 6.4±0.5

pF<0.0001
pF<0.0001
pF=0.001
pF<0.0001

2005-2007
Real G.D.P.
% of G.D.P. as Health Care
Expenditure

15 / 9.2±0.3
15 / 11361.6±1627.3 / p<0.0001
15 / 1.0±0.2 / p=0.001

9 / 6.4±0.5
11 / 5522.3±549.27 / p<0.0001
8 / 1.0±0.3 / p=0.014

pF<0.0001
---
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pF<0.0001
pF<0.0001

Tobacco Control Policy Score (TCP-s)

Price

Table 7-2. Comparisons and Changes in Price and Policy Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession Countries

Retail Price of Cheapest/Most Popular
Domestic Brand
Retail Price of Most Popular
International Brand
T.C.P.-s Score
( # of Policy Elements - 22 Total
Possible)

All Policy Areas
Smoke Free Public Areas
Smoke Free Public Transportation
Direct Advertising Policies
Indirect Advertising Policies
Distribution Policies
Within Country Change

Existing E.U. Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error)

Accession Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error)

Statistical
Difference

USD, PPP$, 2001

15 / 4.1±0.4

11 / 2.6±0.3

pF=0.006

USD, PPP$, 2001

15 / 4.8±0.3

11 / 4.7±0.6

pF=0.81

1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
Duration of Policy Activity (Yrs)
# Unique Legislative Events
Duration
# Unique Legislative Events
Duration
# Unique Legislative Events
Duration
# Unique Legislative Events
Duration
# Unique Legislative Events
Duration
# Unique Legislative Events

15 / 8.4±1.3
15 / 10.5±1.3
15 / 13.7±1.1
15 / 16.1±1.0
15 / 27.4±3.3
15 / 4.9±0.5
15 / 19.8±3.2
15 / 2.1±0.3
15 / 17.5±3.4
15 / 1.3±0.2
15 / 19.5±1.8
15 / 2.1±0.3
15 / 13.5±2.5
14 / 1.6±0.2
15 / 12.0±2.4
15 / 2.0±0.2
15 / 5.3±1.1 / pβ<0.0001

11 / 2.5±1.3
11 / 11.4±1.6
11 / 14.8±0.7
11 / 16.2±0.8
11 / 13.8±2.4
11 / 3.6±0.5
10 / 10.7±1.6
10 / 1.9±0.3
11 / 12.3±2.5
11 / 1.2±0.1
11 / 12.1±2.5
11 / 1.6±0.3
11 / 7.6±1.4
11 / 1.4±0.2
11 / 10.4±1.2
11 / 1.7±0.2
11 / 12.3±1.6 / pβ<0.0001

pF=0.004
pF=0.67
pF=0.45
pF=0.95
pF=0.005
pF=0.05
pF=0.04
pF=0.69
pF=0.27
pF=0.75
pF=0.02
pF=0.30
pF=0.08
pF=0.44
pF=0.62
pF=0.41

# of Policy Elements
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--

Table 7-3. Comparisons and Changes in Population Health Outcome Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession
Countries

Existing E.U. Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error)

Accession Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error)

Statistical
Difference

Annual Cigarette Consumption
(per Capita)

1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004

14 / 1753.0±74.7
14 / 1636.8±122.6
14 / 1659.3±164.1

6 / 1956.5±195.2
9 / 1951.0±124.5
6 / 1933.8±246.4

p=0.244
p=0.101
p=0.370

Smoking Prevalence (Total
Population)

1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2007
Cigarette Consumption
Prevalence (Total)
Prevalence (Female)
Prevalence (Male)
Mortality (Total)
Mortality (Female)
Mortality (Male)

14 / 30.2±1.4
15 / 29.4±1.4
13 / 28.0±1.4
11 / 23.3±1.1
14 / 24.4±1.5
15 / 24.3±1.6
13 / 24.1±1.1
11 / 19.7±1.2
14 / 36.3±1.9
15 / 34.8±1.8
13 / 32.1±2.0
11 / 27.2±1.6
15 / 300.2±16.4
15 / 269.4±13.3
14 / 232.6±10.8
13 / 199.8±9.0
15 / 208.2±14.1
15 / 187.0±12.4
14 / 165.4±10.6
13 / 142.3±9.2
15 / 427.3±21.3
15 / 381.8±16.0
14 / 321.7±11.9
13 / 274.9±9.8
14 / -93.7±121.5 / pt=0.454
12 / -3.0±0.8 / pt=0.004
12 / -1.6±1.0 / pt=0.134
12 / -4.3±1.0 / pt=0.001
14 / -71.4±8.2 / pt<0.0001
14 / -47.1±5.8 / pt<0.0001
14 / -108.4±12.6 / pt<0.0001

11 / 30.6±1.6
10 / 30.1±1.3
11 / 27.9±1.2
5 / 27.4±2.1
10 / 18.5±2.5
10 / 18.4±1.4
10 / 19.3±1.4
5 / 18.3±1.9
10 / 41.8±2.1
10 / 41.9±2.3
10 / 38.1±2.3
5 / 38.5±4.1
11 / 514.6±43.8
11 / 477.7±38.7
11 / 429.0±33.2
10 / 398.0±38.4
11 / 374.0±36.1
11 / 348.8±32.6
11 / 312.6±26.7
10 / 286.2±30.0
11 / 716.7±61.4
11 / 663.8±52.3
11 / 597.5±46.0
10 / 560.7±53.9
4 / -107.0±293.8 / pt=0.74
11 / -2.7±1.2 / pt=0.052
9 / 0.2±1.6 / pt=0.912
9 / -5.4±1.5 / pt=0.006
11 / -85.6±21.7 / pt=0.003
11 / -61.4±18.1 / pt=0.007
11 / -119.2±29.5 / pt=0.002

p=0.840
p=0.723
p=0.942
p=0.079
p=0.045
p=0.015
p=0.013
p=0.544
p=0.070
p=0.025
p=0.067
p=0.007
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
p<0.0001
--------

Smoking Prevalence (Female)

Smoking Prevalence (Male)

S.D.R. Smoking-Related Causes
(Total Population)

S.D.R. Smoking-Related Causes
(Female)

S.D.R. Smoking-Related Causes
(Male)

Within Country Change
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Table 7-4. Results for Regression Analysis

Dependent Variable

Existing E.U. Countries

Accession Countries

Statistical Difference

Real G.D.P.
% of G.D.P. as Health Care Expenditure
# of Policy Elements
Cigarette Consumption
Prevalence (Total)
Prevalence (Female)
Prevalence (Male)
Mortality (Total)
Mortality (Female)
Mortality (Male)

β=1136.2±242.7, pβ<0.0001
β=0.097±0.042, pβ=0.027
β=0.5±0.2, pβ=0.004
β=-9.5±17.6, pβ=0.6
β=-0.2±0.2, pβ=0.3
β=-0.02±0.2, pβ=0.9
β=-0.4±0.3, pβ=0.1
β=-6.8±1.9, pβ=0.001
β=-4.3±1.8, pβ=0.019
β=-10.5±2.4, pβ<0.0001

β=552.2±145.9, pβ=0.001
β=0.1±0.07, pβ=0.099
β=1.2±0.2, pβ<0.0001
β =-2.3±26.8, pβ=0.9
β=-0.3±0.2, pβ=0.2
β=0.08±0.2, pβ=0.7
β=-0.4±0.3, pβ=0.2
β=-8.6±5.4, pβ=0.1
β=-6.1±4.4, pβ=0.2
β=-11.9±7.5, pβ=0.1

pt=0.064
pt=0.793
pt=0.007
pt=0.780
pt=0.842
pt=0.748
pt=0.919
pt=0.728
pt=0.670
pt=0.843
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Figure 7-1. Range of the Percent Change in Smoking Prevalence from 1990-94 to 2000-04 in Individual Existing and Accession E.U. Countries

% Change in Prevalence of Regular, Daily Smokers (Age 15+ Years), 1990-94 to 2000-04
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Male Population

Figure 7-2. Comparison of Existing E.U., Accession E.U., and European-Neighborhood Countries on Key Indicators

Panel A: Real GDP

Panel B: Tobacco Control Policy Elements (TCP-s)
# of Unique Tobacco Control Policy Elements (22 Maximum; Mean±SE)
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8

CONCLUSION (AND A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING
TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY AND TOBACCO-RELATED POPULATION
HEALTH)

8.1

Chapter Introduction & Purpose
The previous chapters have presented an overview of the tobacco epidemic, a review of

two very different literatures with very different perspectives on the tobacco epidemic (the public
health literature and the political and policy science literature), an empirical analysis integrating
the political and policy science viewpoint with the public health perspective on the evolution of
the tobacco epidemic, and two quantitative analyses alternately supporting the interdependence
and complex temporal relationship between tobacco control policy adoption and population
health outcomes as well as the importance of societally-derived factors in the evolution of the
tobacco epidemic. The ultimate objective has been to identify key elements and forces in the
tobacco epidemic and, more precisely, the processes of tobacco control policy adoption so as to
present an integrated conceptual model based on the causal loops of tobacco control policy and
tobacco-related population health. This model is now presented and each element discussed,
with suggestions for quantification and future research questions.
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8.2

An Conceptual Model for Integrating the Social and Political Forces Affecting Policy
Adoption and Population Health: A Causal Loop

Figure 8-1. Causal Loop Diagram
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8.3

Elements of the Causal Loop Diagram

8.3.1

Population (Social System)
Abatement of the effects of the tobacco epidemic in society (the population) is the primary

focus of the public health community.

The overwhelming majority of research and

measurement efforts are directed toward quantifying tobacco use, the health effects of such
use, and the costs, both direct and indirect, of tobacco use and tobacco-related health effects.
However, neither the public health community nor the political or policy science community has
comprehensively assessed the influence of factors within this sphere on tobacco control policy
adoption.

For example, it is unclear how – or if – fundamental societal values regarding

libertarian vs. paternalistic perspectives on the balance between individual choice and public
health meaningfully affect the likelihood, pace, or types of tobacco control policy adoption. A
research agenda integrating the political and policy science and public health perspectives on
the influence of this sphere on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic would include assessment
and measurement of knowledge, attitudes, an behaviors related to not only tobacco use, but
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also regarding the tobacco industry, and the role of government in regulating individual
behavior.

More specifically, suggested metrics and constructs in a comprehensive and

integrated research framework might include:
•

Knowledge and attitudes regarding the health effects of tobacco use, including
understanding and conception of “risk”

•

Knowledge and attitudes regarding conduct by the tobacco industry

•

Tobacco use and consumption

•

Fundamental preferences and values for private vs. public solutions to problems

•

Fundamental preferences, values, and tolerance for paternalism and protection
vs. perceived infringement of individual rights (and the distinction between those
2 constructs)

Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might include:
•

To what extent, if any, does social change precede policy adoption?

•

How do fundamental values affect opposition or support for tobacco control
policies?

•

Are effects and associations uniform throughout the population or do they differ
between specific strata?

•

What is the quantitative nature of the interaction between social structural
variables, especially the values and expectations regarding the role of
government, affect a) policy outcomes and b) population health outcomes?

8.3.2

Government (Policy System)
Understanding how government structures, functions, and aspects of the policy process

influence tobacco control policy adoption has been the primary focus of the political and policy
science community.

This sphere, however, has been too narrowly construed and thus

understudied by the public health community. Further, neither the political and policy science
nor the public health communities have undertaken study of how policy adoption in the
governmental sphere is affected by population-level tobacco use and vice versa. A research
agenda integrating the political and policy science and public health perspectives on the
influence of this sphere on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic would include mechanisms to
account for this interrelated and temporal dynamic.
integrated research framework might include:
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Key metrics in a comprehensive and

•

Form of government (e.g., federalism) and degree of pluralism

•

Existing social and social welfare policy regimes

•

Existing tobacco control policy regime, including institutional arrangements for
regulatory vs. prevention functions

•

Obligations or constraints as required by treaties or other forms of multi-level
governance

•

Competition vs. coordination between different venues and “levels” in a federalist
system

•

Responsiveness of policy system to social system or to policy system at different
“levels” in a federalist system

Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might include:
•

What is the interaction between social and policy systems as related to tobacco
control policy and tobacco-related health outcomes?

•

Are tobacco control policy regimes related to / affected by other aspects of social
welfare or health regimes?

•

What are the important / most effective elements of the institutional
arrangements for regulation and prevention?

•

Do the number of policy venues affect in any meaningful way either policy or
population health outcomes?

8.3.3

Judiciary
The judiciary has had undeniable impacts on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic,

including tobacco control policy. However, except for the most high profile cases, usually in the
Supreme Court, the impact of the judiciary has not been routinely or systematically studied in
either the political and policy science or public health communities.

A research agenda

integrating the political and policy science and public health perspectives on the influence of this
sphere on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic would attempt to articulate and systematically
quantify the effects of the judiciary on tobacco control policy adoption or tobacco-related
population health outcomes.
Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might
include:
•

How have the courts been used, which courts, how often, and for what?
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•

What have been the rulings in the lower courts?

•

How has judicial activity (rulings, case law) quantitatively affected policy
outcomes (at the state- or national-level)?

•

Is there a pattern or relationship between either the use of the courts (legal
mobilization) or the rulings of the courts to tobacco control policy or tobaccorelated population health (implying a social effect of the judiciary as well)?

8.3.4

Tobacco Control and Public Health Infrastructure vs. Tobacco Industry (Competing
Coalitions)
These are the “opposing forces” in the tobacco epidemic, competing for the policy

monopoly, to control the subsystem, and to be able to define the policy image. Both coalitions
are institutionalized. The Advocacy Coalition Framework or global advocacy networks would
seem ideal theoretical frameworks with which to systematically and quantitatively assess the
impact of these coalitions, though few studies to date have attempted to do so. Key research
questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might include:
•

What are the resources and strategies of each coalition?

•

How do the structural and resource characteristics of coalitions affect their ability
to influence the policy subsystem?

8.3.5

•

How do the coalitions interact with other venues or the policy or social systems?

•

What policy images are the coalitions promoting and how it being advanced?

Scientific, Expert, and Epistemic Communities
These communities have pervasive effects, interacting with all the other actors in the

system. While it is understood that these communities have had an effect on the tobacco
epidemic and tobacco control policy adoption, much less is known about how these effects have
been exerted. Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework
might include:
•

What

is

the

relationship

between

“scientific

knowledge”

and

“issue

understanding” in either the policy or social systems?

8.4

•

What is the status of these communities?

•

What is their role, formal or informal, in the policy subsystem?

Conclusions: Submissions to Political and Policy Science, and Public Health
The primary aim of this work has been to integrate the two very different perspectives

from the political and policy science and public health communities as regards the evolution of
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the tobacco epidemic. An integrated conceptual model based on the causal loops of tobacco
control policy and tobacco-related population health has been presented that incorporates the
realms of population, governmental, judicial, public health, tobacco industry and other
subsystems, and scientific communities. This framework, as well as the identification of its
constituent elements and the dynamic interrelationship between social factors and policy
adoption, is submitted as the novel contributions of this work. However, while this framework
does assimilate the key elements and forces elucidated during the course of this work and
integrates the political and policy science with the public health perspective, in truth this
framework likely elicits more questions than it answers. The research questions and agendas
and metrics proposed in this chapter highlight both the strengths and deficiencies of the two
perspectives. For the political and policy science community, development of a comprehensive
and integrated research framework implies building on the existing explanatory frameworks of
the policy process to incorporate additional spheres such as the judiciary and, in particular,
socially-driven factors influencing policy adoption.

For the public health community,

development of a comprehensive and integrated research framework entails building upon
existing strengths in the measurements and assessment of tobacco use within the population
and developing and incorporating a more sophisticated understanding of the factors affecting
the policy adoption process.

It is likely that this more sophisticated, comprehensive, and

integrated understanding of the tobacco epidemic, including the dynamics of tobacco use and
tobacco control policy adoption, will be required if the goals of, for example the F.C.T.C. and
other international efforts, are to be achieved and the tobacco epidemic in the developing world
substantially curtailed.
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10 APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF KEY LEGAL CASES AND EVENTS
10.1 Introduction
Events within the judiciary, specifically the rulings and opinions on the cases and
lawsuits within it, have alternately worked to impede and advance tobacco control policy in the
United States. Many of these events have taken years to come to resolution and are complex
proceedings, with many motions, rulings on motions, appeals of these motions, certification
followed by de-certification as class status, etc., followed by a lengthy appeal process of the
verdict in the initial case itself. These lawsuits have been filed in both state and federal courts
and several have proceeded to the Supreme Court. It is beyond the scope of the present
analysis to provide a detailed evaluation of each case. Rather, seminal cases and events will
be described as they relate to the evolution of tobacco control policy.
These events have frequently been described as having occurred in three waves: the
first wave from 1954-1973 consisting of individuals suing tobacco companies for negligence; the
second wave from 1983-1992 starting with the Cipollone v. Liggett Group (discussed in detail
below); and the third wave starting in 1994-present consisting of individual plaintiffs, class action
suits, and third-party health care cost recovery suits. (Douglas, Davis, & Beasley, 2006)
However, because the purpose here is to better understand how activity in the judiciary has
impacted the evolution of the tobacco epidemic generally and tobacco control policy specifically
in the United States, the following categorizations have been developed based on the type of
legal activity and its relationship to said epidemic and policy evolution:
•

Suits brought against tobacco companies by individuals claiming personal harm;

•

Suits brought against tobacco companies by groups of individuals (class actions)
claiming personal harm;

•

Suits brought by individuals or groups against various parties claiming harm, or
demanding protection from harm, from environmental tobacco smoke;

•

Suits brought by groups, including governments or those representing groups,
against tobacco companies seeking reimbursement of expenses attributable to
the harm caused by cigarettes; and

•

Suits disputing scope of action, including those brought by the tobacco industry
against the government claiming action without jurisdiction and so seeking to limit
the scope of government action, and suits pursued by government or other
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agencies claiming actions not permitted under existing statutes, agreements, or
case law and so seeking to limit the scope of action of the tobacco industry.
The legal basis for the suits and the defenses against them have changed over time
based on the evolution of the “problem” of tobacco use – of particular importance have been the
1964, 1986, and 1988 Surgeon General’s reports (definitively establishing that smoking causes
morbidity and mortality, exposure to secondhand smoke causes morbidity and mortality, and
that nicotine is addictive, respectively) and the public disclosure of tobacco industry documents.
Regardless of the type of legal action, it is superfluous to convey that the tobacco industry has
fought all cases with any and all legal strategies and procedural tactics at its disposal.
Frequently referred to as “scorched earth litigation tactics”, these have included filing multiple
motions and exhausting appeals of all motions, taking extensive depositions and investigations,
and other delaying and stalling tactics, all intended to prolong the procedures and increase the
complexity (and cost) for plaintiffs.

This strategy has been notoriously summarized with a

quotation taken directly from tobacco industry documents: “The way we won these cases, to
paraphrase Gen. Patton, is not by spending all of Reynolds’ money, but by making the other son
of a bitch spend all of his.” (Extracted from filings as part of Haines v Liggett Group, Inc, quoted
from (Daynard, Bates, & Francey, 2000)) An additional, important legal strategy of the tobacco
industry has been to first fight the legitimacy of a suit filed in state courts based on central-level
pre-emption language in existing, central-level statutes. That is, before a case has proceeded
to trial, such an action by tobacco companies would first require the plaintiff(s) to defend that the
state law providing the legal basis for their claim (e.g., misleading advertising) was a legitimate
law not preempted by a central-level statute. These strategies and tactics have been effective
deterrents to filing suits, particularly with individual plaintiffs and those from small jurisdictions
(e.g., municipalities).
10.2 Suits with Individual Plaintiffs Claiming Personal Harm
In the first category of cases to be discussed in this analysis, individual lawsuits claiming
personal harm began as early as the 1950s and new suits continue to be filed. While details are
case-dependent, typically the plaintiff has been an ill current or former smoker (or their surviving
spouse, heir, or estate) seeking damages from a tobacco company. Early suits of this type
typically claimed that cigarettes were either faulty or that tobacco companies didn’t adequately
warn consumers about the risks of smoking. For their defense, tobacco companies have denied
that cigarettes were harmful, claimed that the illnesses cited had other causes, or, after the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, that smokers did know the risk but in
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deciding to smoke regardless, knowingly assumed the risks thus alleviating the tobacco
companies of liability. These early, individual cases were all successfully defended by the
tobacco companies. The legal arguments forwarded by both the plaintiffs and the defense
(tobacco industry) evolved over time with additional scientific information and the public
disclosure of the tobacco industry documents. For individual smokers, evidence of nicotine’s
addictive nature, and later that tobacco companies were fully aware but concealed this, made
the “free will” defense by tobacco companies much more difficult. However, prior to 2000 only a
few verdicts were decided in favor of the plaintiffs and all were overturned on appeal (e.g.,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group; initial verdict was for the plaintiff – the first ever finding for a plaintiff
– was overturned on appeal then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but eventually dropped 9
years after the initial filing of the suit due in part to expenses incurred by the plaintiff).
10.2.1 Engle and Engle Progeny Cases
Since 2000 and the extensive study of the millions of pages of tobacco industry
documents released as part of the Minnesota trial and then the Master Settlement Agreement,
verdicts against tobacco companies have become more common, though trials and appeals
remain long and complex. Most recently, a series of cases in Florida have been making their
way through the state court system, with the majority of the now-individual cases being decided
in favor of the plaintiffs. In Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al., the original case was certified as a
class action on behalf of smokers in Florida with the initial verdict and a huge damage award –
$145 billion in punitive damages and $2.7 million in compensatory damages – in favor of the
plaintiffs. However, the Florida Appeals Court threw out the verdict and decertified the class but
importantly allowed individual cases to proceed while using the carry-over findings of the jury in
the original case of multiple wrongdoings by the tobacco industry. These individual cases,
variously estimated to number at 4000-8000, are sometimes referred to as the “Engle offspring”
or “Engle progeny” cases and are now proceeding. Of the jury verdicts reached so far in 13
cases, 11 have been decided for the plaintiffs, though appeals in all are pending. A significant
challenge in proving individually-based suits remains establishing individual smoking
attributable, proximal causality for the plaintiff, which is different and a larger burden than
demonstrating statistical causality and disease probability within a population.
10.2.2 Summary
It is unclear how these individual-plaintiff cases have directly affected the adoption of
comprehensive tobacco control policies.

These cases have likely had secondary impacts,

including establishing precedent and case law particularly related to liability and industry
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wrongdoing, as well as making public previously unknown information through the discovery
process. Further, this category of cases may have impacted product and industry framing and
policy images, though these possible associations have not been systematically evaluated.
10.3 Class Action Suits Claiming Personal Harm
The second category of cases is class action suits claiming personal harm from cigarette
smoke. Though class action suits filed by smokers have proceeded, the challenge of these
suits is illustrated by the Florida case above (Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al.). As it is considered
a strategic advantage for tobacco companies to require that each case be tried separately,
tobacco companies have fought class certification vigorously. Generally, class action lawsuits
by smokers against tobacco companies have been unsuccessful regardless of the time period
as courts have generally held that both causation and damage have to be demonstrated
individually.
10.4 Suits Claiming Harm from Exposure to Secondhand or Environmental Tobacco
Smoke
In the third category of cases, claims of harm from exposure to secondhand or
environmental tobacco smoke, suits have been brought by a broad array of plaintiffs against an
equally broad array of defendants.
10.4.1 Individually-Based Suits
In individually-based suits, there have been multiple cases that have upheld a
nonsmoker’s right to a smoke-free environment and the obligations for such an environment to
be ensured. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of a lower court which
had ruled that a nonsmoking inmate housed with a smoker (or otherwise involuntarily subjected
to forced exposure to secondhand smoke) had the right to petition for relief on the grounds that
such forced exposure constituted cruel and unusual punishment, an 8th Amendment violation,
and failure to consider such a petition showed deliberate indifference to future health
consequences of such exposure (Helling v. McKinney, No. 91-1958). As an example of an
occupationally-based case, a lifelong nonsmoking railroad worker who was required to sleep in
company-provided bunk cars with smoking co-workers contracted lung cancer for which he
claimed his employer was liable (he subsequently died, prematurely, at aged 40 years). After
his death, his widow continued the case and eventually settled with the railroad company
(Thaxton v Norfolk Southern Railroad Co., 239 Ga.). Additionally, lawsuits have helped to
establish the obligation of landlords, under covenants of habitability, to adequately protect
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tenants from exposure to secondhand smoke (e.g., Gainsborough St. Realty Trust v. Haile, No.
98-02279).
10.4.2 Class-Action Suits
In addition to individually-based suits, class action suits have also been filed by those
affected by secondhand smoke. Most prominently, nonsmoking flight attendants who were
occupationally (and involuntarily) exposed to environmental tobacco smoke filed suit against
several tobacco companies claiming, among other things, that tobacco companies knew about
the harmful effects of tobacco smoke but withheld this from the public thereby preventing
employers from protecting their workers and leading to unnecessary and involuntary harm. In
this particular case (Broin v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al.), and as a departure from all previous cases
that had been vigorously contended to completion, the tobacco companies agreed to a partial
settlement which, among other agreed-to terms, allowed claims for damages to proceed on a
individual-case basis.
10.4.3 Summary
In contrast to personal-harm suits brought by smokers, these individual or class action
suits by nonsmokers seeking relief or compensation for harm from exposure to secondhand
smoke have had a far more direct impact on policy. First, they have established the legal
precedent for the harmful effects of secondhand smoke. Second, by establishing liability for not
protecting non-smokers from exposure to secondhand smoke, these activities have served to
establish a requirement for employers and landlords, among others, to develop practices that
protect nonsmokers. That is, these activities established de facto requirements (policy) for
smoke-free environments.
10.5 Suits Seeking Reimbursement for Tobacco-Attributable Expenses
In the fourth category of cases, a creative and novel approach to litigation against the
tobacco companies emerged beginning in the 1990s. To avoid the need to prove, as was
required in individually-based suits, that the proximal, causal mechanism for illness was
smoking, lawsuits emerged seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred attributable to
smoking within a population. These lawsuits were able to capitalize on both the additional
scientific evidence that had emerged since the early, individual-based lawsuits, additional
release of tobacco industry documents revealing their awareness and concealment of the
dangers of smoking and more sophisticated epidemiologic methods that could much more
accurately identify smoking-attributable morbidity, mortality, and expense in a population than in
an individual. That is, these suits sued not for punitive damages for harm caused by tobacco
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products (and thus did not have to prove that the harm in an individual was caused by tobacco
products) but rather sued for the statistically-determined expense of treating that harm within a
given population.
10.5.1 The States Attorneys’ General and the Master Settlement Agreement
In 1994, the first of these cases was filed by the Attorney General for the State of
Mississippi (Michael Moore) suing on behalf of the taxpayers of Mississippi seeking restitution
for the costs to the state Medicaid fund for treating smoking-related illnesses (Moore v.
American Tobacco, et al. Case No. 94-1429). The states of Florida, Minnesota (with Minnesota
Blue Cross/Blue Shield as co-plaintiff), and Texas followed, and eventually the Attorneys
General for the remaining 46 states had filed similar suits. Rather than defend lawsuits in all 50
states, the tobacco companies sought to enter into an agreement with the Attorneys General
and thus began a long, complex, and contentious negotiation process which is beyond the
scope of the present analysis to describe in detail save three key milestones:

the 1997

proposed agreement (sometimes referred to as the national settlement agreement, the global
settlement agreement, or the 1997 national settlement proposal); the McCain Bill; and the

Table 10-1. Summary of Key Components of the Master Settlement Agreement
Topic
Type of Agreement
Advertising

•
•
•
•

Youth Access
Corporate Culture

•
•
•
•
•
•

Release of Industry Documents

•

Annual Payments

•
•

Anti-tobacco Research and Education

•
•
•
•

Civil Liability

•
•
•
•

Description
Contractual agreement between tobacco companies and States
Some limits, especially targeting youth
Bans: use of cartoons; advertising in public transit and some public venues (e.g.,
malls); media payments for tobacco promotion; non-tobacco merchandise with logo
except at sponsored events; gifts in exchange for tobacco products
Limits but still permits: corporate sponsorship at sporting and cultural events;
billboard advertising for sponsored events; advertising outside retail stores; restricts
use of non-tobacco brand names for tobacco products
Free samples in adult-only facilities
Requires packs of ≥20 sticks through 12/2001
Companies must commit to reducing youth access and consumption
Companies cannot suppress health research
Dissolves existing tobacco industry trade associations and regulates the formation
of new ones
Companies cannot lobby against certain types of legislation but can oppose
increases in excise taxes and attempts to restrict environmental tobacco smoke
Industry will release and create a website for specified documents (excluding
documents where companies claim privilege or trade secret)
Expires June 2010
Up-front and annual payments of $204.5 billion through 2025, subject to inflation,
volume of sales, and federal legislation adjustments
No restrictions on how states can spend money
Creates national foundation to fund research and surveillance to reduce underage
tobacco use and substance abuse
Required industry payments to the foundation of $250 million over 10 years
Required industry payment of $1.45 billion over 5 years to fund anti-tobacco
education program
Payments subject to inflation and volume of sales adjustment
Agreement serves to settle all state and local medical-cost reimbursement lawsuits
Protects tobacco companies from all future state and local tobacco-related lawsuits
Permits dollar-per-dollar reduction in state’s reimbursements of tobacco company is
found guilty in a local government lawsuit

Source: (Redhead, 1999)
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Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 (also known as the Multi-State Agreement or M.S.A.).
The first settlement proposal was forwarded in 1997 and required legislation in order to
be enacted.

In November 1997, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced the Universal

Tobacco Settlement Act (the “McCain Bill) which incorporated terms of the 1997 settlement
proposal but increased the sum of the annual payments, payments for research, and included
stricter tobacco company reporting requirements. After revision by the Commerce Committee,
the McCain Bill was introduced to the Senate where it was eventually defeated in June 1998.
Negotiations after the defeat of the McCain Bill resulted in a settlement agreement that did not
require Congressional action.

The M.S.A., signed in November 1998, was a series of

contractual agreements between the signatory tobacco companies and 46 individual states. A
summary of the main components of the M.S.A. are shown in Table 10-1. There were important
differences between the M.S.A. and the original 1997 proposed national settlement agreement
and the McCain Bill. Importantly, the M.S.A. was structured as a contractual agreement to be
managed by the National Association of Attorneys General and not the legislative framework for
comprehensive tobacco control policy as was provided in the McCain Bill.

Additional

differences included: fewer restrictions on advertising (the McCain Bill, for example, also
restricted print and internet advertising); fewer and weaker restrictions to prevent youth access
to tobacco products (e.g., the M.S.A. did not include the restriction on vending machines and
mail order sales that were part of the McCain Bill); no enforcement of minimum-age sales
through retailer licensing (these provisions were included in the McCain Bill); no provisions or
restrictions on how states could use settlement funds; and finally, no provision for the F.D.A. to
regulate tobacco products, stipulations included in both the original 1997 proposed national
settlement and the McCain Bill. The four states that were not party to the M.S.A. – Minnesota,
Texas, Florida, and Mississippi – negotiated separate, individual-state settlements with the
tobacco companies that were similar in content and implementation date to the M.S.A..
The most important difference between these separately negotiated state settlements
and the M.S.A. was the Minnesota agreement, specifically the document warehouse created as
part of the Minnesota settlement. In particular, Minnesota requested and eventually obtained,
after multiple appeals of trial orders, access to thousands of pages of supplementary pages of
internal documents that the tobacco industry had been previously shielding under the auspices
of attorney-client privilege. (Hurt, Ebbert, Muggli, Lockhart, & Robertson, 2009) The Minnesota
depository contains more than 60 million pages of documents and more than 20,000 other
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materials. Combined with the materials released as part of the M.S.A., these documents have
transformed the legal landscape for tobacco companies.
Within a similar timeframe as the states filed suits and the M.S.A. settlement, other
groups filed similar reimbursements lawsuits.

Specifically, third-party payor insurance

companies (e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris U.S.A Inc.), tribal health
funds from a variety of Native American tribes (e.g., Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas v.
American Tobacco Co.), and labor union health funds (e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17
Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc.) filed suits against tobacco companies to recover the costs
expended to treat smokers. In general, these lawsuits were either unsuccessful or dismissed on
the grounds that third-party claims are too remote for the relief sought.
10.5.2 Master Settlement-Emulating Suits
Additionally related to the M.S.A., the Agreement has spawned a series of derivative
lawsuits. In the first type, lawsuits have been filed designed to capture part of the settlement
funds for a particular group (e.g., Brown v. Philip Morris, et.al; Table Bluff Reservation (Wiyot
Tribe) et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al.). These suits have been unsuccessful and the National
Association of Attorneys General has retained control of the administration of the M.S.A. funds.
In the second type, a series of lawsuits have been filed, either by governments or tobacco
companies contesting the terms or interpretation of the terms of the M.S.A.
10.5.3 Master-Settlement Agreement Interpretation and Enforcement Suits
There have also been a series of legal cases pursuant to the M.S.A. as a mechanism to
either determine the limits or interpretation of or enforce the terms of the M.S.A. In accordance
with the M.S.A., the Attorneys General, collectively and within their own state, are responsible
for enforcing the terms of the M.S.A. Within in a year of the completion of the M.S.A., the
National Association of Attorneys General established the Tobacco Enforcement Committee in
order to coordinate M.S.A. enforcement activities within and between the M.S.A. states.
(Eckhart, 2004) Within the first four years of the M.S.A., this national-level committee has
reported initiating more than twenty actions related to reported tobacco company M.S.A.
violations including tobacco company activities related to misrepresenting the health effects of
smoking, targeting youth in magazine advertising, providing samples and substantial advertising
at N.A.S.C.A.R. and N.H.R.A. auto racing events, and providing free samples by mail. (Eckhart,
2004)

Many issues brought to the attention of the Attorneys General have also reached

litigation. For example, the Office of the California Attorney General lists dozens of governmentinitiated cases within the State of California and beyond, many of which reached adjudication in
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the state’s Supreme Court on issues ranging from the use of cartoons, health claims, brand
name sponsorship, distribution of free samples, action against retailers for selling tobacco to
minors, and enforcement of M.S.A. settlement payments. (State of California Department of
Justice, Attorney General's Office, 2010) Tobacco companies have also filed suit against state
governments based on the terms of the M.S.A. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. American Legacy
Foundation, the plaintiffs filed suit in Delaware claiming that the M.S.A.-created advocacy group
violated the terms of the M.S.A. with their series of “edgy” anti-tobacco ads. In July 2006, the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the ruing of a lower which stated that the ads had not violated
the terms of the M.S.A. and the ads could proceed (Lorillard Tobacco Company v. American
Legacy Foundation, No. 579, 2005).
10.5.4 Summary
The impact of these reimbursement-seeking suits on tobacco control policy is not
straightforward. As a contractual agreement, the M.S.A. did impose de facto policy but not
through traditional legislative means (the contractual agreement was necessary due to a failure
in traditional legislative mechanisms). Components of the M.S.A. were clearly based upon
evidence-based tobacco control policy instruments, but enforcement of the agreement is
dependent upon the resolution of contractual law disputes between the settling parties. Likely
the components of the M.S.A. with the most enduring impact on tobacco control policy, though
indirect, was the establishment, building on the achievement in the Minnesota trial, of the
tobacco industry document library and the creation of the American Legacy Foundation, a
national tobacco control advocacy organization which, with the Campaign for Tobacco Free
Kids, are two of the most nationally prominent and active anti-tobacco interest groups. One of
the most controversial legacies of the M.S.A. has been the settlement payments and how states
have an have not used these funds, with most states not allocating recommended proportions of
their Settlement funds to tobacco control activities.
10.6 Suits Disputing Scope of Action
In the final category of legal activities to be described in the current analysis, are suits
brought by either governments (federal or state) or the tobacco industry itself claiming violation
of existing statutes or procedural rules, case law, or the constitution and so seeking to limit the
scope of action of the other. For suits of this kind brought by tobacco companies, four are
seminal:
•

A libel suit brought against a broadcasting company based on the contents of a
documentary on the tobacco industry;
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•

The action brought against the government’s planned regulation of tobacco by
the F.D.A.;

•

Action brought against the government and the E.P.A. regarding the E.P.A.’s risk
assessment report on environmental tobacco smoke;

•

Various actions brought against the government(s) claiming advertising
restriction violation of First Amendment rights;

•

Action already filed by tobacco companies and non-tobacco companies seeking
to limit the actions of the F.D.A. under the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control of 2009.

For suits of this kind brought by the government against tobacco companies, two are seminal:
•

Suits claiming faulty use of the term “light” cigarettes; f

•

The Department of Justice’s civil claim seeking relief under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (R.I.C.O.). These cases are described
below.

10.6.1 Suits Brought by Tobacco Companies
10.6.1.1 Suit Against A.B.C.’s “Day One” Documentary
In February 1994, A.B.C. in its T.V. news-magazine documentary program “Day One”
aired a feature titled “Smoke Screen”, which focused on tobacco industry practices as related to
the nicotine content of cigarettes. Specifically, the program investigated the industry practice of
using re-constituted tobacco to make cigarettes, a process wherein parts from tobacco plants
are homogenized using water and the ingredients removed during this process, nicotine among
them, are later sprayed back onto the homogenate using a liquid syrup or extract.

The

implication in part, from the perspective of industry regulation, was whether this practice
constituted intentional manipulation of a drug (nicotine) content of a product which could then be
interpreted as being within the jurisdiction of the F.D.A. Whether the A.B.C. program used faulty
investigative techniques or whether they reported incorrect facts or facts incorrectly has been
the subject of debate, but the controversy over the approximately 20-minute story seems to
have revolved around sensationalized promotion of the program, the creative editing of clips of
“Deep Cough” (a former R.J. Reynolds employee that, in disguise, detailed on-camera these
industry practices but did not agree that they industry was “boosting” nicotine content merely
keeping it consistent; A.B.C. included the former clips in the aired version of the program but not
the latter), and the use of the word “spiking” to describe the industry’s practices. (Shepard,
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1995) Philip Morris, Inc. filed a $10 billion libel and defamation suit against A.B.C., the “Day
One” reporter (Walter Bogdanich) and the “Day One” producer (John Martin) in March 1994..
(Variety Wire Serivces, 1994)

A.B.C. agreed to a pre-trial settlement the terms of which

included, among other things, a financial settlement (estimated to be $15 million in legal fees)
and that A.B.C. issue an apology, which it did, and while the apology was narrowly construed
and technical, the typical approach to reporting the episode in the media was along the lines of
‘A.B.C. admits wrongdoing and apologizes to Philip Morris’. (Editorial, New York Daily News,
1995), (Shepard, 1995) The consequences of this episode, either short-term or long-term, are
likely mixed. In the short-term, Philip Morris capitalized on the publicity and the aftermath,
particularly the financial settlement, allegedly intimidated at least one other broadcaster from
airing an industry exposé-type documentary. (Shepard, 1995), (Kaplan & Isikoff, 1995), (Kurtz,
1995) The long-term effects of this episode have been conjectured to be more detrimental to
the tobacco industry. The documentary itself won the 1994 George Polk award for network
television reporting and the award committee, in a post-apology review of the award, upheld its
decision based on the substantial truth and importance of the documentary’s contents.
(Shepard, 1995) Further, others have cited the prominence of both the original documentary
and the aftermath as being critical from an agenda-setting perspective and it is difficult to
overlook that within a year of the settlement (two years from the airing of the documentary),
President Clinton and David Kessler had announced their intention for the F.D.A. to regulate
cigarettes (discussed further below). (Shepard, 1995), (Editorial, New York Daily News, 1995)
10.6.1.2 Suit Against F.D.A.’s Assertion Over Regulation of Tobacco
The tobacco companies have also used the legal system to prevent, delay, discredit, or
deter government activity intended to expand tobacco control policy activities, regulations, or
bureaucratic jurisdiction thereof. In February 1994, the same month as the airing of A.B.C.’s
“Smoke Screen”, then-President Clinton and then-F.D.A. Commissioner Dr. David Kessler
announced that the government, through the F.D.A., was considering the regulation of tobacco
products with the rationale that nicotine was a drug already tightly regulated by the F.D.A. when
occurring in products such as trans-dermal patches and gum and, thus, cigarettes were merely
drug-delivery devices. (Kessler, et al., 1996) The F.D.A. then undertook an extensive study and
review of existing evidence on the physiologic effects of nicotine, among other things, and in
August 1995 issued a report for public comment on the findings of their review. (Department of
Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, 1995) The F.D.A. issued their
Final Rule in August 1996, with the first provisions taking effect in February 1997. (U.S. Food
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and Drug Administration, 1996), (Anonymous, 1996) The logical argument (and subsequent
legal arguments) for F.D.A. regulation of cigarettes was developed around several premises: a)
the physiologic and psychoactive properties of nicotine, including its addictive properties, met
existing, internal F.D.A. standards for the definition of a drug; b) cigarettes and other tobacco
products were intended by the industry to be simply the mechanisms for delivery of that drug; c)
that smoking caused substantial public harm; and d) the best strategy to reducing this public
harm was to break the cycle of tobacco use by designing policies that focused on the reduction
of use initiation in children and adolescents. (Kessler, et al., 1996) The Final Rule forwarded a
series of policies designed to restrict access of tobacco products from those <18 years of age,
including requiring photo identification to purchase tobacco (for those <26 years of age),
substantial restrictions on vending machines, promotional materials, and advertising. (Kessler,
et al., 1996)
The 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule has had a profound impact on the trajectory of tobacco
control policy in the United States that remains detectable still. Between the 1995 interim report
and the August 1996 announcement of the Final Rule, the F.D.A. published a series of carefully
constructed peer-reviewed articles, augmented by the final report from the Advisory Committee
on Tobacco Policy and Public Health, which served to outline the scientific basis for the
components of the Final Rule. (Kessler, et al., 1997), (Kessler, Nicotine addiction in young
people, 1995), (Kessler, Wilkenfeld, & Thompson, The Food and Drug Administration's Rule on
tobacco: blending science and the law, 1997), (Kessler, et al., 1996), (Koop & Kessler, 1997)
Of particular import has been the framing of smoking and nicotine addiction as a “pediatric
disease”. The F.D.A. used as the scientific and logical justification for this focus, as outlined in
the peer-reviewed articles accompanying the Final Rule, the evidence of susceptibility and
special need for protection in this population based on epidemiologic evidence for tobacco use
experimentation and development of addiction in this age group, and because of its target for
such initiation through the advertising and promotional practices of the tobacco industry itself.
The F.D.A. also rationalized that, given the level of addiction existing within the population, an
outright ban would not be reasonable and create too much hardship on those already addicted,
thus policy should aim to reduce and eliminate future addiction.

It is also reasonable to

presume that the F.D.A. was not unaware of the political and practical barriers to imposing a
complete ban on all tobacco products, the more favorable social construction of children as
needing – and deserving – protection (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) and thus the greater
likelihood for the acceptance of policies based in “soft paternalism” (discussed previously) to
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protect this population, nor is it possible to overlook the not unlikely coincidence that Dr. Kessler
is, by training, a pediatrician.
For support of the other critical premises for F.D.A.’s assertion of its jurisdiction over the
regulation of tobacco, namely the addictive nature of nicotine and the intentional manipulation of
these addictive properties by the tobacco companies, the series of peer-reviewed articles (and
the text of the Final Rule itself) carefully detailed the scientific evidence for the addictive
properties of nicotine, and that tobacco companies were manipulating the nicotine content of
both cigarettes and other tobacco products fully aware of the role of cigarettes as the vehicle to
deliver a tightly controlled dose of nicotine, an addictive drug. In making the case for the latter,
the tobacco companies’ knowledge and intention with regard to using cigarettes to deliver a
dose of nicotine, the F.D.A.’s burden was greatly lessened by a series of events that happened
in a very similar timeframe as the F.D.A.’s activities. In 1994, Rep. Henry Waxman, (D-CA) as
the Chair of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, conducted a series of
hearings on the health effects of smoking. In early April 1994, the Presidents/CEOs for seven
American tobacco companies infamously testified under oath to this committee that smoking
was neither addictive nor did it cause disease. Less than two weeks after this testimony, two
former Philip Morris scientists (Drs. Victor DeNoble and Paul C. Mele) testified to this same
committee that Philip Morris suppressed, through threat of legal action, the publication of their
work on the addictive properties of nicotine. Further, these scientists testified that some of their
additional research projects for the company included the development or identification of a
substitute for nicotine that had the same psychoactive but not cardio-active properties.
Additionally, in a separate incident in May 1994, a mailing received by a tobacco researcher (Dr.
Stanton A. Glantz) with the return service address of “Mr. Butts” contained several thousand
pages of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company internal documents. (Cummings & Pollay,
2002) While the identity of “Mr. Butts”, the original source of the documents, was the subject of
litigation surrounding the unauthorized copying of the documents (Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Williams, Maddox v. Williams), the damaging effect of the documents to the tobacco
industry could not be undone (among other things, the documents revealed that, as early as
1963, tobacco companies were aware of the harmful health effects of cigarettes).

The

researcher and his team subsequently published summary findings of these documents first in
the scientific literature and then in book-form. (Glantz, Barnes, Bero, Hanauer, & Slade, 1995),
(Barnes, Hanauer, Slade, Bero, & Glantz, 1995), (Bero, Barnes, Hanauer, Slade, & Glantz,
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1995), (Hanauer, Slade, Barnes, Bero, & Glantz, 1995), (Slade, Bero, Hanauer, Barnes, &
Glantz, 1995), (Glantz, Slade, Bero, Hanauer, & Barnes, 1996)
While the testimony from the former Philip Morris scientists and evidence from released
internal tobacco industry documents substantially supported the F.D.A.’s quest to demonstrate
both industry knowledge and intent in the dosage manipulation and delivery of nicotine, and the
targeting of children and adolescents, the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule would ultimately fail. The
tobacco companies objected to both the regulations and the expansion of the F.D.A.’s
jurisdiction and filed suit against the F.D.A. on the basis that Congress had not authorized the
F.D.A. to regulate tobacco products (F.D.A. et al. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.). The
F.D.A.’s authority to regulate tobacco was upheld by the District Court but overturned by the
Circuit Court. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, in a famous 5-4 decision in 2000, the
Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court’s ruling that Congress had not so authorized or
intended the F.D.A.’s jurisdiction over tobacco under the existing Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
citing as support internal F.D.A. stating that it did not have authority to regulate tobacco, that
Congress had developed a regulatory scheme for tobacco outside the F.D.A., and that despite
repeated opportunities to do so, Congress had not explicitly authorized the F.D.A. to regulate
tobacco. It was almost 10 years after this Supreme Court decision that Congress legislated this
jurisdiction to the F.D.A. under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of
2009. (Curfman, Morrissey, & Drazen, 2009)
10.6.1.3 Suit Against E.P.A. for Report on Environmental Tobacco Smoke Risk Assessment
The tobacco industry’s legal action against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(E.P.A.) is another occurrence wherein the court system was employed as a strategy to prevent,
delay, discredit, or deter government activity in tobacco control activities. In the late 1970s and
into the 1980s, increasing scientific evidence emerged implicating exposure to secondhand
smoke as part of the causal mechanism for multiple morbidities and mortalities. These scientific
studies culminated in the reports from both the National Academy of Sciences and the Surgeon
General’s Office that reviewed and synthesized the existing evidence linking exposure to
secondhand smoke to disease and mortality in nonsmokers. (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1986), (National Research Council, National
Academy of Sciences, 1986) In particular, the Surgeon General’s report had as a primary
conclusion that involuntary smoking causes disease, including lung cancer, in nonsmokers.
Under the authority of the 1986 “Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality Research Act” in which
Congress directed the E.P.A. to develop a comprehensive indoor air quality research and
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information dissemination program, in 1988 the E.P.A. began studying the implications for
indoor air quality of environmental, or secondhand, smoke. (Environmental Protection Agency,
2009) An environmental tobacco smoke risk assessment report was drafted in June 1990 which
then, per internal E.P.A. regulations, was required to be reviewed by the E.P.A. Science
Advisory Board, an internal independent board that reported directly to the E.P.A. Administrator
(then William Reilly) comprised of nine standing members and nine members selected from
consultants and scientists based on content-expertise appointed on a report-specific basis.
(Muggli, Hurt, & Repace, 2004) The tobacco industry employed both political strategies to delay
or prevent the release of the report, dubbed “sand in the gears” (Muggli, Hurt, & Repace, 2004)
as well as scientific strategies, dubbed “keep the controversy alive”, which included sponsoring
scientific studies with “neutral” results and sponsoring scientists to attend national and
international meetings and conduct symposia highlighting “neutral” or “confounding” study
results. (Muggli, Forster, Hurt, & Repace, 2001)

However, for a variety of reasons and

circumstances, these efforts were largely unsuccessful.

The E.P.A., after review by the

Scientific Advisory Board, released a draft report for public comment in May 1992 and the final
report in December 1992 (“signed” in January 1993, thus the sometimes conflicting dates for the
report). The final report, a total of 530 pages, concluded that environmental tobacco smoke is a
known human carcinogen in adults, responsible for an estimated 3,000 adult deaths annually,
and increases the risk for lower respiratory tract and ear infections, among others, and asthma
in children. (Anonymous, 1993), (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1992) In June 1993,
the major tobacco companies filed suit against the E.P.A. in Federal District Court in
Greensboro, NC seeking injunctive relief and that the court declare the E.P.A.’s risk assessment
report “wrong as a matter of law and science”. (Janofsky, 1993), (Kenworthy & Brown, 1993)
The industry’s complaint against the E.P.A. alleged that the E.P.A. had violated the Radon Act
by not properly constituting its Scientific Advisory Board, had not complied with its own risk
assessment guidelines, and that the classification of secondhand smoke was “capricious” based
on the decision to use a 90% confidence interval as the standard for establishing association
between exposure and disease rather than the more customary 95% confidence interval (FlueCured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation et al. v. the United States Environmental
Protection Agency No. 98-2407). In July 1998, District Judge William Osteen Jr. cited multiple
procedural and scientific mistakes, including that the E.P.A. was “committed to a conclusion
before the research had begun”, and vacated most of the conclusions in the E.P.A.’s report,
which created concern for both municipalities citing the report as support for pending antismoking bylaws as well as for pending environmental tobacco smoke lawsuits. (Meier, 1998),
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(Koch, 1998) The E.P.A. appealed the decision and it was later reported that Judge Osteen had
previous experience as a tobacco industry lobbyist (Associated Press, 1995), though this had
little impact on the legal proceedings. In June 1999 the appeal was argued before the U.S. 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals and, in December 2002, the court ruled unanimously to overturn Judge
Osteen’s ruling. In their decision, the Circuit Court cited that the E.P.A.’s report carried no legal
or regulatory authority and that the report was not a reviewable agency action; the Circuit Court
did not rule on the other elements of either the initial complaint or Judge Osteen’s ruling (FlueCured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation et al. v. the United States Environmental
Protection Agency No. 98-2407). The tobacco industry did not appeal the Circuit Court’s ruling.
While pioneering in 1992/1993, by 2002 there had been substantial additional scientific studies
conducted adding to the body of evidence causally linking exposure to tobacco smoke to a
multitude of diseases and mortality. Thus, a single E.P.A. report was no longer material; the
tobacco industry had to concede this battle.
10.6.1.4 Suits Claiming Infringement of First Amendment Rights
Unlike the tobacco industry’s legal actions against the F.D.A. and E.P.A., which
appealed to technical and procedural standards to challenge agency authority to act or regulate,
tobacco industry suits fighting advertising bans have been based on appeals of direct violation
of existing case law and / or violation of Constitutional protections, specifically First Amendment
rights to free speech. Federal regulation of tobacco advertising started in 1965, the year after
the seminal Surgeon General’s report asserting a causal association between tobacco use and
morbidity and mortality, with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (P.L.
89-92) which required a warning label on cigarette packages but not on advertising. The Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 strengthened the language of the package warning label
and banned tobacco advertising on radio and television.

The package warning label was

changed to a set of four rotating labels and the requirement was extended to print advertising in
the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984. These early statutes received no legal
challenges because it was not until 1975 that the Court ruled, in a non-tobacco case, that First
Amendment protections extended to commercial speech. (Gostin, 2002) In the 1980 ruling in
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, also a non-tobacco case, the U.S. Supreme
Court created a 4-part standard by which to assess constitutional constraint of First Amendment
commercial free speech and which remains the precedent case law standard. (Bayer, Gostin,
Jarvin, & Brandt, 2002) Known as the Central Hudson test, the four components are: a) only
advertising for lawful products or activities that are truthful and not deceptive or misleading are
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extended protection; b) the government’s interest in curtailing the commercial speech must be
substantial; c) the regulation (curtailment of commercial free speech) must materially and
directly advance the public’s interest; and d) the restriction is only as extensive as necessary to
advance the public’s interest.

The 1996 Final Rule from the F.D.A. included substantial

regulations limiting tobacco product promotion and advertising including: prohibition on billboard
advertisement within 1,000 feet of an elementary or secondary or a playgroups; requirement
that all advertising be limited to black text on a white background (the so-called “tombstone”
format); prohibition of the sales and / or distribution of non-tobacco items with tobacco product
branding of any form; and prohibition of tobacco company sponsorship of sporting and cultural
events, race cars or other teams or entries into sporting or other events, or any other event
wherein the brand name of a tobacco company or product would appear. (Anonymous, 1996)
While the F.D.A. anticipated First Amendment challenges (unfair restriction of commercial
speech) for these advertising and promotion regulations and included justification and support
addressing the four Central-Hudson tenets in the Final Rule (Anonymous, 1996), the Court
never actually reviewed these regulations as the Final Rule was challenged on, and the Court
ruled on, the jurisdiction of the F.D.A. to regulate tobacco (FDA et al. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.). In 2000 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled to overturn the 1996 F.D.A. Final
Rule judging that Congress never intended the F.D.A. to have jurisdiction over tobacco, the
advertising regulations within the Final Rule became immaterial.

The Master Settlement

Agreement of 1998, a substantially less-restrictive version of the failed original 1997 national
settlement agreement and the McCain Bill, did contain some advertising restrictions including
(from Table 10-1 above): limits in advertising to youth; prohibition of the use of cartoons,
advertising in certain public areas (malls, public transit), and payments to media for product
promotion; and limits but not prohibition of sponsorship (and advertising at) sporting and cultural
events.

However, because the M.S.A. was a contractual agreement between the settling

parties and not a legislated restriction, these advertising and promotion restrictions were also
not subject to First Amendment challenges though, as discussed above, there has been
litigation to determine the interpretation of these M.S.A. advertising restrictions.
Massachusetts was signatory to the 1998 M.S.A. However, in January 1999 then-state
Attorney General Scott Harshbarger forwarded a series of additional regulations, as part of the
consumer protection statute Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A §2, with the intent to
eliminate deceptive and unfair practices in the marketing and distribution of cigarettes so as to
prevent the recruitment of new customers from among the minors in the state.
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These

regulations were broader and more restrictive than the regulations agreed upon in the M.S.A.,
and were instead more similar to those included in the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule. Before the
regulations took effect, four tobacco companies sued the Attorney General on multiple grounds
including that the regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965 and that the regulations violated their First Amendment protections of commercial
free speech (Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al, No.
00-0596). After mixed rulings in federal Circuit and Appellate Courts, the case was appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court. In a complex and split ruling in June 2001, the Supreme Court ruled
that the state’s regulations were preempted by the Federal statute and, in applying the CentralHudson four part test, that the regulations, particularly those banning advertising within 1,000
feet of schools and in-store displays below the height of 5 feet, met three but failed the fourth
standard (the restrictions were more extensive than necessary) (Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v.
Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al, No. 00-0596).

So, while the Court

acknowledged the legitimacy of the state’s interest in preventing smoking initiation by minors,
the ruling was widely regarded as a victory for the tobacco industry and placed doubt on the
future of similar local statutes in effect in New York, Chicago, and Baltimore. (Greenhouse,
2001), (Kane, 2001)
10.6.1.5 Suit Seeking to Limit the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009
As discussed previously, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of
2009 that legislated the regulation of tobacco to the jurisdiction the F.D.A. included multiple
provisions for package labeling and also required that the F.D.A. reissue the 1996 Final Rule
that was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.
(Gostin L. O., 2009), (U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions,
2009), (Redhead & Burrows, FDA Tobacco Regulation: The Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act of 2009, 2009) Issued in March 2010 and to take effect on June 22, 2010
(one year after the bill was signed by President Obama), the reinstated advertising regulations
include: a ban on sporting and all cultural event sponsorship; a ban of free samples or nontobacco product giveaways or promotions linked to the purchase of a tobacco product; a ban on
small-sized packs (usually <20 sticks); a ban on music and sound effects in audio advertising; a
ban on color and graphics in video ads, which become restricted to static black text on a white
background; and the “tombstone provision”, which requires package labels and advertising be
limited to black text on a white background. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010)
Additionally, the 2009 Act provided that package and warning labels become one of nine
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rotating text warnings to appear on the upper 50% of the top front and rear panels of packages
and occupy 20% of the total area of an advertisement (Public Law 111-31-June 22, 2009 Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §201), with the provision that the F.D.A. has the
authority to adjust the nature and content of the warnings to, for example, graphic color
warnings (Public Law 111-31-June 22, 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act §202). Given recent case law development, the F.D.A. has deferred implementation of the
regulations on outdoor advertising, instead initiating a period of further review, including formal
public comment, before issuing a Final Rule on this provision. (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, 2010)
In light of previous legal challenges and Court rulings, both Congress and the F.D.A.
expected legal challenges to any new regulations and the text of the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 and the 2010 F.D.A. Final Rule were drafted to reflect this.
Both included extensive sections detailing the scientific evidence, particularly that which has
emerged since the 1996 Final Rule, that materially supports the articles and regulations. As
anticipated, multiple tobacco companies filed suit in District Court in Kentucky in 2009. The
Plaintiffs in this still-ongoing case include a series of tobacco companies and retailers, though
not Philip Morris or its parent company Altria.

As discussed previously, Philip Morris has

declared its support for the 2009 Act and F.D.A. regulation of cigarettes. Thus while it has been
reported that the company feels the regulations are a violation of First Amendment protected
commercial free speech, Philip Morris did not enlist as a plaintiff in this lawsuit. (Wilson,
Tobacco regulation is expected to face free-speech challenge, 2009)

The suit challenged

almost all aspects of the 2009 Act (the 2010 F.D.A. Final Rule had not yet been issued at the
time the suit was filed), including the component of the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule banning outdoor
advertising and billboards, as violating their First Amendment rights of commercial free speech
and their Fifth Amendment rights of due process (Commonwealth Brands, Inc., et al. v. FDA et
al. No. 1:09-CV-117-M). In his January 5, 2010 opinion, Judge J.H. McKinley, Jr. refused to rule
on the ban on outdoor and billboard advertising declaring it “unripe” in light of the fact that this
component was not included in the 2010 F.D.A. Final Rule and the F.D.A.’s active “Request for
Comment” on this stipulation of the 2009 Act. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010)
Further, the court overturned all aspects of the challenge except the black-and-white-text only
(“tombstone”) package label requirement and a provision disallowing tobacco companies
claiming “safer” products in light of F.D.A. regulation; all other aspects of the 2009 Act, including
the graphic warning label provisions, sponsorship bans, bans on promotional materials, and the
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removal of advertising preemption, were upheld by the Court. (Commonwealth Brands, Inc., et
al. v. FDA et al. No. 1:09-CV-117-M), (Wilson, 2010), (Blackwell, 2010) The Court did grant
injunctive relief to the tobacco companies as regards the “tombstone” labeling requirements,
meaning that the F.D.A. cannot implement these provisions. The F.D.A. filed an appeal on
March 8, 2010, and the tobacco companies have also filed an appeal of the decision. As this
litigation is not yet complete, the final impact on tobacco control policy is not yet known.
The F.D.A., including the 2009 Act, is also currently being challenged by companies
outside the traditional tobacco industry: Smoking Everywhere, Inc. and NJOY, makers of
electronic cigarettes. In September and October 2008, the F.D.A. first held then detained two
shipments of electronic cigarettes being imported by Smoking Everywhere, Inc. Between fall
2008 and spring 2009, the F.D.A. undertook a series of regulatory procedures and actions to list
electronic cigarettes from a series of manufacturers, mostly based in China, as unapproved or
misbranded drugs and so subject to immediate seizure.
products were seized in April 2009.

As series of shipments of NJOY

In April 2009, Smoking Everywhere, Inc. (NJOY

subsequently joined as a plaintiff) filed suit and a request for injunctive relief in the U.S. District
Court in the District of Columbia. (Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a NJOY v.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. Civil Case No. 09-771 (RJL)) At the onset of the suit,
the 2009 Act had not yet been implemented, though the FDA did file a supplemental brief on
July 10, 2009. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2009) On January 14, 2010, District Judge
Richard J. Leon granted the Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, meaning that the F.D.A. must
allow these companies to import and sell their products. (Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and
Sottera, Inc., d/b/a NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. Civil Case No. 09-771
(RJL)) However, the F.D.A. filed an appeal of this ruling and a request for an immediate stay of
the order for injunctive relief in February 2010, which was granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in March 2010. (Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a
NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. No. 10-5032, 1:09-cv-00771-RJL) Thus, the
current status of this case is that the F.D.A. may, at least temporarily, block the importation and
sale of the electronic cigarettes. As this case proceeds, it is unclear whether the F.D.A. will
ultimately seek to regulate electronic cigarettes as “reduced harm” tobacco products under the
scope and authority of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control of 2009 or as a
drug / drug delivery device under the scope and authority of the broader Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act as other nicotine-replacement products currently are regulated (News Staff,
American Academy of Family Practitioners, 2010), or how the current product testing and
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analysis activities in which the F.D.A. is currently engaged will affect the final outcome of this
case. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2009)
10.6.2 Suits Brought by the Government Against Tobacco Companies
10.6.2.1 Suits Challenging “Light” Cigarette Claims
In contrast to cases where industry is seeking to limit the scope of government action
through the courts, there are also cases in which individuals or governments are seeking to limit
the scope of industry action through the courts. In a set of legal cases that involve package and
advertising claims, are cases brought against tobacco companies based on the use of the terms
“light” and “low tar” in the marketing and packaging of cigarettes. At issue has been “light”, “low
tar”, and “ultralight” cigarettes, available since the late 1960s, that yield lower tar (7-14 mg and
<7 mg, respectively, compared to 22 mg of tar per stick) per Federal Trade Commission
mechanical smoking machine tests (under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965, the Federal Trade Commission is the federal agency responsible for package labeling
standards) and which tobacco companies have implicitly marketed as being safer and assisting
in cessation. (Rigotti & Tindle, 2004) However, substantial scientific evidence has emerged
identifying that the lower tar yield in “light” cigarettes is a function of the physical characteristics
of these cigarettes (esp. position of microholes in the filter paper) that affect test results from
mechanical smoking machine tests but are far less relevant in human use because smoker
compensation (the statistically significant tendency of smokers of “light” cigarettes to inhale
more deeply, puff more frequently, and smoke more often) results in the tendency of smokers of
“light” cigarettes to have exposure to a higher – not lower – dose of tobacco-related carcinogens
(Rigotti & Tindle, 2004), (National Cancer Institute, 2004) despite the widespread belief by
smokers of these products were reducing their risk. (Wilson, Weerasakera, Peace, Edwards,
Thomson, & Delvin, 2009), (Borland, et al., 2004), (Cummings, Hyland, Bansal, & Giovino,
2004) Further, testimony during a recent Senate committee hearing highlighted an internal
tobacco company memo from 1975 that discussed the inaccurate tar estimates from smoking
machine tests and the understanding that smokers of “light” cigarettes were receiving the same
if not higher dose of tar and nicotine. (Niemantsverdriet, 2007)

Individual and class suits

brought against tobacco companies for medical harm done based on the health claims of “light”
cigarettes have typically been unsuccessful as tobacco companies have defended themselves
against liability based primarily on the presence of package warning labels. However, a class
suit filed in federal district court in Maine, Altria Group, In., et al. v. Good et al., sought economic
damages (refund for products purchased plus putative damages and attorneys’ fees) based on
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fraudulent advertising claims, not medical damages, under a state Unfair Trade Practices law.
The tobacco companies sought to have the case dismissed, claiming that the state law was preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and, as the companies
had complied with relevant federal regulations, were thus protected from any claims based on
state law. In December 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that the state
Unfair Trade Practices law was not expressly preempted by the federal law and remanded the
case to lower court for trial. The full impact of this case on tobacco control policy remains
unclear as Altria v. Good is not yet complete. However, the Supreme Court ruling is expected to
result in multiple, subsequent suits seeking restitution for the economic – not health – damages
of the fraudulent packaging claims of “light” cigarettes.
10.6.2.2 Suit Brought by the Department of Justice
The final case to be discussed is the very complex Department of Justice suit against
the tobacco industry, United States of America v. Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., et al., is the largest
civil action in U.S. history. Originally filed in 1999 and supported by then-President Clinton, the
suit lasted ten years including nine months of direct trial, hundreds of motions, multiple related
rulings, thousands of orders, dozens of appeals, testimony from hundreds of expert witnesses,
and countless millions of pages of filings, discovery documents, and supporting evidence. With
such length and complexity, the details and case proscribe succinct summary. However, there
were five critical aspects and rulings in the case (summarized from: United States of America v.
Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., et al., and (Fiore, Keller, & Baker, 2005), (U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Division, 2007), (Public Health Law Center, 2010)). First, the main case was heard by a
single Federal Judge, Judge Gladys Kessler.

Second, the original suit was filed to seek

restitution for tobacco-related Medicare expenses but, in an early ruling, the medical-expenses
restitution component was disallowed though the Department of Justice was allowed to proceed
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Third, the Department
of Justice proceeded with the case constructed around the “seven pillars of fraud” enumerated
as: a) Denying adverse health effects of cigarettes and exposure to environmental tobacco
smoke; b) Perpetrating the deception that tobacco-industry sponsored research was
independent; c) Denying that nicotine is addictive; d) Intentionally manipulating cigarette
contents in order to maximize the delivery of a nicotine dose in order to create and sustain
addiction; e) Intentionally marketing “light” cigarettes with knowing deception; f) Intentionally
marketing to young people despite assertions and agreements to the contrary; and g)
Intentionally refusing to acknowledge or release knowledge about the health hazards of
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smoking.

Fourth, in 2006 in an almost-1700 page opinion, Judge Kessler ruled that the

Government had made its case, namely that the tobacco companies were guilty of knowingly
perpetuating a 50-year fraud including the frauds outlined in the government’s “seven pillars”.
Judge Kessler’s ruling was unanimously upheld in May 2009 by a three-judge appeal panel.
Fifth, despite a finding of guilt, Judge Kessler did not award any monetary damages to the
government in light of an intermediary ruling that the R.I.C.O. statute only permits forwardlooking (to prevent and restrain future violations of the Act) and not backward-looking (putative
damages or forfeit of ill-gotten gains) remedies. Thus, the only sanction imposed by Judge
Kessler was the prohibition of any further use of deceptive marketing practices, including the
use of the term “light”, “low-tar”, and to issue a series of public statements acknowledging their
fraud and the health hazards of smoking. Finally, while both sides appealed both the verdict
(tobacco companies) and penalties (government) to the U.S. Supreme Court, in June 2010 the
U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case functionally signifying the end of the case.
(Wilson D. , Supreme Court Rejects Appeals of Tobacco Ruling, 2010)
The case has not been without controversy, including accusations and suppositions that
the Department of Justice’s strategies and vigor were, at times, influenced by unclear political
pressures. (Fiore, Keller, & Baker, 2005) And, in the end, it is entirely unclear the effects that
the ruling will have on either tobacco companies or tobacco control policy. Other than a tersely
worded opinion, a Court record-of-facts, and the ruling that the First Amendment does not
protect fraudulent claims, the inability of the Court to impose sanction other than something
tantamount to a public apology has left some to question if the government’s victory might be
limited to a moral one. (Opinion, New York Times, 2006)
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Milwaukee, WI

1999 – 2000

Outcomes Research Analyst
Center for Outcomes Research and Quality Management, Children's Hospital of
Wisconsin
Milwaukee, WI

1997 – 1999

Research & Administrative Assistant
Department of Pediatrics (Emergency Medicine), Medical College of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, WI

1997

Program Manager
Department of Bioengineering, University of Washington
Seattle, WA
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EDUCATION
2006 – Present

Doctorate in Philosophy, Public Policy Analysis
Policy Field of Emphasis: Health Policy
Dissertation Title: “Comprehensive Tobacco Control Policy Regimes and
Population Health: Assessing Causal Loops”
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV
(Candidate 2009; Anticipated Graduation 2010)

2009

Master of Arts, American Public Policy & Politics
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV

1996

Master of Science, Consumer Policy & Affairs
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario
Thesis Title: “An Economic Analysis of the Factors Affecting the Demand for
Skiing by Two Adult Canadian Households”

1994

Bachelor of Science, Honors Biomedical Sciences
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario

CONTINUING EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
2007

American Heart Association
33rd 10-Day Seminar on the Epidemiology and Prevention of Cardiovascular
Disease
July 29 – August 10, 2007
Tahoe City, CA

2004

MRA Management Association, Waukesha, WI
•
Principles of Management Certificate Series (Managing Relationships and
Building Trust; Delegation and Motivation Techniques; Effective
Communication and Performance Management; Dealing with Difficult People
and Discipline; Problem Solving Skills, Training and Coaching)
•
Effective Hiring and Interviewing Techniques
•
Facilitation Skills
•
Project Management: The Human and Technical View
•
Emotional Leadership: The Overlooked Element

2003

MRA Management Association, Waukesha, WI
•
Leading Effective Teams Certificate Series (Foundation for Leading Teams;
Communicating with Your Teammates; Keeping Your Teammates on Track;
Managing Conflict in Your Team)
•
Supervisor and the Law
Franklin Covey Training Seminars
•
FOCUS Time Management Seminar

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
2009 – Present

American Political Science Association
•
Section on Health Politics and Policy, Section on Public Administration,
Section on Comparative Politics, Section on Canadian Politics

2004 – Present

American Heart Association (Professional)
•
Council on Epidemiology and Prevention, Council on Quality of Care &
Outcomes Research

2004 – 2006

North American Society for the Study of Obesity (Professional)

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
2010

Five Year Service Award
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV
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2004

Key Contribution Award
Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI

2002

Award of Merit for “Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin Heart Center Outcomes
Report”
Wisconsin Healthcare Public Relations and Marketing Society

2002

Key Contribution Award
Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI

1998

Best Paper Award for: “Frisbee SJ and Frisbee WR. The demand for skiing
among working two–adult households.”
Tourism and Hospitality Management Division, Administrative Sciences
Association of Canada Annual Meeting, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 1998

1994 – 1996

University of Guelph Dorothy Britton Memorial Graduate Scholarship

1994 – 1996

University of Guelph Graduate Student Assistantship

1991

Natural Science and Engineering Research Council Summer Research
Scholarship

1990 – 1993

Natural Science and Engineering Research Council Canada Scholarship

1990

Easter Seals Research Institute Summer Research Studentship

1990 – 1994

University of Guelph President’s Scholarship

TEACHING
2010

PUBH691 Bioinformatics and Personalized Medicine
Fall 2010
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine
•
Lecturer (2-lecture series “Biomarkers for Risk Assessment of Environmental
Exposure”); Lan Guo, PhD, Instructor of Record and Course Coordinator

2010

PUBH7062 Current Research Issues
Fall 2010
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine
•
Lecturer (1 lecture “Overview of Ongoing Research Foci”); Rachel Abraham,
MD, MPH, Instructor of Record and Course Coordinator

2010

PUBH630 Policy & the Health System
Spring 2010
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine
•
Instructor (Instructor of Record, sole & lead instructor), curriculum
development

SERVICE
Students Supervised
2007 – 2008

Babina Gosinga MBBS
•
Member, MPH Practicum Committee

2007 – 2008

Miriam Mutambudzi, BA
•
Ad Hoc Advisor, MPH Practicum

Editorial Duties
2010 – Present

Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Hematology Journals Group (British Journal of Hematology, International Journal
of Laboratory Hematology, Haemophilia, Vox Sanguinis, Microcirculation,
Transfusion Medicine)
•
Statistical Review Editor
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2010 – Present

Microcirculation
•
Member, Editorial Board

Manuscript Reviewer
2010

Journal of Primary Care and Community Health

2010

Diabetes / Metabolism Research and Reviews

2010

Environmental Science and Technology

2010

European Journal of Public Health

2009 – Present

Metabolism Clinical and Experimental

2009 – Present

Journal of Dental Research

2009 – Present

Diabetic Medicine

2007 – Present

Microcirculation

2006 – Present

Diabetes Care

2004 – Present

Injury Prevention

Institutional
2008

2008 WVU Health Sciences Center E. J. Van Liere Research Day
•
Judge, Poster Presentations

2007

2007 WVU Health Sciences Center E. J. Van Liere Research Day
•
Judge, Poster Presentations

2005

Health Sciences and Technology Academy (HSTA) 11
Symposium
•
Presider, Oral Presentations

1998

Medical College of Wisconsin, Department of Pediatrics Website Development
Committee
•
Programmer, Emergency Medicine Section Website

th

Annual Science

Community
2001 – 2004

Fight Asthma Milwaukee – Allies Coalition
•
Co-Chair, Surveillance and Evaluation Committee

FUNDED GRANTS AND CONTRACTS
Grants
2010-2012

National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,
Centers for Children’s Environmental Health & Disease Prevention Research
1R21ES019236 “Associations between Non-8-Carbon-Chain Perfuoroalkyl Acids
and Serum Lipid, Liver, and Kidney Parameters in Children”
•
Principal Investigator

2009

West Virginia University School of Dentistry Seed Grant
“Analyses of Inflammatory Markers Among Older Adults in West Virginia”
Bei Wu, PhD, Principal Investigator
•
Co-Investigator

2008 – 2010

West Virginia University
Faculty Senate Award R-08-004
“Does the Perceived Quality of Life and Health State Utility Predict Treatment
Adherence and Outcome in Patients with Coronary Artery Disease?”
Maurice Moffett, PhD, Principal Investigator
•
Co-Investigator
[Note: Grant relinquished 8-2008 when PI relocated another institution.]
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2007 – 2011

American Heart Association
National Center Established Investigator Award 0740129N
"Hypercholesterolemia and Microvascular Rarefaction: Translational Initiative
from Mice to Humans"
Jefferson C. Frisbee, PhD, Principal Investigator
•
Co-Investigator

2005 – 2006

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Special Interest Project Competitive Supplement “9-2005: Network for
Cardiovascular Health Intervention Research and Translation Network–
Collaborating Center”
•
Project Director

2003 – 2004

Commonwealth Fund & Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
“Parent Mentors and Reducing Childhood Asthma Morbidity”
Glenn Flores, MD, Principal Investigator and Project Director
•
Sub-contract: cost analysis

2003 – 2004

Agency for Health Care Research and Quality
“Bar Coding Technology and Patient and Employee Safety”
Ben-Tzion Karsh, MD, Principal Investigator and Project Director
•
Sub-contract: data collection

2003 – 2004

Children’s Hospital and Health System Foundation Grants
•
“Quality of Life After Pediatric Trauma” (Andrea Winthrop, MD, Project
Director)
•
“Acupuncture Treatment for Fibromyalgia” (Lynn Rusy, MD, Project Director)
•
“Extubation in Patients with Altered Mental Status” (Kelly Tieves, MD,
Project Director)
•
Sub-contracts for all projects: data collection, management, and statistical
analysis

2002 – 2004

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and American Academy of Allergy, Asthma
and Immunology
"Emergency Department Allies: Managing Pediatric Asthma"
Kevin J. Kelly, MD, Principal Investigator and Project Director
•
Sub-contract: study design, quality control, and analysis

2001 – 2004

Robert Wood Johnson
"Milwaukee Allies Against Asthma"
John R. Meurer, MD, MM, Principal Investigator and Project Director
•
Sub-contract: study design, data quality control and analysis, community
disease burden surveillance

2000 – 2003

Department of Health and Human Services Maternal Child Health Bureau
"An EMSC-Based Violence Intervention/Prevention Program Evaluation with
Cost-Benefit Implications"
Marlene Melzer, MD, Principal Investigator
•
Sub-contract: biostatistician, study design, quality control, and analysis

Contracts
2006 – 2008

Brookmar Inc., C8 Health Project Settlement Fund
“WVU C8 Health Project Data Hosting”
•
Project Manager, Scientist

2006 – 2007

Brookmar Inc., C8 Health Project Settlement Fund
“Chronicle and Public Opinion Services for Brookmar C8 Health Project”
•
Project Coordinator, Analyst

2006 – 2007

Brookmar Inc., C8 Health Project Settlement Fund
“Description and Estimated Population Health Impact of Medical Surveillance”
•
Project Coordinator, Analyst
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2003 – 2004

Food and Drug Administration
“Feasibility of a Projection Methodology to Assess Pediatric Drug Use in the
United States”
•
Sub-contract (data management, statistical analysis, evaluation, and
interpretation)

2003 – 2004

Johnson Controls, Inc.
“Evaluation of the Clinical Impact of a UV Light Filtration Unit”
•
Project design, implementation, data management, statistical analysis

2003

Medical College of Wisconsin Department of Dermatology
“Multi-Site Study of Hemangioma of Infancy”
Beth A. Drolet, MD, Project Director
•
Sub-contract (project design, project & data management, statistical
analysis)

2001 – 2004

NACHRI
“Virtual Pediatric Intensive Care Unit Software Initiative”
•
Quality control, statistical and analytic processes

2001

Child Health Corporation of America – Child Health Accountability Initiative
(CHAI)
“Pain Management Project Multi-Center Study”
•
Quality control, analysis, and reporting
“Adverse Event Trigger Methodology Project Multi-Center Study”
•
Quality control, analysis, and reporting
“Bronchiolitis Initiative Phase 3 Project Multi-Center Study”
•
Quality control, analysis, and reporting

2000 – 2001

National Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions (NACHRI)
“Failed Extubations in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit Multi-center Study”
•
Study design and quality control

INVITED PRESENTATIONS
External
2010

“Correlations between chronic depression and peripheral vascular function: a
translational approach” with Beckett JAL [Presenter], Stapleton PA, Goodwill AG,
d’Audiffret AC, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC.
June 16-18, 2010, Bethesda, MD
NIH, NCRR 3rd Biennial National IDeA Symposium of Biomedical Research
Excellence (NISBRE)

2009

“Health Care Policy Forum”
October 21, 2009, Morgantown, WV
WVU Young Democrats and WVU Student Government Association; Forum
Panelist & Speaker

2009

“Misconceptions about the US and Canadian Health Care Systems”
September 25, 2009, Morgantown, WV
2009 Conference of the West Virginia Political Science Association, West
Virginia Chapter of the APSA, and the West Virginia University MPA Students;
Panel on “The National Healthcare Dilemma”; Forum Panelist & Speaker

2008

“The C8 Health Project: How a Class Action Law Suit Can Interact with Public
Health – History of Events”
May 7, 2008, Morgantown, WV
Community Medicine Public Health Grand Rounds; Speaker
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2006

“The Epidemiology of Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors in West Virginia
School Children: Results from the CARDIAC Project”
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Morgantown, WV
Invited Presentation Speaker

2005

“Relationship between economic conditions and cardiovascular disease risk
factors in West Virginia school children: Results from the CARDIAC Project” with
Frisbee SJ [Presenter], Cottrell L, Elliott E, Minor V, Spangler-Murphy E, Neal
WA.
American Heart Association 2005 Scientific Sessions Meeting Dallas, TX
Special Emphasis Panel – “Measures and Models: Health Policy and Outcomes
Research”

Internal
2010

“Correlations Between Peripheral Vascular Function, Inflammation, and
Depression in Human Subjects” with Stapleton PA [Presenter], d’Audiffret AC,
Goodwill AG, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC.
West Virginia University School of Dentistry / West Virginia Association of
Academic Dental Research Sixteenth Annual Research Day; Invited Poster
Presentation

2009

“Peripheral Vascular Dysfunction, Systemic Inflammation and Markers of Clinical
Depression in Human Subjects” with Stapleton PA [Presenter], d’Auddifret AC,
Goodwill AG, James ME, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC.
West Virginia University School of Medicine van Liere Research Day 2009;
Invited Poster Presentation

2009

“Social Choices in Health & Health Care: Comparing Canada and the United
States”
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine
– PUBH617 Ethical & Legal Issues in Public Health, Section on Justice & Health
Care; Invited Lecturer & Panel Discussant

2006

“Chronic Inflammation, Cardiovascular Disease, and Dental Health: Developing
Community–Based Translational Research Projects”
West Virginia University School of Dentistry / West Virginia Association of
Academic Dental Research Twelfth Annual Research Day; Invited Presentation

2005

“Factors Influencing the Development of Cardiovascular Disease in West Virginia
Children”
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Center for Interdisciplinary
Research in Cardiovascular Sciences; Monthly Seminar Series

2004

“Outcomes Measurement, Evaluation and Research at Children’s Hospital of
Wisconsin”
Medical College of Wisconsin, Department of Pediatrics (Urology); Invited
Presentation Speaker

2001

"Designing a Clinical Research Study"
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Cardiovascular Research Focus Meeting;
Invited Presentation Speaker
"Statistical Design and Analysis"
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Nursing Research Interest Group; Invited
Presentation Speaker
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PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS
Conference Abstracts, Posters, and Oral & Paper Presentations
Kini NM, Meurer J, Malloy ME, Frisbee SJ, Siewert J. After hours nurse triage system identifies inner-city children
who are in need of a medical home. Pediatric Academic Societies' 1998 Annual Meeting. New Orleans, LA:
May 1998. [Poster]
Kini NM, Robbins JM, Kotagal RU, Kirschbaum MS, Frisbee SJ, for the Child Health Accountability Initiative.
Inpatient care for uncomplicated bronchiolitis: comparison to Milliman & Robertson recommendations. Year
2000 Pediatric Academic Societies and American Academy of Pediatrics Joint Meeting. Boston, MA: May
2000. [Poster]
Sachdeva RC, Tweddell JS, Mussatto KA, Frisbee SJ, Otto M, Pelech AN, Litwin SB. The use of PRISM score to
predict outcomes for pediatric patients with right ventricular outflow tract homograft valve replacement.
Midwest Pediatric Cardiology Society Meeting. Milwaukee, WI: June 2000. [Poster]
Sachdeva RC, Frisbee SJ, Stahovic LL, Wegner C, Rice TB. Quality of life measurements in technologically
dependent children with special health care needs. 22nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Medical Decision
Making. Cincinnati, OH: September 2000. [Poster]
Rice TB, Frisbee SJ, Wegner C, Stahovic LL, Sachdeva RC. Risk factors for long-term outcomes in pediatric patients
with tracheostomy. CHEST 2000 Annual Meeting. San Francisco, CA: October 2000. [Poster]
Fedderly RT, Whitstone BN, Frisbee SJ, Tweddell JS, Litwin SB. Factors related to pleural effusions after the Fontan
procedure in the era of fenestration. American Heart Association 73rd Scientific Sessions. New Orleans, LA:
November 2000. (Circulation. 2000;102(Suppl II):745.) [Poster]
Rice TB, Frisbee SJ, Wegner C, Stahovic LL, Sachdeva RC. Outcomes for a trach/vent program: a 23year
experience. American Academy of Pediatrics 2000 Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL: November 2000. [Poster]
Mussatto KA, Tweddell JS, Frisbee SJ, Sachdeva RC, Emmons V, Pelech AN, Litwin SB. The use of PedsQL to
assess health related quality of life in pediatric patients with right ventricular outflow tract homograft valve
replacement. Society of Critical Care Medicine 30th International Educational and Scientific Symposium.
San Francisco, CA: February 2001. [Poster]
Sachdeva RC, Tweddell JS, Mussatto KA, Frisbee SJ, Otto M, Pelech AN, Litwin SB. The use of PRISM-II score to
predict outcomes for pediatric patients with right ventricular outflow tract homograft valve replacement.
Society of Critical Care Medicine 30th International Educational and Scientific Symposium. San Francisco,
CA: February 2001. [Poster]
Sachdeva RC, Twedell JS, Frisbee SJ, Mussatto KA, Emmons V, Pelech AN, Litwin SB. Evaluation of a quality of life
technique to evaluate outcomes of children with right ventricular outflow tract homograft valve replacement.
Society of Critical Care Medicine 30th International Educational and Scientific Symposium. San Francisco,
CA: February 2001. [Poster]
Wegner C, Sachdeva RC, Stahovic LL, Frisbee SJ, Rice TB. The family of a child with technology dependence: an
outcomes study using the Impact on Family Scale. Society for Pediatric Nurses Annual Conference. New
Orleans, LA: April 2001. [Poster]
Berger S, Whitstone BN, Frisbee SJ, Bauer K, Dhala A, Ellis D, Pirallo RG, Pukansky L, Wolkenheim BJ, Sachdeva
RC. A cost-effectiveness analysis of Project A.D.A.M. (Automatic Defibrillators in Adam's Memory) for high
schools in the Milwaukee Public School District. The 3rd World Congress of Pediatric Cardiology and
Cardiac Surgery (PCCS 2001). Toronto, Ontario: May 2001. [Poster]
Whitstsone BN, Frommelt MA, Brosig C, Frisbee SJ, Leuthner S. The impact of prenatal versus postnatal diagnosis
on psychological distress in parents of children with severe congenital heart disease. The 3rd World
Congress of Pediatric Cardiology and Cardiac Surgery (PCCS 2001). Toronto, Ontario: May 2001.
Rudd NA, Zlotocha JR, Mussatto KA, Frisbee SJ, Pelech AN, Frommelt PC. Growth velocity of infants with
hypoplastic left heart syndrome: a comparison of enteral feeding strategies. The 3rd World Congress of
Pediatric Cardiology and Cardiac Surgery (PCCS 2001). Toronto, Ontario: May 2001. [Poster]
Brosig C, Whitstone B, Frommelt M, Frisbee SJ, Leuthner S. Psychological distress in parents of children with
severe congenital heart disease: the impact of prenatal versus postnatal diagnosis. Great Lakes Regional
Meeting on Child Health Psychology. Milwaukee, WI: May 2002. [Poster]
Weisman SJ, Currier KL, Frisbee SJ, Throop C, Sachdeva RC. Pediatric pain management: effective practices in a
multi-site collaborative for post-surgical patients. International Association for the Study of Pain 10th World
Congress. San Diego, CA: August 2002. [Poster]
Meurer JR, Kramer K, Allerson L, Frisbee SJ, Ebert DA, Urban M, Carr R, Navon L, Fiore B. Appropriate asthma
medication use by children in Wisconsin Medicaid. Wisconsin Public Health and Health Policy Institute 4th
Conference. Madison, WI, October 2003. [Poster]
Winthrop AL, Brasel KJ, Stahovic L, Paulson J, Schneeberger B, Kuhn E, Frisbee SJ. Quality of life and functional
outcome after pediatric trauma. J Trauma. 2004; 57(2):#446. [Poster]
Rice TB, Frisbee SJ, Sachdeva RC. Information systems build capacity to improve patient care. NACHRI 2004
Annual Meeting. Fort Lauderdale, FL: October 2004. [Poster]
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McGrosky M, Frisbee SJ, Neal WA. Office-based obesity prevention program: West Virginia Providers on the Move.
American Heart Association 45th Annual Conference on Cardiovascular Disease Epidemiology and
Prevention. Washington, DC: April 2005. Circulation. 2005; 111: e184-e296. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Cottrell L, Elliott E, Minor V, Spangler-Murphy E, Neal WA. Epidemiology of obesity, hypertension,
hyperlipidemia and insulin resistance in West Virginia school children: six years of the CARDIAC Project.
American Heart Association 45th Annual Conference on Cardiovascular Disease Epidemiology and
Prevention. Washington, DC: April 2005. Circulation. 2005; 111: e184-e296. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Cottrell L, Elliot E, Minor V, Spangler-Murphy E, Neal WA. Relationship of birthweight to obesity,
hypertension, and dyslipidemia in pre-adolescents: results from the CARDIAC Project. North American
Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO) Annual Meeting, Vancouver, BC, October 2005. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Cottrell L, Elliot E, Minor V, Spangler-Murphy E, Neal WA. Obesity, hypertension, and dyslipidemia, and
the metabolic syndrome in West Virginia school children: 7 years of the CARDIAC Project. North American
Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO) Annual Meeting, Vancouver, BC, October 2005. [Poster]
Cottrell LA, Minor V, Spangler Murphy E, Tillis G, Frisbee SJ, Nicholson P, Neal WA. The power of perception:
parental estimates of their children's weight, their perceived abilities, and opportunities. North American
Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO) Annual Meeting, Vancouver, BC, October 2005. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Cottrell L, Elliott E, Minor V, Spangler-Murphy E, Neal WA. Relationship between economic conditions
and cardiovascular disease risk factors in West Virginia school children: Results from the CARDIAC Project.
American Heart Association Annual Scientific Sessions Meeting, Dallas, TX, November 2005. [Oral
Presentation, Panel: “Measures and Models: Health Policy and Outcomes Research”]
Frisbee SJ, Goodwill AG, Boegehold MA, Neal WA, Frisbee JC. Altered patterns of inflammatory marker expression
in plasma of obese vs dyslipidemic humans. North American Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO)
2006 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, October 2006. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Halverson JA, Neal WA. Changes in obesity and factors related to its increase in West Virginia school
children. North American Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO) 2006 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA,
October 2006. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Leyden KM. Neighborhood characteristics and overweight in families in rural communities. North
American Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO) 2006 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, October 2006.
[Poster]
Frisbee SJ. Self esteem, self and body image, quality of life and overweight in children in rural communities. North
American Association for the Study of Obesity (NAASO) 2006 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, October 2006.
[Poster]
Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, Frisbee SJ. Inflammation, nitric oxide bioavailability and the metabolic syndrome:
interactions leading to microvascular rarefaction. Workshop on Mathematical Modeling of Microcirculation;
Mathematical Biosciences Institute, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, October 2007. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, d'Audiffret A, Frisbee JC. The relationship between depressive symptoms, cardiovascular disease risk
factors, and inflammation in rural communities. American Heart Association, 47th Annual Conference on
Cardiovascular Disease Epidemiology and Prevention in association with the Council on Nutrition, Physical
Activity, and Metabolism, Orlando, FL, Feb. 2007. Circulation. 2007;115:e214-e301 (P256). [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Muller-Delp JM, Goodwill AG, Frisbee JC. Influences of Age and Gender on Cardiovascular Disease
Risk Factor Associated Inflammation. American Heart Association, 47th Annual Conference on
Cardiovascular Disease Epidemiology and Prevention in association with the Council on Nutrition, Physical
Activity, and Metabolism, Orlando, FL, Feb. 2007. Circulation. 2007;115:e214-e301 (P117). [Poster]
Chambers CB, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC, Crout RJ. Dental health, cardiovascular disease and inflammation in adults
and children. International Association for Dental Research and American Association for Dental Research
87th General Session and Exhibition, New Orleans, LA, March 2007. [Oral Presentation, Panel: “Oral Health
and Quality of Life Issues”]
Mujuru P, Frisbee SJ, Dey RD. Relationship between lung function, obesity, and systemic inflammation in a rural
community cohort. American Thoracic Society 2007 International Conference. San Francisco, CA, May
2007. [Poster Presentation, Session: “Poster Discussion Session A23 – Obesity and Pediatric Respiratory
Disease”]
Frisbee SJ, Mujuru P, Dey RD. Relationship between depressive symptoms and lung function in a rural community
cohort. American Thoracic Society 2007 International Conference. San Francisco, CA, May 2007. [Poster]
Frisbee JC, James ME, Muller-Delp JM, Frisbee SJ. HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors improve microvascular
outcomes in the metabolic syndrome independent of plasma cholesterol profile. Federations for the
American Societies of Experimental Biology (FASEB) Annual Experimental Biology 2007 Meeting.
Washington, DC, April 2007. FASEB Journal. 2007;21:742.5. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Chambers CB, Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, Crout RJ. Dental habits related to adult cardiovascular disease
and systemic inflammation. American Association for Dental Research 37th Annual Meeting and Exhibition,
Dallas, TX, April 2008. [Poster]
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Chambers CB, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, Crout RJ. Dental health, cardiovascular disease risk, and
systemic inflammation in children. American Association for Dental Research 37th Annual Meeting and
Exhibition, Dallas, TX, April 2008. [Oral Presentation, Panel: “Oral and Systemic Health”]
Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, Stapleton PA, James ME, Bryner RW, Frisbee SJ. Metabolic syndrome and microvascular
rarefaction: contributions from nitric oxide and inflammation. 25th Conference of the European Society for
Microcirculation, Budapest, Hungary, August 2008. [Poster]
Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, James ME, Bryner RW, Frisbee SJ. Microvascular adaptations to obesity and the
metabolic syndrome. 2008 American Physiologic Society Intersociety Meeting: The Integrative Biology of
Exercise V, Hilton Head, SC, September 2008. The Physiologist, December 2008. [Poster]
Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, James ME, Brock RW, Hollander JM, Frisbee SJ. Development of a predictive model for
negative microvascular outcomes in the metabolic syndrome. Federations for the American Societies of
Experimental Biology (FASEB) Annual Experimental Biology 2009 Meeting. New Orleans, LA, April 2009.
FASEB Journal. 2009;23:594.11. [Poster]
Stapleton PA, d’Audiffret AC, Frisbee SJ, Goodwill AG, James ME, Frisbee JC. Correlations between peripheral
vascular function, inflammation, and depression in human subjects. Federations for the American Societies
of Experimental Biology (FASEB) Annual Experimental Biology 2009 Meeting. New Orleans, LA, April 2009.
FASEB Journal. 2009;23:795.3. [Oral Presentation]
Studlar DT, Christensen K, Frisbee SJ. The impact of tobacco control polices in the EU: comparing old and new
member states. Proceedings from the European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International
Conference,
Los
Angeles,
CA,
April
2009.
Available
at:
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/studlar_07B.pdf. [Paper Presentation]
Mujuru P, Salana HK, Frisbee SJ. Does biomechanical body structures of weight in obese subjects impede
physiological breathing patterns? A cross-sectional study. 137th American Public Health Association Annual
Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, November 2009. [Oral Presentation, Section 5156.0 Epidemiology of Obesity]
Goodwill AG, Stapleton PA, Frisbee SJ, James ME, Frisbee JC. Increased vascular generation of thromboxane A2:
an initiating condition for microvascular rarefaction in obese Zucker rats? Federations for the American
Societies of Experimental Biology (FASEB) Annual Experimental Biology 2010 Meeting. Anaheim, CA, April
2010. FASEB J. 24: 774.19. [Poster]
Frisbee SJ, Studlar DT. Is U.S. tobacco control policy really bottom-up? Federal aid for local tobacco control
coalitions. American Political Science Association 2010 Annual Meeting and Exhibition. Washington, DC,
September 2010. [Poster]
Goodwill AG, Stapleton PA, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC. Obesity-induced increased vascular thromboxane A2
generation: an initiating stimulus for microvascular rarefaction? 9th World Congress for Microcirculation.
Paris, France, September 2010. [Poster]
Frisbee JC, Goodwill AG, Stapleton PA, Frisbee SJ, d’Audiffret AC. Aspirin resistance with genetic dyslipidemia:
th
contribution of vascular thromboxane generation. 9 World Congress for Microcirculation. Paris, France,
September 2010. [Poster] [Subsequently selected for featured oral presentation]

Manuscripts
Frisbee SJ, Frisbee WR. The demand for skiing among working two-adult households. Proceedings of the
Administrative Sciences Association of Canada. 1998.
Hennes H, Frisbee SJ, Paddon KJ, Walsh-Kelly CM. Current income profile for academic pediatric emergency
medicine faculty in the United States. Pediatric Emergency Care. 1999;15(5):350-354.
Frisbee SJ, Hennes H. Infant back carriers: A potential risk for injury. Injury Prevention. 2000;6:56-58.
Fedderly RT, Whitstone BN, Frisbee SJ, Tweddell JS, Litwin SB. Factors related to pleural effusions after the Fontan
procedure in the era of fenestration. Circulation. 2001;104(12 Suppl 1):I148-I151.
Frisbee SJ, Malloy ME, Meurer J, Kuhagen KA, Kini NM. Urban Wisconsin pediatric patients using an after-hours
telephone triage service: outcomes and compliance. Wisconsin Medical Journal. 2001;100(5):55-58.
Kini NM, Robbins JM, Kirschbaum MS, Frisbee SJ, Kotagal UR for the Child Health Accountability Initiative. Inpatient
care for uncomplicated bronchiolitis: comparison to Milliman and Robertson guidelines. Archives of
Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine. 2001;155(12):1323-1327.
Tweddell JS, Hoffman GM, Mussatto KA, Fedderly RT, Berger S, Jaquiss RDB, Ghanayem NS, Frisbee SJ, Litwin
SB. Improved survival of patients undergoing palliation of hypoplastic left heart syndrome: lessons learned
from 115 consecutive patients. Circulation. 2002 Sep 24;106(12 Suppl 1):I82-9.
Ghanayem NS, Hoffman GM, Mussatto KA, Cava JR, Frommelt PC, Rudd NA, Steltzer MM, Bevandic SM, Frisbee
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